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Allegations of Extortion
NEW MEXICO RESIDENCIAS OF THE MID-16oos

Rick Hendricks and Gerald Mandell

O

n 11 May 1646, in the mining town of ParraI in Nueva Vizcaya, Capt.
Juan de Heredia-armed with a power of attorney granted to him by
New Mexico governor Gen. Alonso Pacheco (1642-1644)-initiated a civil
lawsuit. I Heredia's formal complaint was directed against Pacheco's successor, Gov. Fernando de Arguello Carvajal (1644-1647):
Gen. Fernando de Arguello, utilizing the residencia process for his
own purposes, has committed serious extortions against Gen. Alonso
Pacheco and has seized the latter's property.... It has come to my
attention that there are presently five freight wagons from New Mexico
in the town of Parral, recently dispatched by General Arguello, which
contain all of the personal property and merchandise belonging to
General Pacheco, including seventeen Apache slaves of various ages
and both sexes. 2
Captain Heredia's assertion was hardly unique. The residencia process,
whereby the incoming New Mexico governor conducted an official review
of his predecessor's administration, was subject to repeated irregularities
during the 1600s. Between 1637 and 1671, governors in Santa Fe routinely
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manipulated provisions of the residencia system to wrest native trade goods
and other marketable property-including the occasional cache of silver
bullion-from their predecessors. J In this respect governmental traditions
within the province of New Mexico were consistent with those of New Spain
and, indeed, much of the Spanish Empire. Economic expediency, not infrequently abetted by greed, was the driving force behind this phenomenon.
The integrity of the residencia system was debated for decades. By the
1530S or a little later, the practice of naming the successor of the official
under examination as residencia judge had become generalized in the Indies,
as had criticism of the practice. Writing from Michoacan in September
1554, Licenciado (licentiate) Lorenzo Lebron de Quinones commented that
the residencias of corregidores (chief officers of a district, often the equivalent of governors) and alcaldes mayores (chief executive officers in a town or
district) in that region did not produce the effect of satisfying the grievances
of the citizenry because the incoming officials conducted the residencias
of the outgoing officials. This practice was roundly criticized by legal theorists on other grounds. Some argued that in order to gain the favor of powerful locals, the successors gave free rein to their vengeance on the former
officeholders. 4
A royal cedula issued 3 September 1565 was intended to be the general
rule regarding the selection of residencia judges. It provided that, for offices
filled upon the deliberation by the Council of the Indies, judges designated
by the president of the council would conduct the residencia. For offices
filled by viceroys, commissioned judges were to conduct the residencia. This
directive notwithstanding, the debate continued over what entity had the authority to name judges for offices filled by appointments made in the Indies. 5
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a change in orientation
occurred. Apparently criticism by different members of the administration
of the Indies had an effect. A royal cedula of 30 January 1618 indicated that
residencias were flawed when conducted by successors in office, who had
an interest in hiding the abuses that they might commit in the future. Another decree, dated 30 April 1618 and dispatched to the Viceroy of Peru,
expanded on these concepts and ordered that residencias of governors and
corregidores were to be carried out by special judges. To avoid the high
costs of sending such a judge from the capital, it was recommended that a
person free from suspicion and living in the region where the residencia
was being held be named to conduct the trial. Should no such person be
found there, one would be selected from a nearby community. A year later,
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when the viceroy was ordered to send a list of possible residencia judges, the
prohibition against naming successors was reiterated. 6
The same prohibition was sent to New Spain, but to very little effect,
judging from a letter from several of the judges of the Audiencia of Mexico
dated 10 January 1620. According to the judges, while providing for the
residencia of an alcalde mayor, one judge opined that it should not be conducted by the successor. The viceroy, the Marques de Guadalcazar, without permitting the other judges to comment, stated that this fellow was a
very poor judge, thus cowing the others. The residencia was assigned to the
successor; this was done with all the other residencias, which, in the view of
the letter writers, was the same as not having the residencia at all.
Three years later, in 1623, a royal cedula indirectly justified Guadalcazar
by attributing to the viceroy the authority to name the successors or other
"satisfactory people" as residencia judges of alcaldes mayores and jueces
repartidores (assessors).7 This practice prevailed in Santa Fe, where incoming governors normally served as residencia judges. 8 In a far-off, sparsely
populated province such as New Mexico (one hundred forty days by freight
convoy from Mexico City), the tradition promoted considerable administrative mischief.
Outgoing New Mexico governors-eager to leave the province with the.
departing mission caravan-were required to remain in Santa Fe until the
thirty-day residencia was completed. Citizens who had grievances against
the former governor, or who had not been paid for services rendered, could
apply for monetary compensation. Exaggerated claims against the outgoing
governor provided incoming officials with a convenient excuse to impound
the previous governor's assets. It was Arguello's contention, for example,
that legitimate claims worth thirty thousand pesos were filed during Pacheco's
residencia-a figure that must be considered implausible at best. At its noblest, the residencia provided a framework of justice for ordinary citizens,
but at its coarsest, in the hands of unscrupulous incoming governors, it was
little more than a racketeering device. Financial burdens-the purchase of
office, taxes, a"nd promissory notes signed in Mexico City and Parral in order to obtain supplies-incurred by newly appointed New Mexico governors were essential ingredients in administrative irregularities. Although
Crown officials in Mexico City understood that incoming New Mexico governors would likely use whatever means were at their disposal to recover
their expenses, outright theft and extortion were not altogether acceptable
solutions, especially when substantial assets were involved. 9 When outgoing
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New Mexico governors were the victims of egregious residencia fraud, appeals could be, and sometimes were, submitted to the viceroy and Audiencia
of Mexico.
The foundation for Pacheco's difficulties with Arguello had been established several years before, with the untimely death in 1641 of New Mexico
governor Juan Flores de Sierra y Valdes. Flores, who was a resident of San
Bartolome prior to 1641, had arrived in Santa Fe in April as the replacement
for Capt. Luis de Rosas, whose career in Santa Fe and violent death were
thoroughly investigated by historian France V. Scholes. Governor Flores's
surname was Asturian, and he may have been descended from the houses
of Miramontes or Caravallo, both based in Cangas de Tineo, Asturias. Flores
was one of several New Mexico governors with Asturian ancestry. Others
included Juan Manso (1656-1659) from Luarca and Juan de Miranda (16641665 and 1671-1675), who is described in documents as a councilman in
perpetuity of Tineo, Asturias. A few of Flores's descendants or other close
relatives had settled in Mexico City by midcentury.1O
Governor Rosas's term in office, which lasted from April 1637 until April
1641, was characterized by social conflict and political turmoil. Only months
after arriving in Santa Fe, he aroused the ire of the missionaries. The
Franciscans-the most powerful interest group in the province-had assumed that Rosas would utilize the residencia process to punish his predecessor, Francisco Martinez de Baeza (1635-1637), against whom the friars had
a number of grievances. Instead, Rosas saw to it that Baeza's residencia went
smoothly. It was later alleged that Rosas had accepted a bribe from Baeza,
which Scholes thought was entirely likely, "as bribery was not an uncommon
means of escaping a strict residencia."11 Although specific evidence is lacking,
language contained in Heredia's complaint against Arguello, which referred
to "serious extortions," suggests that the latter attempted to elicit a bribe from
Pacheco in exchange for an expedited residencia. 12
Offices great and small were routinely purchased in New Spain, and it is
possible that Rosas had purchased his governorship sometime prior to 1637.
Officially, governorships were never on the list of saleable offices and were
never sold at auction in the Indies, as were many other offices. Although it
was against the law to sell governorships, the practice persisted. During the
reign of Felipe IV (1621-1665) and to a greater extent that of Carlos II (16651700), a system developed whereby titles and grants were conferred after a
cash payment. The purchase of each title to a governorship was a separate
contractual arrangement between the Crown and the purchaser. The pay-
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ment was considered a merit earned with the Crown, and in this way the
appointment was legally justified. Still, the purchaser did not obtain ownership ofthe post, which continued to be subject to the rules governing length
of terms in office as established by law. Thus, some individuals, such as
audiencia judges and treasury officials, obtained a post practically for life;
but governors, corregidores, and alcaldes mayores held office for relatively
short termsY
Arguello reported that the governorship of New Mexico had cost him
nine thousand pesos, and there is evidence to suggest that Gov. Diego
Dionisio de Penalosa Briseno y Verdugo (1661-1664) offered a six-thousandpeso "gift" to the wife of Viceroy Juan de Leyva y de la Cerda to obtain his
position. 14 Penalosa's contribution for-the governorship was roughly equal to
the amount required to purchase the office of public scribe for the town of
Parral during the early 164os.15
Another factor that added to the financial burdens of incoming New
Mexico governors was the media anata. Enacted in 1631 as a revenueraising measure, the media anata imposed a 50 percent tax on the first year's
salary of newly appointed government officials, as well as a third of all other
financial perquisites relating to the position.16 The purchase of offices and
the media anata presented serious monetary obstacles for individuals such
as Rosas, Arguello, and Penalosa and contributed to abuse of the residencia
system in New Mexico. Paying upwards of five thousand pesos for a government post that provided an annual salary of only two thousand pesos over
three years made little sense, unless the officeholders could recover their
investments through outside activities. If Rosas had purchased his governorship, it might explain what the colonists perceived as his unusual preoccupation with commerce and manufacturing, a field in which he was exceeded
only by Gov. Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal (1659-1661).
Whatever his circumstances, Rosas introduced himself to the residents
of New Mexico as a tough, independent-minded administrator, who intended
to govern the province according to his own prerogatives and personal objectives. Chief among Rosas's personal goals was the pursuit of financial
gain, and he directed much of his energy toward that end. One of the few
avenues of financial advancement available to New Mexico governors was
the accumulation of skins and native commodities that could later be liquidated in Parral or Mexico City. Shortly after assuming office, Rosas stockpiled merchandise for delivery to his agents in Nueva Vizcaya. He required
Indians in several pueblos to weave shawls and other articles for him and
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also established a good-sized weaving shop in Santa Fe, where Indian workers manufactured inexpensive sackcloth and other products. By October
1638, Rosas had· already managed to organize a large shipment of buffalo
hides, buckskins, sackcloth, candles, and woven articles for delivery to Parra!'
Like most seventeenth-century New Mexico governors, Rosas generated
additional revenues marketing retail merchandise imported from New Spain.
It was this tendency of the New Mexico governors, born of financial necessity, to accumulate large quantities of commodities and trade goods that
greatly contributed to the perversion of the residencia system. Storehouses
of native goods left behind by a predecessor were tempting targets for new
governors to seize as their own. Several governors- Juan de Eulate (16181625), Rosas, Arguello, Juan de Samaniego y Jaca (1653-1656), Manso, Lopez
de Mendizabal and others-had the foresight to ship merchandise south
before their successors' arriva!.'7
Founded in 1631, approximately 250 leagues (750 miles) south of Santa
Fe, Parral was the most vigorous mining and commercial center in northern
New Spain. The great distance between Santa Fe and Parral was also a
factor in the abuse of the residencia system in New Mexico. Venal governors viewed the geographical gap as a kind of buffer zone, or cushion, for
their illicit activities. Rosas and other governors knew that once their native
trade goods had been transferred to Parral, they were probably safe from
their successors' prying eyes. By contrast, outgoing governors held captive
by protracted residencia proceedings in Santa Fe could do little to stop successors from raiding their assets and shipping them south for sale. This is
apparently what happened to Pacheco in the summer or fall of 1645. Governor Arguello seized his accumulated property with the intention of shipping it to Parral for prompt liquidation.
Rosas's aggressive commercial activities and pugnacious demeanor attracted the attention of the missionaries, who accumulated a long list of
complaints against the governor. Over time political factions arose in New
Mexico, and the potential for violence increased. Rosas's term as governor
came to an end on 13 April 1641, with the arrival of his replacement as governor, Sargento Mayor Juan Flores de Sierra y Valdes. One of Flores's most
pressing assignments after assuming office was conducting Rosas's residencia.
On 5 July 1641, Capt. Francisco de Salazar, a leader of the anti-Rosas faction, presented a petition against the ex-governor that contained more than
sixty claims. Before Rosas's residencia could be completed, Governor Flores
died. This occurred in the summer or early fall of 1641, only four to six
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months into the governor's three-year term. Messengers were immediately
dispatched to Mexico City. At the time of Flores's death, the viceroy of New
Spain was Diego L6pez Pacheco Cabrera y Bobadilla, Duque de Escalona
y Marques de Villena (1640-1642). News of Flores's demise probably reached
the viceroy by late fall of 1641. Since the gravity of the situation was obvious,
the Marques de Villena wasted little time in naming a replacement. His
selection for this urgent undertaking was Capt. Alonso Pacheco de Heredia.
Although Pacheco's genealogy remains uncertain, there is evidence that
strongly suggests he may have been a native of Nueva Vizcaya, very likely
the grandson of Capt. Alonso Pacheco, who selected the location for the
city of Durango in April 1563.18 One indication of Alonso Pacheco de
Heredia's relationship to the earlier Alonso Pacheco comes from a 1595 legal proceeding in Durango. In that year, Alonso Pacheco buried his wife,
Ana de Leyva, in the parish church. Leyva's son-in-law, Juan de Heredia,
was offended by the distance between the burial site and the high altar. It
seems possible, therefore, that Gov. Alonso Pacheco de Heredia (1642-1644)
was the son of Juan de Heredia and his wife, and that he reversed his surnames in honor of his more illustrious grandfather-one of the founders of
the city of Durango. 19 Subsequent records demonstrate how closely the
Heredias and Pachecos were interwoven.
Prior to his appointment as governor of New Mexico in 1641-1642, Pacheco
signed a financing agreement at San Juan del Rio in the early 163os, and by
1638 he had become an alcalde ordinario in the city of Durango. 2o From
time to time, he made appearances in Parra\. In October 1637, Alonso witnessed the marriage of Eufracia Pacheco and Ayudante (later Captain) Juan
de Heredia. 21 Father Juan de Heredia, a Jesuit and brother of the bride, conducted the service. The groom, Juan de Heredia, whom Alonso characterized as his "brother" in a power of attorney executed in Durango in 1638,
acted as Pacheco's legal representative in May 1646.22
Pacheco had associations with various Parral merchants, including Capt.
Domingo Gonzalez, a Portuguese native of Tangier, North Mrica. According to Gonzalez's 1642 will, Pacheco had borrowed 104 pesos and deposited
"a gold ring with white stones of little value" as security for the loan. The
account was still unsettled at the time of Gonzalez's death. 23
Another resident of Nueva Vizcaya whom Pacheco characterized as his
brother was Capt. Pedro de Zubia Pacheco, a farmer and encomendero at
San Bartolome. Pedro, born 1617 in Durango, declared that he was the son
of Capt. Juan de Zubia Pacheco and Leonor Martinez. In September 1635,
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when he was around eighteen years of age, Pedro Pacheco asked Gov. Luis
de Monsalve y Saavedra to grant him the encomienda of the pueblo of
Otenapa, which had previously been in the possession of his brother, Juan
de Heredia, the Jesuit priest. 24
Capt. Pedro de Zubia Pacheco became provincial judge of the rural constabulary and cattle-growers' association in the Santa Barbara province. 25
Despite his elevated political status, he was jailed on several occasions for
violent outbursts. In October 1651, he was charged with shoving a priest at
San Bartolome, and in 1660 he threatened to kill a man. Years later, in June
1674, Pedro de Zubia was incarcerated for assaulting a group of his
encomienda Indians with a club. 26 After confessing to the crime, he was
fined 150 pesos, assessed court costs, and ordered to pay his encomienda
Indians at least two reales per day, over and above the customary food allotments. Another of Pedro de Zubia's brothers was Lucas de Zubia Pacheco,
who had business dealings with Alonso in 1642 and supervised the military
escort for the 1643-1644 mission supply caravan to New Mexico. Pedro's
first cousin was Juan de Zubia Pacheco, a native of New Mexico and the
son of Capt. Diego de Zubia, Gov. Juan de Onate's purveyor general. 27
In the final analysis, the viceroy's appointment of Capt. Alonso Pacheco
as governor of New Mexico in the winter of 1641-1642 was most appropriate:
Pacheco appears to have been a native norteiio (northerner), was familiar
with the northern climate and geography, had considerable experience in
military and governmental affairs, had served as alcalde ordinario in the city
of Durango, was probably in the prime of his life, had numerous family ties
in Durango and Parral, and apparently had friends and relatives with connections to the provinces of New Mexico.
Governor Pacheco's entourage left Mexico City around February or
March 1642 bound for Santa Fe. At the time of his departure, Pacheco had
no way ofknowing that the former governor, Luis de Rosas, had been murdered in Santa Fe by Nicolas Ortiz on the night of 25 January. The convoy
had reached Parral by early May. In Parral, Pacheco discovered that one of.
his future alcaldes mayores, Juan RamIrez de Salazar, a former member of
the anti-Rosas faction, had been jailed by local officials. 28 After Ortiz's acquittal of murder charges in Santa Fe, the Parral authorities had apparently
set up a dragnet in Nueva Vizcaya in order to apprehend the perpetrator. It
seems that RamIrez and his Indian servant, Crist6bal Duran y Chaves, were
suspected of attempting to warn Ortiz of his impending arrest, and consequently were arrested. Whatever the case, in May 1642 Governor Pacheco
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insisted that Ramirez be released, stating that the latter was a paid soldier
operating under Pacheco's royal standard. Having little choice in the matter, the alcalde mayor of Parral, Gen. Melchor de Valdes, complied with
Pacheco's demand 29 As a provincial governor, Pacheco was subject only to
the authority of the viceroy and audiencia.
Because of Ortiz's trial and related matters, it seems that Pacheco remained in Parral for four months, from early May until mid-September

1642. Perhaps as a measure to raise funds for his stay, Pacheco and his brother,
Capt. Lucas de Zubia, sold a twenty-year-old Black slave for four hundred
pesos to a local churchman. JO The following month, Pacheco's other brother,
Capt. Pedro de Zubia, sold some houses he owned in nearby San Diego for
five hundred pesos. Jl Since the death sentence against Ortiz was handed
down on 12 September, it appears that Pacheco finally left Parral around
mid-September. J2 The journey from Parral to central New Mexico normally
took sixty days by coach or wagon; but Pacheco, traveling without the burden of the mission supply caravan, which was not scheduled to return until

1644, arrived in Santa Fe during the first week of November 1642. During
Pacheco's stay in Parral-on 9 June 1642- Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, the
Bishop ofPuebla, replaced the Marques de Villena as viceroy of New Spain.
Once Pacheco had taken up residence in Santa Fe, he set about investigating all of the events that had occurred in New Mexico subsequent to
Rosas's arrival in 1637, with particular attention paid to the specifics of Rosas's
death in January 1642. Pacheco was authorized by formal decree to grant
pardons ifhe saw fit. He also possessed secret instructions from the audiencia
empowering him to rid the province of seditious elements if necessary, "by
a brief and exemplary punishment."JJ The clerical, anti-Rosas faction expressed concern that the governor was relying primarily upon the testimony
of pro-Rosas witnesses to make his decision. Nevertheless, by mid-July
Pacheco had identified the guilty parties and ordered the beheading of eight
captains in the town square on 21 July 1643: Antonio Baca, Francisco de
Salazar, Cristobal Enriquez, Juan de Archuleta, Diego Marquez, Diego
Martin Barba, Nicolas Perez, and Juan Ruiz de Hinojos. As a means of
promoting quietude in the province, Pacheco appointed several other antiRosas leaders alcaldes mayores in various districts, including Juan Ramirez
de Salazar.
After the executions, Pacheco sent long reports to Mexico City, wherein
he provided a history of the civil conflict in New Mexico. Despite Pacheco's
perception that peace and harmony were at hand, it was not long before
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familiar complaints arose against the governor. A month before the executions, Custodian Hernando Covarrubias, had written the viceroy a long letter that suggested that, however traumatic the events of the previous months
had been, Pacheco had overstepped his authority. Covarrubias accused
Governor Pacheco of exaggerating the political turmoil in New Mexico,
appointing alcaldes mayores to serve in areas occupied only by Indians,
commandeering horses and mules belonging to citizens and friars without
offering just compensation, acquiring the property of deceased New Mexicans at reduced prices, proposing to apply the encomienda system on a percapita basis (as opposed to the traditional per-household formula), behaving
inappropriately at public gatherings, and revoking and re-granting several
important encomiendas in order to obtain the revenues for himself. Thus,
Pacheco, like so many other New Mexico governors of his era, was accused
of malfeasance in office.
Allegations ofthis sort, whether they were valid or not, provided residencia
judges with a convenient excuse for seizing the outgoing governors' assets.
This appears to have been the case with Pacheco. Some of the commandeered horses mentioned in Covarrubias's letter ultimately came into the
possession of Arguello, who had them driven to Parral for sale. Pacheco had
taken the horses from the citizens for questionable purposes, and Arguello
stole them from Pacheco.
By September 1643 relations between Pacheco and the missionaries had
deteriorated even further; the governor considered Custodian Covarrubias
"the most arrogant friar in the world" and told him SO.J4 To make matters
worse, relatives of some of the captains beheaded in July filed suit against
Pacheco, seeking restitution for the surviving families of those who were
executed. In addition to his governmental activities, Pacheco evidently spent
a portion of his time acquiring a hoard of native goods, which he intended
to liquidate in Parral in 1645. By the summer of 1644, Pacheco was also
awaiting the arrival of his replacement.
Another viceroy--..,.the third in Pacheco's two-year term-had taken office on 23 November 1642. The new official, Garda Sarmiento de Sotomayor,
Conde de Salvatierra, selected Capt. Fernando de Arguello Carvajal as
Pacheco's successor. Arguello's appointment may have come in the late summer or fall of 1643, about the time the New Mexico mission supply caravan
was preparing to make its 1644 journey north. Sometime prior to 1643,
Arguello had served as presidio captain of Sinaloa. J5 Individuals who held
this office occasionally used the title "governor."J6 He may have followed a
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relative, Capt. Leonardo de Arguello, who was alcalde mayor of Sinaloa as
early as 1631 and an alcalde ordinario of Durango in 164°.37
Documents that bear his name or handsome signature. always refer to
"don" Fernando de Arguello CarvajaL presumably in deference to his distinguished ancestry and superior social connections. Fernando, whose proper
surname was Arguello Carvajal y Arguello Carvajal, was the brother ofInigo
and Jose de Arguello Carvajal y Arguello Carvajal. The brothers were born
in Badajoz, Spain, to Lorenzo de Arguello Carvajal and Catalina de Arguello
Carvajal. As the first born, Inigo inherited the family's entailed estate. He
and his brother, Fernando, received minor orders and appeared headed for
ecclesiastical lives, but for some unknown reason they abandoned their careers in the Church. Inigo became a distinguished author in Spain. In written works he referred to his brother, Fernando, as the "Govemor of Sinaloa."
Their sibling, Jose de Arguello Carvajal, became a knight of the Order of
San Juan. 38 Licenciado Inigo de Arguello Carvajal, Knight of Calatrava and
a judge at the Audiencia of Mexico, was apparently another relative. 39
In February 1643 Fernarido became involved in an ugly confrontationcomplete with shouting, arm-waving, arid the destruction of documentswith officials of the Holy Office of the Inquisition. 40 He had leased a farm
from the Holy Office, which had once been owned by the Portuguese merchant Simon Vaez Sevilla. Following accusations of religious improprieties,
the Holy Office confiscated property worth 116,399 pesos from Vaez Sevilla,
including the farm it later leased to Arguello, who referred to the property
as a "ranchuelo," a derogatory reference to its humble character. Since
Arguello neglected, or refused, to post a bond for the rental agreement,
officials of the Holy Office attempted to arrest him, at which time Arguello
became irate. A heated argument erupted. Arguello tore the arrest warrant
into little pieces and declared, while shaking his head vigorously, that
the Holy Office had no authority over him. The case was tumed over to the
Tribunal of the Holy Office, but the outcome is unknown. Whatever the actions taken against Arguello, they did not prevent him from assuming the
governorship in 1644. This incident reveals something about Arguello's
personality-a kind of stubborn arrogance that did not bode well for the
citizens of New Mexico in general, or for Alonso Pacheco in particular.
Arguello obviously had friends and relatives in high places, possibly in the
Holy Office itself. A man who had successfully thumbed his nose at the
Inquisition would likely have few reservations when it came to intimidating
the outgoing governor in Santa Fe.
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The New Mexico mission supply caravan, under the administration of
fray Tomas Manso, departed Mexico City in early 1644 without Arguello,
who was apparently not yet prepared for his transfer to Santa Fe. Arguello's
whereabouts in the spring oh644 are unknown. An escort of fourteen soldiers accompanied the supply wagons, including Diego de Guadalajara
(whom Arguello subsequently imprisoned in New Mexico), Francisco
Dominguez, Pedro de Montoya, Alonso Garda, Juan de Mondragon, and
nine others. The commander of the soldier escort was Governor Pacheco's
brother, Lucas de Zubia. 41 According to Scholes, the caravan arrived in New
Mexico around July 1644, at which time Arguello was still preparing to leave
Mexico City. This was bad news for Pacheco, who was eager to depart Santa
Fe in the autumn of 1644.
Since the mission supply wagons were the property of the Crown, several
New Mexico governors concluded that they were entitled to use the empty
wagons (which returned south in the fall after making their deliveries) to
transport Apache slaves, buffalo hides, skins, pinones, woven articles, and
other native merchandise to Parral or Mexico City. The sticking point in
this scenario was the residencia process, which had to be completed prior to
the outgoing governor's departure. By the fall of 1644, when the supply caravan was preparing to head south, Arguello had not yet arrived in Santa Fe,
and, thus, Pacheco's residencia would be delayed for months. He was essentiallya prisoner in New Mexico. Despite his apparent resourcefulness and
inclination to act upon pressing issues, he had not had the opportunity or
wherewithal to ship his stockpile of trade goods south in the summer or fall
of 1644. Consequently, they would be subject to seizure during the residencia
proceeding if Governor Arguello made a concerted effort to do so.
Governor Arguello, journeying north to Santa Fe as the mission caravan
was heading south, stopped in Parral in late October 1644. On 24 October
he acted as godfather at a local baptism. The parents of the infant were Juan
Nunez de Bonifacio and Felipa de Esloimanse, about whom little is known.
Several days later Arguello recorded an important loan agreement. In this
transaction, he borrowed nine hundred pesos from Valerio Cortes del Rey,
the town assayer, and deposited two of his slaves, a husband and wife, as
security for the loan. 42 Arguello's guarantor was Maestre de Campo Francisco Montano de la Cueva, a Parral miner who had served as governor of
Nueva Vizcaya in 1638. Terms of the promissory note specified that Cortes
was to be repaid by the last day of August 1645. This nine-hundred-peso
obligation, in combination with whatever sum Arguello had invested to se-
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cure his post as governor, may have served as a powerful incentive for seizing Pacheco's trade goods and Apache slaves in 1645.
If Arguello's convoy departed Parral in late October or the first week of
November, he may have arrived in Santa Fe near the end of December
1644. As was generally the case, Arguello's first important duty was to conduct the residencia of his predecessor, Alonso Pacheco. Dates for this event,
which may have been in the spring of 1645, are not available. Evidence
taken from the 1646 civil proceeding in Parral indicates that Pacheco was
still in possession of his property on 28 May 1645, at which time he signed a
power of attorney in Santa FeY This legal instrument directed his agents in
Nueva Vizcaya to receive any and all merchandise, including Indian slaves
and livestock, which Pacheco might ship south. The agents named in the
document were Capt. Francisco de Suasti, Baltasar de Ontiveros, Capt. Juan
de Heredia (the husband of Eufracia Pacheco), and Pacheco's brothers, Pedro
and Diego de Zubia Pacheco of San Bartolome. If Governor Arguello impounded Pacheco's Apaches, livestock, and other merchandise, which he
apparently did, this must have occurred in the early summer of 1645, before
Pacheco had an opportunity to consolidate his assets and direct them south
to his agents.
.
Although Pacheco remained in New Mexico until the end of Arguello's
term in 1647, his legal representatives were busy in Parral, where Capt. Juan
de Heredia filed a formal complaint against Arguello in May 1646. The civil
proceeding that followed, which was characterized by the presiding judge,
Gov. Luis de Valdes, as a causa (lawsuit), lasted from 11 May until 30 June
1646. It appears that' paperwork pertaining to the case had also been sent to
the viceroy's attorneys in Mexico City.
In his opening statement, Heredia explained that five wagon loads of
merchandise and seventeen Apache slaves belonging to Pacheco had been
dispatched to Parral by Arguello. It was revealeg in subsequent testimony
that several reposteros (draperies) bearing Pacheco's coat of arms were also
among the items shipped to Parral. These articles, and a modest herd of
mules and horses, had been illegally seized by Arguello during or after the
residencia proceeding. Heredia and Pacheco's other legal representative in
Parral, Capt. Pedro de Zubia, wanted the property embargoed by authorities and returned to Pacheco. Arguello's attorney in Parral was Maestre de
Campo Bernardo de Arrasola y Corral. A week into the proceeding, Gover_nor Valdes placed a hold on Pacheco's property and on monies derived
.
from the sale of same.
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Attorney Arrasola responded to Heredia's allegations by stating that claims
worth thirty thousand pesos had been submitted against Pacheco during the
residencia, and the seized property would be liquidated in order to satisfy
those demands. During his residencia in 1661, Gov. L6pez de Mendizabal
had more than eighty claims filed against him, and the total value of the
demandas (claims) submitted amounted to less than three thousand pesos. 44
In and of itself, Arguello's assertion that Pacheco's property had been confiscated in order to satisfy thirty thousand pesos in claims against him was
evidence of malfeasance. Either the governor had conspired with colonists
to manufacture claims against Pacheco, or he simply lied about the number
of objections in order to justify his behavior to the authorities in Parra!'
Pacheco's extravagant actions as governor, such as the seizure of mules and
horses, the decapitations of 1643, and his hostility toward certain missionaries, would surely have stimulated numerous petitions during the residencia
proceeding. Even so, the total value of legitimate demands against Pacheco
could only have been a fraction of thirty thousand pesos.
Through his representatives, Pacheco made exaggerated statements of
his own during the proceeding. It was alleged, for example, that Arguello
had despoiled his predecessor of merchandise worth sixteen to seventeen
thousand pesos: woven shawls and wall hangings, decorated elk skins, buffalo hides, pinones, and seventeen Apache slaves. Their claim was dubious.
Apache slaves of various ages were worth, at most, about one hundred pesos
apiece in Parral-not more than seventeen hundred pesos tota!.45 A more
reasonable figure may have been 850 to 1,000 pesos. Raw pinones, valued at
ten pesos per fanega wholesale in Mexico City, were worth only about two
hundred pesos per ton. 46 Likewise, shawls, skins, and buffalo hides were not
articles of great value, unless marketed by the hundreds or thousands. Hence,
Pacheco's estimate seems to have been inflated. The actual value of goods
seized by Arguello and transferred to Parral may have been five thousand
pesos or less, which was still a substantial sum, given the fact that New
Mexico governors earned only two thousand pesos annually.
Another interesting feature of Pacheco's complaint against Arguello pertained to the seizure and sale of equine stock. It was alleged that Sgt. Francisco de Ortega-a mulatto native of Zacatecas and one ofArguello's political
servants-had driven 166 mules and horses to Parral, some of which bore
Pacheco's brandY Pacheco suspected that these animals had been sold in
Parral for Arguello's account, but the governor's attorney insisted that, like
all the other merchandise, they had been liquidated at public auction to
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satisfy the demands of Pacheco's residencia. The mules and horses mentioned in the lawsuit mayhave been some of those requisitioned by Pacheco
in 1642-1643, for which the colonists and friars had not been given just compensation. It was propably Pacheco's plan all along to acquire, by whatever
means necessary, as much livestock and native merchandise as possible before the autumn of 1644, in order to ship them to Parral at the end of his
term. His power of attorney in late May 1645 specified that livestock might
be among the items sent to his agents in Nueva Vizcaya. 48
For his part, Arrasola emphasized the following legal points. First,
Pacheco's lawsuit was frivolous. He had been accorded due process by
Arguello in Santa Fe, and his property had been liquidated at public auction in order to satisfy the numerous claims made during his residencia.
Second, Governor Valdes was not qualified to decide the issue, and only the
viceroy had the authority to resolve such matters. 49 In the end Valdes agreed
with Arrasola's argument. Thus, on 25 June 1646, Valdes ruled that he was
not a proper judge in the lawsuit. He referred the case to a competent official of Capt. Pedro de Zubia's choosing and ordered the latter to pay court
costs. The governor's decision effectively disencumbered the merchandise
in Arrasola's possession and allowed him to proceed with Arguello's instructions regarding its disposal. Francisco Montano de la Cueva, financial guarantor for Arguello and Arrasola, was also freed from his legal obligations.
Pacheco's legal maneuver in Parral was doomed from the outset. Governors had enormous power within their own geographical districts, but their
authority did not extend to other provinces. Asking a provincial governor, in
this case Valdes, to settle an argument between two other provincial gover-'
nors was an administrative and judicial impossibility. A higher authority was
required-a directive from Mexico City-and documentation was essential. Valdes's ruling on 25 June reiterated the opinion he expressed in the
Nicolas Ortiz proceeding of 1642: The province of New Mexico and controversies arising therein were "subject and subordinate" to the viceroy.5o
The outcome of the Pacheco-Arguello dispute is unknown. Pacheco may
have pursued his appeal to the Conde de Salvatierra. In order to evaluate
Pacheco's claim, it would have been imperative for the fiscal (the viceroy's
investigative attorney) to compare Pacheco's residencia accounts to the testimony given in the Parral proceeding. The fiscal, Dr. Pedro Melian or one
of his colleagues, would have had to determine whether Arguello confiscated and liquidated more of Pacheco's property than was absolutely necessary to satisfy the residencia claims. 51 If the fiscal concluded that the value of
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the goods contained in Pacheco's five freight wagons, along with the Apache
slaves and 166 mules and horses, exceeded the value of legitimate claims,
he would have written a legal opinion reflecting that determination. The
viceroy's decision, had he arrived at one, would have been based largely
upon the fiscal's recommendation. Since a detailed inventory of the merchandise shipped to Parral did not become part of the court record, the
fiscal may have requested and obtained such an accounting from Bernardo
de Arrasola. Whatever the case, the evidence was long gone. After the proceeding concluded on 30 June 1646, the remainder of Pacheco's trade goods
and Apache slaves were apparently absorbed by the Parral economy.
Pacheco and Arguello remained in New Mexico until 1647, pending the
arrival of Arguello's replacement, Luis de Guzman y Figueroa (1647-1649).
According to custom, Governor Guzman stopped in Parral in February 1647,
where he granted powers of attorney to Asturian merchant Fernando de
Valdes Llanos and his nephew, Julian de Valdes. Guzman likely had administrative difficulties in Santa Fe, for Scholes wrote, "Against Guzman y
Figueroa such serious charges were brought that he had left New Mexico
before his term of office was ended."52 Governor Guzman's successor was
Gen. Hernando de Ugarte y la Concha (1649-1653), a native of Fuenterrabfa
in the Basque provinces and one of the few New Mexico governors of his
era around whom controversy did not continuously swirJ.53
When Pacheco and Arguello finally left Santa Fe in the autumn of 1647,
as Scholes explained, "one of them [was] in custody for having sold
[gun]powder belonging to the Crown, [and] the other [was] free because of
bribes he had given."34 Since Pacheco apparently spent the winter of 16471648 in Parral, Arguello must have been the official under investigation.
Presumably bound for Mexico City, Pacheco left Parral in early March

1648 with the wagons of Capt. Andres Lopez de Gracia, a New Mexico-based
freighter and sheep rancher. 55 Before departing, Pacheco granted a power of
attorney to his brother, Capt. Pedro de Zubia Pacheco, and to Bachiller (university graduate) Juan del Candano, the holder of an ecclesiastical benefice
in ParraP6 By 1649 Pacheco's former tormentor, Fernando de Arguello Carvajal,
had returned to Mexico City, where he sold an Angolan slave to a young man
named Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal."
The Pacheco-Arguello controversy of 1645-1646 and other such incidents
raise questions about the efficacy of the residencia system in New Mexico.
Scholes concluded:
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In all parts of the Indies, the residencia provided an opportunity for
disgruntled individuals, unsuccessful applicants for office, and restless,
discontented spirits to attack the honor and character of officials whose
terms of office had come to an end. Moreover, if an official attacked or
infringed upon local vested interests, he was certain to be submitted to
a torrent of abuses and complaints during his residencia. 58
The most powerful "local vested interests" in New Mexico during the mid1600s were the Franciscan missionaries and the provincialencomenderos.
Although Scholes's observations may have been somewhat overstated, serious irregularities during the residencia proceedings were fairly common in
Santa Fe, particularly between 1637 and 1671.

In addition to the routine practice of purchasing offices, there were several other factors that may have played a role in the abuse of the residencia
system in New Mexico. Prior to the founding of ParraI in 1631, New Mexico
governors who wished to liquidate generos de la tierra (skins, pinones, and
woven goods) had to seek markets for those articles in places like San
Bartolome, Zacatecas, and Mexico City. The rise of ParraI as a commercial
center during the 1630S made it much easier for New Mexico governors to
engineer mercantile schemes and market commodities.
Beginning around 1635, virtually every incoming New Mexico governor
stopped in Parral on his journey north to Santa Fe. During a governor's days
or weeks in Parral, he appointed business agents whose job it was to receive,
liquidate, or transship any and all native merchandise the governor might
send south during his term. 59 It might be argued that the financial services
available in Parral contributed to the governors' desire and ability to accumulate native trade goods. As illustrated by the Pacheco-Argiiello dispute,
stockpiles of merchandise proved to be irresistible targets for unscrupulous
residencia judges. Parral's geographical location facilitated trade between
New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya, and also provided several governors with
better access to markets for their misappropriated merchandise.
The vast distance between Santa Fe and Parral, more than seven hundred miles, was also a factor in residencia abuse during the mid-1600s. For
governors such as Rosas, Argiiello, Ugarte, Samaniego, Manso, and others
who shipped Apache slaves and other components of their merchandise
south before the arrival of their successors, the distance between Santa Fe
and Parral served as insurance against illegal seizure. By 1655 Samaniego's
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buckskins were in the possession of his Parral business agent and were sure
to be safely transshipped to Mexico City.60
Unscrupulous governors, on the other hand, viewed the great open space
between Santa Fe and Parral as a kind of buffer zone for their illicit practices. The incoming governors, acting as residencia judges, knew full well
that the officials under review were required to rem.ain in Santa Fe until the
residencia process had been completed. A long delay in the proceedings
furthered the economic self-interest of certain judges. Several New Mexico
governors, including Pacheco, were effectively held captive in this manner.
This aspect of the residencia process, however reasonable, was the means
by which incoming governors such as Arguello separated their predecessors
from the hoards of property they had accumulated. Attempted extortion was
common, in fact, and Arguello probably sought to secure a bribe from
Pacheco prior to impounding his property and shipping it to Parra!' Rosas
mayor may not have obtained a bribe from Baeza in 1637. Lopez de
Mendizabal successfully delayed Manso's departure in 1659. He attempted
to extract a four thousand-peso bribe from the former governor, but had to
settle for one hundred marks ofsilver (worth 750 to 800 pesos), fifteen Apache
slaves, a quantity of iron, and some grain. In keeping with New Mexico
tradition, Lopez de Mendizabal was also the victim of attempted extortion
by Pefialosa in the fall of 1661. 61
Gov. Juan de Miranda (1664-1665 and 1671-1675) attempted to use geographical distance as a cushion for his illicit activities in the early 1670s.
Miranda's predecessor, Juan Rodriguez de Medrano y Mesia (1668-1671),
had arrived in Santa Fe in January 1669, bringing with him four wagon
loads of retail merchandise from Mexico City. Between 1669 and 1671, despite a lingering drought and Apache raids, Medrano conducted extensive
trade between Santa Fe and the mining towns of Sonora. By the end of his
term, Medrano had accumulated a substantial stockpile of valuables, including 350 marks of untaxed Sonora silver, 6 cloaks, and 6 lengths of black
Flemish lace, the total value of which was just over 3,100 pesos. Medrano's
replacement, Miranda, assumed office on 21 July 1671 and immediately set
about identifying and locating his predecessor's property. The most tempting prize was the aforementioned silver and fabric. In the autumn of 1671,
following Medrano's residencia, Miranda's agents forcibly seized the hoard
of goods that Medrano had stored in a bull-hide trunk. Francisco Javier,
Miranda's secretary who claimed to be partially paralyzed and could scarcely
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lift so much as a pound, was an active participant in this scheme. Medrano's
reaction was to call Miranda, among other things, "a prodigious thief."62
Miranda transferred Medrano's silver to the casas reales (government
headquarters). A year later, in the winter of 1672, the new governor shipped
a portion of this contraband to fray Juan de Talaban at the convento in El
Paso (said to be within the jurisdiction of Nueva Vizcaya) for safekeeping.
Hidden within a trunk, wrapped with white elk skin and stamped with
Miranda's personal brand, were 101 marks of silver, 1 cloak, and 2 pieces of
fine lace. Unfortunately for Miranda, Medrano, traveling south to Parral,
was also aboard the convoy. At or near Dona Ana north ofEl Paso, Medrano
discovered and seized his silver and lace. Upon reaching Parral in April
1673, Medrano produced detailed written statements condemning the conduct of Miranda, who wa.s still in possession of 249 marks of silver, 5 cloaks,
and 4 lengths oflace. Medrano formally demanded restitution from Miranda
and declared that he would go before the viceroy and real acuerdo to request thirty thousand pesos in compensation for his loss and suffering. 63 On
9 May the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, Jose Garda de Salcedo (1671-1674),
declared that he was not an appropriate judge in this controversy.
The outcome of the case is not known. Miranda was still in Santa Fe;
time and distance were on his side. If confronted with allegations of theft,
Miranda would have argued that he had seized Medrano's property in order
to satisfy claims made against the former governor during his reside~cia
proceeding. It is clear, however, that Miranda intended to retrieve the silver
and other merchandise he had sent to Talaban when he departed the province in 1675. In all likelihood, Miranda settled residencia demands with
part of Medrano's property and simply kept the rest for himself. Despite
Miranda's suspicious behavior-smuggling untaxed silver to an unwitting
priest at El Paso-Medrano's case may have been complicated by the fact
that one of Miranda's close ass09iates in Mexico City was Licenciado Diego
de Borja Barco, a relator with the audiencia. 64
Poverty was an endemic factor in administrative misconduct in New
Mexico. Whether legitimate or fraudulent, each governor's commercial
activities provided economic opportunities for dozens of New Mexico residents, including Pueblo Indians. More than eighty claims (some possibly
manufactured) were filed against Lopez de Mendizabal during his residencia
in 1661, many of which were demands for unpaid wages. In order to accomplish their financial goals, all governors were required to pay for services,
including errands. Francisco de Ortega's trip to Parral with the herd of horses
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probably brought him at least one hundred pesos; the wranglers who accompanied Ortega were paid additional amounts. What mattered most to
Ortega and his assistants was the opportunity to earn specie, and they left
the legal justification for their journey to Arguello. On 17 May 1646, six days
after the Pacheco-Arguello suit began in Parral, Ortega delivered three hundred pesos to Francisco Domfnguez, who agreed to deliver a sealed letter
regarding the Diego de Guadalajara case to the viceroy in Mexico City.6) In
a cash-poor province such as New Mexico, paid journeys to Parral and
Mexico City amounted to economic development, and New Mexicans with
experience in political affairs had a vested interest in keeping the governors
active in commerce-whatever kept the economic stimulus package intact.
Poverty and fabricated residencia claims went hand in hand. After negotiations for a bribe with Juan Manso failed in 1659, Governor Lopez de
Mendizabal "summoned [witnesses] from all parts of the province, some
under penalty of heavy fines, and special favor was manifested toward those
who testified against the ex-governor."66 The poorest colonists were particularly susceptible to this type of economic pressure.
Events such as these paint an unflattering portrait of seventeenth-century
governors, particularly those who served between 1635 and 1675, such as
Baeza, Rosas, Pacheco, Arguello, Guzman, Manso (to a limited degree),
Lopez de Mendizabal, Pefialosa, and Miranda. In a letter to the king dated

23 October 1647, fray Andres Juarez, senior friar in New Mexico, wrote some
harsh words regarding the quality of provincial governors prior to that date.
Two of the worst, according to Juarez, had been Pacheco and Arguello.
They had been a curse upon the province, "cheating these poor natives and
Spaniards."67 If the governors were flawed, then so was the selection process.
As noted, one of the important ingredients in this drama of imperfection
was the purchase of offices. In the end, it was the citizens of the provinceand Pacheco-who reimbursed Arguello for the nine thousand pesos he
had invested in the governorship.
Most seventeenth-century governors, some of them Europeans, considered their tour of duty in Santa Fe a personal hardship. There was 'little
status associated with the position. As one individual remarked, the governor of New Mexico was"captain general of fifty men, [comprised] of the
dregs of the earth, mestizos, mulattoes, and foreigners."68 Moreover, the faraway province of New Mexico was notoriously devoid of amenities. It was
a poor, inhospitable region, with few commercial opportunities, and no
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silver-mining bonanzas. A handful of New Mexico-based traders made regular trips to Parral, but their activities were limited by the small local market.
Sheepraising was the major industry, the largest flocks being in the hands of
the missionaries; and the weather in Santa Fe was much harsher than communities farther south, in Nueva Vizcaya and Nueva Galicia. Compared to
the mining town of Parral, where two-thirds of the men of property were
Europeans, Santa Fe was little more than a dusty colonial outpost.
Diego de Peflalosa, a native of Peru and governor of New Mexico between 1661 and 1664, developed a poetic loathing for Santa Fe after only a
year in office. His unethical behavior in the fall of 1661 during the residencia
of his predecessor, Lopez de Mendizabal, was reflective of this unmitigated
contempt. In a note dated 2 October 1662 to Capt. Pedro Francisco de
. Sartillon, a resident of Sonora, Peflalosa begged, "Someone come and get
me out of this [miserable] Algeria of New Mexico!"69 Peflalosa had grown
disillusioned with Santa Fe and longed for an escape.
Two months earlier, the governor had written an extraordinary letter to
Juana de Armendariz of Mexico City, thanking herfor some subtle, but very
effective, lobbying she had done on his behalf, possibly having to do with
his predecessor's residencia:
Your grace triumphs so gloriously! You impel, with your superior
cleverness, my censured decree and revise, with marvelous style, the
art of innuendo, excusing neither the privileges of government nor the
oversights of the governor, lying entombed in the expansive lands of
this other world 70
Indeed, for many of the men who served as governors in Santa Fe, New
Mexico was very much like another world and far different than any place
they had ever lived. Still, the system of government in New Spain bestowed
great power upon these individuals, some of whom exploited their prerogatives to the fullest. During the mid-16oos at least six New Mexico governors
appealed residencia findings and administrative abuses to Mexico City: Pacheco,
Manso, Lopez de Mendizabal, Peiialosa, Miranda, and Medrano. The audiencia
ruled in the Manso, Lopez de Mendizabal, Peflalosa, and Miranda affairs,
but the outcomes of the Pacheco-Arguello and Medrano-Miranda controversies are unknown. Punitive measures taken by the authorities in Mexico City
did little to mitigate the governors' actions. The harsh real provision (writ or
decree) handed down against Lopez de Mendizabal on 12 May 1662 did not

22? NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME80,NUMBER I

deter Miranda. Indeed, Miranda conducted Pefialosa's residencia in an arbitrary manner in 1664 and appears to have stolen a portion of Medrano's
silver in 1671.71 Likewise, the audiencia's decree in Manso's favor in February 1661 did not prevent Pefialosa from trying to obtain a bribe from Lopez
de Mendiz<ibal in November of that year. 72 Even though Rosas had every
manner of legal and administrative difficulty in the period from 1637 to
1641, it did not keep Pacheco from misappropriating horses in 1643, and it
did not prevent Arguello from stealing them again in 1645. Regardless of the
political consequences, each of these men adhered to his own financial
agenda. This was an almost inevitable by-product of a system that encouraged governors to pursue avenues of self-interest. Monetary considerations
arising from low salaries, the purchase of offices, the media anata, and financial obligations incurred in Mexico City and Parral were paramount.
Greed and temptation also played a role. Skins, woven articles, and other
native trade goods accumulated by outgoing governors were repeatedly targeted by incoming officials wishing to defray the expenses of office.
Viceroys and audiencia judges were well aware of mischief in the provinces, but were scarcely in a position to stop it. Tough, resourceful leaders
such as Alonso Pacheco and Fernando de Arguello were needed in New
Mexico, where a military conflict with the Apache Nation was an emerging
threat. Indeed, the very traits Arguello possessed that made him suitable for
the governorship virtually guaranteed that he would one day test the limits
of his authority. The viceroys of New Spain, who ruled over a vast realm,
depended upon men like Arguello. Bestowing great power on the provincial governors and then taking it away by requiring them to justify each and
everyone of their actions would have been an absurd contradiction.
Victims of residencia fraud took it very seriously, yet complaints by
Pacheco and Medrano may have fallen on deaf ears in Mexico City. Governor Pacheco had been granted exceptional discretionary powers in 1642,
and he exercised them ruthlessly. If Pacheco had requisitioned equine stock,
but had not compensated the colonists adequately, and if his successor,
Fernando de Arguello, had seized 166 of these animals and driven them to
Parral for sale, the audiencia hardly considered these offenses topics for urgent deliberation. Some residencia appeals were entertained by the viceroy
and real acuerdo, but others were rejected. Apparently Arguello's downfall
came not as a result of his theft of Pacheco's mules, but as a consequence of
allegations that Arguello had misappropriated gunpowder belonging to the
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Crown. In the end, as fray Andres Suarez pointed out in 1647, it was often
the citizens and missionaries of New Mexico who bore the brunt of the
governors' misconduct.
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The Municipal Origins of la Villa de San Felipe
el Real de Chihuahua, 1718-1725
THE CABILDO'S STRUGGLE FOR JURISDICTIONAL AUTONOMY

Jaime Pacheco and LeRoy Anthony Reaza

F

ifty-eight years before the summer of 1776 when American colonists
assembled to sign the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia,
another localized and little-known event occurred on the opposite side of
the continent in the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya. The renaming of San Francisco de Cuellar heralded the beginning of an autonomous, rudimentary form
of municipal democracy. The decree also initiated six years of turbulent
and chaotic governance involving assorted political rivalries, questionable
family allegiances, and opposing ideologies. Adminis~rative disagreements
set the stage for a confrontation that would pit the municipal Cabildo or
Ayuntamiento's (town council) authority over, and control of, the local government against the legal and jurisdictional responsibilities of the governor.
Their political contest led to the governor's forceful and surprisingly bloodless removal of the corregidor (royal magistrate) from his position ofleadership on the Cabildo. This article analyzes the jurisdictional disputes and
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complex litigation, and the expulsion of the corregidor that resulted from
the creation of the villa (chartered municipality usually possessing a cabildo).
Explored in the process are the legal decisions rendered by the viceroy and
by the Audiencias of Guadalajara and Mexico. In the end, the officials of
San Felipe el Real were obligated to accept only a partial victory. The viceroy's
final ruling greatly limited the governor's authority over the villa, while it
placed the municipality's jurisdiction under his control.
The viceroy of New Spain initiated the dispute on 1 October 1718 when
he issued a royal decree that elevated the real (mining settlement) of San
Francisco de Cuellar, founded nine years earlier, to the rank of villa and
renamed it San Felipe el Real de Chihuahua. l This municipality, unlike
many other towns of similar size, possessed special privileges normally associated with a corregimiento, a municipal district or jurisdiction governed by
a corregidor. Only two other larger population centers, the viceregal capital
of Mexico City and the wealthy mining center of Zacatecas, were governed
with this kind ofadministration before 1720. Both had cabildos that included
a corregidor who was approved by the king and whose functions were patterned on those of corregidors found in Spain. This "municipal" corregidor
sat with the cabildo as the crown's representative and its ex officio presiding
officer to conduct the official business of the town's elite and mostly
nonindigenous population. 2 He also functioned, within the municipality
and its adjoining districts, as civil governor and chief justice. These duties
contrasted with those of the corregidor, more common to !'Jew Spain, who
governed provincial areas and managed the administration ofIndian laborers on tribute-paying lands known as encomiendas. 3
The villa of San Felipe el Real de Chihuahua soon came to be a major
center of mining, commerce, and trade in this rapidly developing frontier
of northern New Spain. Trade routes linking Mexico City to the kingdom
of New Mexico converged on the villa, helping to establish it as a burgeoning area for the buying and selling of international goods and merchandise.
The growing importance and increasing mineral wealth of San Felipe el
Real during this period influenced the decision ofseveral governors of Nueva

Facing page
VILLA DE SAN FELIPE EL REAL DE CHIHUAHUA AND SURROUNDING AREAS
IN THE KINGDOM OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, 1718-1725

(Map by Jaime Pacheco)
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Vizcaya to maintain a separate residence in the villa. The eventual relocation of the governor's headquarters to the town allowed it to function as the
unofficial capital of the kingdom, superseding Durango and San Joseph del
Parral, where governors had also resided. 4
During the summer of 1718, Col. don Juan Felipe Orozco y Molina, a
prominent miner and vecino (property owner) of the real of San Francisco
de Cuellar and a former governor ad interim of Nueva Vizcaya (1712-1714),
became the leading spokesman for the vecinos of this mining community.
In consultation with many of its leading residents, he spearheaded the movementto enhance the real's visibility by meeting with his old friend, Viceroy
don Baltasar de Zuniga, Marques de Baiera, in Mexico City. The colonel
believed that by renewing ties with Balero, he might convince the marques
that the vecinos of San Francisco de Cuellar should be empowered to govern themselves. Confident that the viceroy would accept his plan, Orozco y
Molina journeyed to the viceregal capital to win Balero's support for the
creation of the municipality that he envisioned. 5
The colonel succeeded. He and Viceroy Balero agreed to structure the
proposed villa as a semiautonomous entity, modeling it closely after the
corregimiento system of governance existing in some Castilian municipalities. 6 Orozco y Molina, as ministro delegado (viceroy's appointed delegate),
would take charge of the villa until a permanent corregidor was sworn into
office.! The colonel undoubtedly suggested to the viceroy vecinos to serve
on the Cabildo. 8 An immediate issue, however, was how the autonomy of
the new municipality would affect the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, Manuel
San Juan y Santa Cruz, particularly in the event of a jurisdictional dispute
between his office and the Cabildo.
Orozco y Molina likely informed the
viceroy that the governor might support
the new municipality only on the condition that he be given a significant role
in its political management.

DON BALTASAR DE ZUNIGA, MARQUES
DE BALERO, VICEROY OF NEW SPAIN,

1716-1722
From Manuel Rivera Cam bas, Los
Gobernantes de Mexico (Mexico: Imp.
De

J.

M. Aguilar Ortiz, 1872), 316.
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Orozco y Molina also helped shape the new villa's Cabildo. He evidently
urged the viceroy to appoint Gen. don Joseph de Orio y Zubiate as alcalde
ordinario de primero Yoto (first ranking judge and president of the Cabildo).
When the corregimiento was established, the general became the villa's
first proprietary corregidor with a fixed term of five years. 9 Colonel Orozco
y Molina probably concluded that Orio y Zubiate's appointment would prevent factional opposition in the Spanish royal court to this unconventional
government on the northern frontier of New Spain. The vecinos of San
Felipe el Real apparently felt secure with General Orio y Zubiate leading
their villa. He boasted nearly forty years of military service, including quashing Indian rebellions, in Nueva Vizcaya. During this period, he also held
various governmental posts and became a wealthy entrepreneur, miner,
philanthropist, and generous benefactor to the religious orders of the villa.
The combination of his achievements, unblemished character, and trustworthiness prevented controversy that could have jeopardized the Spanish
crown's vested interest in the villa's emerging wealth.
The viceroy's remaining appointments were likewise men of economic
wealth and political influence. In addition to General Orio y Zubiate, don
Diego de Vilches assumed the position of alcalde de segundo Yoto (second
ranking judge). The regidores perpetuos (councilmen for life) were named
in sequential order: don Eugenio Ramirez Calderon as regidor decano y
sindico procurador general (senior councilman and municipal attorney); don
Juan de Orrantia as alguacil mayor (chief constable);-don Francisco de
Salcido as fiel ejecutor (inspector of weights and measures); don Ygnacio
Alfonso de Riaza as mayordomo de c011l;ejo (administrator of finances and
municipally owned properties); and don Diego Fernandez de Olano as
regidor. 1O The viceroy also suggested that one of his own honor guard, the
physician don Juan de Bonilla, be designated escribano real y de cabildo
(royal notary and secretary) of the new municipality."
Colonel Orozco y Molina was the most viable candidate to lead the villa's
provisional government, having been given the official mandate to execute
the installation of the first cabildo by the viceroy. Historians have speculated on whom the viceroy actually empowered to administer the villa's governing body. According to historian Francisco R. Almada, Orozco y Molina
served as corregidor of the villa from 21 December 1718 until 5 April 1720.11
Several months after having been appointed by the viceroy as ministro
delegado, he received the title of corregidor on 4 March 1719. However, no
documentation has surfaced to confirm his formal possession of the officeY
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The only titles and positions-granted by the viceroy-that, the colonel
believed, entitled him to serve as leader of the villa de San Felipe el Real,
were those of ministro delegado and subdelegado. 14
During the period of provisional governance from 1718-1720, Governor
San Juan y Santa Cruz and the villa's subdelegado Colonel Orozco y Molina
experienced their first disagreements regarding the villa's jurisdictional
boundaries. The dispute centered on the area located northeast of the villa
at La Junta del RIo del Norte (presently Ojinaga, Chihuahua), which had
been taken in the name of the king in 1684 by Lt. Capt.-Gen. don Juan
DomInguez de Mendoza for the Kingdom of New Mexico, and by Sgt. Maj.
don Juan Antonio Trasvina y Retes, who reestablished missions in the area
in 1715, for the Kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya. Spanish officials and the Franciscan curas doctrineros (ministers of Indian congregations or missionaries)
had been negotiating jurisdiction over the tribes at La Junta. After the Spanish finally subdued the sporadic upheavals that had plagued the region,
they renewed their efforts to indoctrinate the Natives in the fundamentals
of the Catholic faith, hoping to prevent any future uprisings. The padres
successfully maintained a fragile tranquility among the tribal nations that
had given their allegiance to the governor of Nueva Vizcaya but feared that
another outbreak of tribal warfare could delay their Christianizing efforts
and jeopardize the crown's proposed settlements in the area. 15
Not until 1719, when the rumblings of another Indian uprising sounded,
was the governor's control and influence in the La Junta area severely tested
and undermined. During this period, the Indians were for the most part
peaceful, but several notable incursions by marauding tribes, including some
converted Indians, caused the missionaries to flee from time to time and
take refuge in San Felipe el Real or the presidio of San Francisco de Conchos.
These incidents and the Spanish government's fear of French and British
encroachment into the region from the North compelled colonial authorities to take measures to counter any problems. Colonel Orozco y Molina
evidently thought that his viceregal commission as subdelegado upon the
establishment of the villa would protect him during any challenge to the
authority of Governor San Juan y Santa Cruz. Orozco y Molina's bold attempt to assert control over the region of La Junta infuriated the governor.
However, San Juan y Santa Cruz concluded that he had little recourse in
the matter, given that the viceroy had a close relationship with the colonel
and would probably side with him on any appeal. 16
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On 25 May 1720 in San Felipe el Real, the Cabildo Justicia y Regimiento
(formal name ofa Spanish municipal corporation) met at the home of regidor
Ygnacio Alfonso de Riaza, since the casa de ayuntamiento (town hall) had
not been constructed. The membership assembled to take the oath of assent to the audiencia's Teal provision (decree) that incorporated the villa. By
taking the prescribed oath, the officials of the Cabildo finalized the villa's
status as a constituted legal entity.17 The capitulaTes (municipal officials)
hoped to use their newly acquired status to convince the incoming governor of their authority over the disputed area of La Junta.
Governor don Martfn de Alday, like General Orio y Zubiate, was born in
the villa de Escoriaza in the Basque province of Guipuzcoa in Spain. His
success in suppressing Indian insurrections gave him some influence with
the Real Audiencia de Guadalajara in the unresolved jurisdictional dispute
with the Cabildo of San Felipe el Real. 18 Alday's frustrations spurred him to
enumerate for the Audiencia the problems confronting his office on 20 April
1721. Requesting that the Audiencia forward his report to the king, Alday
stated that his administration still had to pacify the region's tribal nations,
and expressed dismay at his predecessor's apparent subordination to the villa's
authorities. 19
The Audiencia affirmed the governor's contention that he had jurisdiction over the contested territory and submitted Alday's letter to King Felipe
V for his consideration. After reviewing the case with his advisors, the king
issued his real cedula on 1 February 1723. He upheld the decision of the
Audiencia, mandating that the villa and its districts remain under the jurisdiction of the governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Viceroy Balero's successor, don
Juan de Acuna, Marques de Casafuerte, subsequently placed Felipe V's order into effect in late October 1723.20 However, Governor Alday did not see
the fruits of his struggle realized during his administration; he left office
before the real cedula took effect. 21
In his new commanding role as corregidor of the villa, Orio y Zubiate
efficiently met the material needs of the town's residents. During his administration in the early 1720S, the villa enjoyed several years of prosperity
that included a great mining bonanza and a marked increase in international commerce and trade, all of which encouraged the emergence of a
democratic polity. However, despite the villa's increasing economic stability, Orio y Zubiate's initial five-year term in office prematurely came to an
end. He had submitted his resignation seven months prior to his untimely
death on 27 June 1723.22
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The effort to name a new corregidor involved several legal procedures.
According to the disposici6n (ruling) by the Audiencia accepting his resignation, Grio y Zubiate specifically requested that it name an experienced
and capable person to replace him. 23 Although his request was acknowledged, the Audiencia instead instructed Governor Alday to name an interim corregidor for the villa. 24 It also stipulated that either his representative
or procurador (legal representative) would have to testify before the judges
on the candidate's qualifications for the office. Unclear in the historical
record is which governor received the Audiencia's ruling. According to Almada,
Governor Alday served until March 1723, when Col. don Joseph Sebastian
L6pez de Carvajal succeeded him. However, based on a document cited by
Guillermo Porras Munoz, incoming governor Carvajal did not formally take
possession of the office until 4 June 1723.25 With the permanent corregidor's
seat vacant, the new governor now had the opportunity to select a man who
would show loyalty to him and deference to his authority.
Shortly thereafter, don Antonio Joseph Paniagua Quintela y Sanjurjo was
appointed corregidor by Governor Carvajal. The formal procedure for certification in that position commenced with notarized testimonials by vecinos
who knew his background, capabilities, and
character. The governor then used t~ht
information to determine whether
~) / '
the ~orregido~'s professi~nal cre. .' ',,'
dentIals were In order. Witnesses
. '/' r-'A"t;~AA
testified that Paniagua was a na}~-""lT_

.L/JJltz ee.

tive of La Ciudad de Valladolid en
los Reinos de Castilla, was of noble birth, and
was approximately thirty years old. 26 Although the
governor had chosen Paniagua to be the new proprietary corregidor of San Felipe el Real, Carvajal
did not receive the certificate of his confirmation

JOSEPH LOPEZ DE
CARVAJAL, GOVERNOR

until sometime during the fall of 1723.
OF NUEVA VIZCAYA
Carvajal had his hands full trying to cope with
the challenges brought by the villa's growing affluence and power. Wealth derived from the area's silver mines helped fuel
crime and vice. Men from all walks oflife fell under the spell of temptation.
Even authorities responsible for enforcing the law and maintaining order
succumbed to profit-making opportunities. Municipal officials and even
secular priests often disobeyed with impunity Spanish laws against their in-
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vestment in money-making ventures such as mining. Priests often purchased
their mining property or interest, and then transferred the rights to business
associates or family members.27
Heated disputes abounded among members of San Felipe el Real's
Cabildo, often threatening their personal relationships.28 One rivalry pitted
Colonel Orozco y Molina against Capt. Joseph de Aguirre; both vecinos
had placed bids on the post of alferez real (royal standard bearer), which
would guarantee the position of regidor and thus a permanent seat on the
Cabildo to the highest bidder. Aguirre won the title and viceregal appointment for the sum of eight thousand pesos.Z9 Some clashes even erupted
into all-out smear campaigns defaming members who threatened vested
interests.
However, no one would do more to unite these conflicting personalities
than Governor Carvajal, who imposed restrictions on the townspeople's way
oflife, particularly some leisure activities. Such ordinances eliminated gambling, card playing, drinking of alcoholic beverages in public, and other
forms of vice. 30 Paniagua's failure to enforce those prohibitions increased
tensions with the governor.
Another source of conflict was Governor Carvajal's attempt to influence
the villa's upcoming elections for alcaldes ordinarios. On 21 December 1723,
the governor informed Paniagua of his preferences and expressed his wishes
for the corregidor to guarantee the results. 31 Caught between the governor
and the Cabildo, Paniagua ultimately defied Carvajal and allied himself
with the villa's capitulares. Governor Carvajal interpreted his corregidor's
choice as an unforgivable act of disloyalty.
Held on 1 January 1724, the elections brought into office alcaldes with
plenty of governmental experience that would benefit the Cabildo. Both
Trasvifia y Retes as alcalde ordinario de primero voto and don Ygnacio Alfonso
de Riaza as alcalde ordinario de segundo voto probably never anticipated
the challenges that they would face during the upcoming year. Trasvifia y
Retes brought to the Cabildo many years of exemplary service to the crown,
having been one of the principal members of the real's foundation. Likewise, Riaza had proven himself to be skilled in matters of diplomacy and in
promoting commercial activity in the villa.
Eventually sent to the governor, the election results failed to include the
details that Governor Carvajal demanded. The newly elected alcaldes' report had not requested Carvajal's confirmation of the election, an omission
that further angered him, for other towns in the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya

38 ~

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 80, NUMBER I

had abided by his mandate. Seeking a prompt response, Governor Carvajal
immediately sent to the Cabildo an order to providethe proper testimonials
concerning the election of alcaldes. Carvajal would accept nothing less than
a detailed explanation of the villa's e1ection. 32
On 1 February 1724, the villa's capitulares met to discuss Governor
Carvajal's directive. The pressure was on Paniagua to explain to the governor the course that he and the Cabildo had taken. His eloquent letter to
Carvajal detailed the reasons why he and the Cabildo had executed their
"unwelcomed acts of defiance," as Carvajal might have characterized them.
Respectfully disagreeing with the governor, Corregidor Paniagua argued that
he could not intervene in the election of alcaldes; Spanish law forbade
corregidores from interfering in the process of electing alcaldes. He also
defended his right to confirm the villa's elections against the wishes of the
governor. In a decision rendered sometime earlier, the Audiencia of
Guadalajara had granted that privilege to all present and future corregidores
of San Felipe el Real.J3 However, despite the decision, Governor Carvajal
would never accept the open rebellion of
his own appointee. Corregidor Paniagua's
defiance had initiated a chain of events that
would
soon envelop the entire kingdom of
ANTONIO PANIAGUA, CORREGIDOR
Nueva Vizcaya.
Witnessing the governor's growing displeasure with the Cabildo's independence, the capitulares convened a series of meetings to formulate a strategy for presenting their grievances to the viceroy. In a meeting held on 3
February 1724, the Cabildo appointed Riaza apoderado (power of attorney)
by a majority vote, vesting him with the authority to litigate the Cabildo's
interests before the Audiencia. Riaza would have the unenviable and difficult task of presenting and arguing the capitulares' belief that their villa was
independent of the governor's control. 34
In an effort to thwart any resistance by the Cabildo, Governor Carvajal
immediately sent his first cousin, Juan de Balderrama, to take charge of San
Felipe el Real. Balderrama, who also held the position of escribano de su
magestad (royal scribe), formally read the king's real cedula to the villa's
capitulares. On the night of 12 February 1724, the day before Balderrama
was to preside over a session of the Cabildo, he observed Riaza leaving the
villa in a forlon (coach or carriage). In his capacity as the villa's apoderado,
Riaza was on his way to conduct the Cabildo's business before the Real
Audiencia de Guadalajara.J5
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Upon receiving word about Riaza's mission from Balderrama, Governor
Carvajal, headquartered in Parral, immediately ordered the apoderado's arrest. The governor accused him of leaving the villa's jurisdiction without
the documents required by the leyes reales (royal laws). Contrary to the
governor's suspicions, Riaza was not trying to flee the kingdom; he notified
Carvajal of his arrival in Parral two days later. Executing his arrest decree~
Carvajal formally detained Riaza the next day and ordered him to return to
San Felipe el Real within twenty-four hours. Riaza expressed outrage over
his detention in letters to the villa's capitulares. In a show of protest, he
insisted that the governor allow him to resume his journey, vigorously refuting the governor's reasons for his detention. Realizing that he was not going
to get his way, Riaza reluctantly returned to San Felipe el Real sometime
after mid-February.36
In this state of uneasiness, the Cabildo met at the home of Corregidor
Paniagua to discuss specific actions that it would take against Governor
Carvajal's suppression of the villa's rights and privileges. The capitulares had
recently received Riaza's letters informing them ofthe governor's order against
his journey to Guadalajara. The Cabildo's response was to issue a requisitorio
(mandatory injunction) demanding that Governor Carvajal allow their

comisario (commissioned representative with power of attorney), Riaza, to
conduct the villa's business before the Audiencia. The Cabildo's concerns
were contained in a letter to be seen only by the Audiencia, viceroy, and, if
necessary, the king. The justification was a law, cited in the Recopilaci6n, that
prohibited any royal official from preventing the dispatch of a message directed to the king or viceroy. In this case, Apoderado Riaza intended to argue
against the governor's impediments to the Cabildo's commercial, administrative, and legal responsibilities to the villa. By explaining to the governor the
reasons for appointing Riaza, the Cabildo hoped to prevent the situation from
escalating into violence at the expense of the villa's vecinos. 37
Upon his arrival in San Felipe el Real, Riaza received an order that caused
him to return to Parra!' Governor Carvajal had left Parral on a visita (general inspection) of the province and would be away for some time. Undoubtedly sanctioned by Carvajal, the order came from Juan Ygnacio de
Escobar, juez receptor (commissioned judge) of the Audiencia, whom the
governor had left in charge as the chief authority ofParra!.38 Despite Riaza's
remonstrances, he was again detained in Parral and forbidden to leave for
Guadalajara until the governor issued a decree concerning the matter. J9
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When the news of Riaza's detention reached Carvajal at the Estancia de
Nuestra Senora de Cortes, the governor wasted no time issuing his decree.
After reviewing the Cabildo's requisitorio he ordered that all letters and
documents be archived for future legal use against the Cabildo and instructed
Escobar to grant Riaza permission for his passage to Guadalajara. That order was Carvajal's attempt to dispel the Cabildo's perception of him as tyrannical and unreasonable. Carvajal explained that he based his detention
ofRiaza not on the accusations made in their requisitorio but solely on the
leyes reales that Riaza violated upon leaving the villa's jurisdiction without
permission. 40 Riaza finally departed for Guadalajara in March 1724 and did
not return to San Felipe el Real until the following year.
Incensed by the governor's autocratic policies, the Cabildo lodged a legal protest with Viceroy Casafuerte and requested a judicial review of the
standoff. Corregidor Paniagua and Cabildo members Orrantfa, Trasvina y
Retes and Ramirez Calderon signed the letter dated 18 March 1724. They cited a litany
of abuses committed by the governor against
EL MARQUES DE CASAFUERTE,
VICEROY OF NEW SPAIN

the Cabildo and the inhabitants of San
Felipe el Real. They also requested the repeal of the king's interim real cedula and de-

manded that the villa be declared outside the governor's jurisdiction and
subject only to the authority of the viceroy.
Feeling obligated to respond to the Cabildo's protests, Governor Carvajal
justified his actions in a legal plea addressed to Viceroy Casafuerte. Drafted
at the Presidio de Mapimi, his letter cited repeated failures by the Cabildo
and the corregidor to obey or execute his orders. One of Carvajal's principal
examples was the recent election of alcaldes, which Corregidor Paniagua
had certified without his confirmation.
Meanwhile, after his long and perilous journey from Parral via Guadalajara, Apoderado Riaza was enjoying an audience with Viceroy Casafuerte
in Mexico City. On 22 August 1724, Riaza made the first of his four official

consultas (legal arguments)-that San Felipe el Real remain under the jurisdiction of the viceroy and not the governor. In an eloquent display of
litigative prowess and knowledge of royal law, he passionately, systematically, and logically demonstrated to Viceroy Casafuerte the villa's declared
right to exist as a legally independent jurisdiction beholden only to his office until its required infrastructure was completed. 41 Riaza's condemnation
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of Carvajal's actions proved to be prophetic, for the governor soon took drastic and unwarranted measures to enforce his authority over the villa.
At dawn on the morning of 16 September 1724, two escuadras (squadrons) ofhea~ily armed cavalry galloped into San Felipe el Real.42 Hoisting
the royal standard, Governor Carva jal ordered his soldiers to cordon off the
two principal streets that connected the main plaza and the Jesuit College
and on which were located the residences of both the corregidor and the
Cabildo's notaryY
Notified ofthe governor's sudden arrival, Juan de Bonilla, escribano real
y de cabildo, immediately went out of his house to greet him. As he approached the governor, who was pacing with his lieutenant Juan de
Balderrama, Bonilla noticed soldiers in front of Corregidor Paniagua's residence. Carvajal immediately instructed Bonilla to inform the corregidor
that he·was waiting to meet with him. The impatient governor, unwilling to
wait any longer, entered the living room and confronted Paniagua who,
exiting his bedroom, was half-dressed in his pantaloons and wig and holding his vara (baton symbolizing his authority). At this moment, Governor
Carvajal produced a decree, issued earlier that day, demanding that Paniagua
surrender his vara and office. 44 The corregidor, angry and defiant, refused
the order, stating that he had not officially completed his term. He then
showed the governor a despacho from Viceroy Casafuerte, who sanctioned
Paniagua's right to fulfill his term as corregidor. 45
Exasperated by the corregidor's disobedience, Carvajal summoned Lieutenant Molina, who, accompanied by three soldiers, entered the corregidor's
living room. Again, Paniagua refused to hand over the vara and protested
the governor's threat of force. Nonetheless, after vehemently condemning
Carvajal's posturing, Paniagua grudgingly placed his vara on a table. 46 The
deposed corregidor promised to appeal his removal to the viceroy and the
king and to testify to everything that transpired in the villa that day.
Savoring victory, Carvajal then ordered the corregidor to vacate his residence and mount an awaiting horse. The soldiers escorting Paniagua were
under orders to guard him from possible escape and to withhold knowledge
of his final destination. Prevented from setting foot in San Felipe el Real,
Paniagua was relegated to writing the viceroy letters demanding his reinstatement as corregidor. Not until early October did the former corregidor
return to the villa in an attempt to finish out his term. 47 However, he would
never again resume his duties as the villa's rightful corregidor.
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Carvajal's ruthlessness did not go unchallenged. Immediately following
Paniagua's removal, the Cabildo met to discuss the ramifications of the
governor's invasion of the villa and his unlawful arrest of its corregidor. 48
The gathering at the home of the recently deceased Regidor Diego
Fernandez de Olano was conducted without the Cabildo's customary presiding officer and under unusual circumstances. 49 With the corregidor in
confinement, the responsibility for presiding over the Cabildo would have
normally devolved upon the alcaldes of the villa. But, even that succession
was impossible; the funeral of the senior alcalde Trasvina y Retes had been
held four days earlier. 50 Complicating matters further was the absence of
Riaza, who was still in Mexico City. The final composition of the Cabildo
consisted ofJoseph de Aguirre, Eugenio Ramirez Calderon, Juan de Orrantfa,
and Juan de Bonilla, the latter serving as the capitulares' notary.51
Their discussion centered on the lawless actions taken by the governor
against the residents of the villa without just cause. Given that the governor
had no official authorization for the application of force, the capitulares
were angry that he had not tried to resolve the volatile situation with more
prudence and sagacity. Another point of contention was the governor's failure to consult the capitulares before his armed entry into the villa, although
the governor likely believed that the Cabildo had forfeited that courtesy
through its neglect of his decrees pertaining to the proper punishment and
imprisonment of criminals, and that his armed incursion fell well within
his legal rights. 52
Cabildo deliberations concerning the banishment of the corregidor took
on particular urgency. In order to address the administrative problems confronting the Cabildo, while also maintaining the peace and tranquility of
the villa, the Cabildo requested the viceroy to reinstate Paniagua as
corregidor. The rumors and fears among the villa's residents only escalated
when they learned the conditions under which Paniagua was removed. The
governor had forced him to leave town in a weak and fragile state after a
long-term illness and without proper attire, a servant to assist him, or even
proper sustenance. Paniagua's sufferings weighed heavily on the minds of
the villa's capitulares and residents. 53
Three days after his incursion into the villa, the governor convened a
meeting at the villa's Sagrado Colegio de la Compania de Jesus to justify his
actions. He requested the presence of the villa's capitulares to reiterate a
viceregal despacho issued prior to the events of mid-September. According
to Carvajal, the viceroy decreed the Cabildo members to obey and respect
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the governor's authority to maintain a harmonious relationship between his
administration and the Cabildo. 54 Carvajal obviously employed the viceroy's
edictlo legitimize his control over the Cabildo, knowing very well that the
viceroy's reaction would be one of harsh retribution if he learned that the
governor had used the king's real cedula to justify his military incursion
against the villa. At that gathering, the capitulares decided to arrive at some
accommodation with the governor.
On 30 September 1724, the Cabildo members wrote Riaza in Mexico
City to inform him of the agreement with the governor. It advised him to
take no legal action against the governor and cease all current appeals. At
the same time, the apoderado should use the letter to make the Cabildo's
position known to all judicial entities that were proceeding with its case. 55
Riaza was likely not surprised when he learned about the governor's military incursion and removal ofCorregidor Paniagua. The details of the event
and of the subsequent understanding between the Cabildo and governor
surely caused Riaza to read between the lines and reflect on the Cabildo's
real intentions. His trepidation, particularly over the agreement, was undoubtedly laced with prejudice against the governor, who arrested him earlier in the year. The strategy of the Cabildo members all along had been to
give the appearance of deferring to the governor, while requesting that Riaza
represent the villa's case to the viceroy.
The Cabildo's agreement with the governor upset many vecinos in San
Felipe el Real. Carvajal's violent and illegal entry into the villa and the
incarceration oftheir corregidor produced feelings of outrage and disbelief.
Some of the villa's most prominent vecinos launched a campaign to make
their disapproval known directly to the viceroy. Their petition to quash the
agreement between the Cabildo and governor circulated in such complete
secrecy that not even the governor knew of its existence. Intended for Viceroy Casafuerte, the document contained individual testimonies protesting
the governor's armed intervention. The petitioners' primary complaint focused on the mistreatment of Paniagua, whom Carvajal had shamed, abused,
and deposed. 56 They also labeled the governor's policies in violation of the
prevailing Laws of the Indies. 57
When informed of the petitioners' intentions, Governor Carvajal demanded an investigation to determine why those vecinos had decided to
take action against him. His recently appointed corregidor, don Bartolome
Garda Montero, was authorized to conduct the investigation. In the
end, the petitioners' testimonies deeply affected the governor. They gave
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reasonably sound arguments indicting his incursion into the villa and arrest
of Paniagua, and forced him to defend and explain his position before the
viceroy and other royal officials. Carvajal attempted to bully the vecinos
into discontinuing their official protest to the viceroy. In late October 1724,
Carvajal made a last-ditch attempt to salvage his reputation and administration. He wrote the viceroy to defend his subjugation of the villa, claiming
that he had always sought to resolve disputes with the vecinos by peaceful
means. Military force was only a final recourse. 58
On 20 November 1724, however, the governor won a legal victory-his
first - concerning the jurisdiction of the villa and the election of its alcaldes
ordinarios. The Audiencia de Guadalajara finally ruled on the appeals submitted by both the Cabildo and Governor Carvajal during the previous
spring. The decision, an unexpected defeat, disappointed the capitulares.
The Audiencia's real provision mandated that a cabildo had to submit the
results of elections for alcaldes ordinarios to the governor for his confirmation and that the Cabildo of San Felipe el Real could no longer use the
official title "Ilustre Cabildo," which was reserved for Durango, the official
capital of the Kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya. 59 The judges ruled that, in the
case of San Felipe el Real, the alcaldes had failed to fulfill their legal obligation to the governor. 60 The Audiencia also levied fines on all Cabildo members for showing disrespect to the governor and producing the requisitorio,
letters, and other documentation against him. Despite the Audiencia's decision, the Cabildo persevered, keeping Riaza informed of all the calamities
befalling the villa and providing additional evidence to help him litigate
their case pending before the viceroy.
Even after the Audiencia delivered the legal setback to the Cabildo,
Apoderado Riaza argued in Mexico City against the king's interim real
cedula. He reiterated the original regulations promulgated by the previous
viceroy, Marques de Balero, at the founding of the villa in the fall of 1718.61
His demand was that the villa be exempted from the jurisdiction of the
governor and subordinated only to the viceregal government according to
Viceroy Balero's original disposicion, which created the villa.
Several days after the decision was pronounced in Guadalajara, the
Audiencia of Mexico met in a special session of the real acuerdo (a meeting
of the viceroy with his audiencia) to render an opinion on the Cabildo's
appeal made earlier in the year. By majority decision, the judges voted to
uphold the king's interim real cedula dictating that the villa remain under
the jurisdiction and administration of the governor. Dealing only with the
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political and legal aspects of the villa's organization, the judges deferred
ruling on Governor Carvajal's military incursion. Afterward, still unwilling
to surrender, Riaza sought to reverse the judges' ruling and convince them
to adjudicate the governor's assault of the villa by providing additional facts
on the incident. The real acuerdo, having considered all the evidence, issued a second ruling during the latter half of December. Upholding its previous decision, the judges still refused to rule on Carvajal's use of military
force. The judges concluded that the viceroy, as captain-general and titular
head of the army, would have to address the governor's questionable military deployment against San Felipe el Real. 62
During a subsequent hearing with Viceroy Casafuerte in February 1725,
the apoderado representing Governor Carvajal revealed documents containing the governor's charges previously brought against Corregidor
Paniagua and the villa's capitulares. In those papers, Carvajal expressed displeasure with the Cabildo, especially its accusations of tyranny and lawlessness against his office, and justified to the viceroy his armed resolution of
the political stalemate. 63 The governor's apoderado was seeking the viceroy's
reaffirmation of the real provision, issued by the Audiencia of Guadalajara
during the preceding November, on the election of alcaldes.
Viceroy Casafuerte evaluated all the information given him by Governor Carvajal, Apoderado Riaza, the auditor general de la guerra (judge advocate general), and the fiscal (crown attorney) of the king. The viceroy's
much-anticipated ruling, finally delivered on 28 February 1725 in conjunction with the recommendations by the Audiencia of Mexico, was his response to all the challenges contested over a span of several years. These
legal disputes had commenced during the administration of Governor San
Juan y Santa Cruz and continued into the term of Governor Carvajal. 64 The
viceroy made his pronouncement in two parts. The first involved the jurisdictional control of the villa, while the second dealt with the military incursion into the villa and removal of the corregidor by the governor. His ruling
upheld the real acuerdo's decision-to place the villa under the jurisdiction of the governor.
In the matter of Carvajal's armed invasion, Viceroy Casafuerte condemned the martial tactics used by the governor to remove the corregidor.
The viceroy ordered that Paniagua be reinstated as corregidor and allowed
to complete his term in office. 65 He also decreed the return of the corregidor's
confiscated property but declared that the governor had the right to appoint
another person to the position of corregidor upon the expiration of Paniagua's

46

~

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 80, NUMBER I

term. The governor, under penalty of one thousand pesos, had to remit all
documents pertaining to this case, as the viceroy's despacho of November
1724 had demanded. Carvajal was instructed never again to impede, aggravate, inconvenience, or obfuscate the jurisdiction of the villa's justicias
ordinarias (ordinary courts), unless he followed the legal process prescribed
by the laws of the kingdom. Likewise, the elections of alcaldes ordinarios
were to be conducted in accordance with the laws published in the

Recopilaci6n. 66
After many months oflegal battles between the villa's capitulares and the
governor, Viceroy Casafuerte finally concluded this seemingly endless political dispute. The viceroy's final order, signed on 14 June 1725, reaffirmed
his original declaration issued in February 1725. The viceroy imposed a fine
of one thousand pesos on Governor Carvajal and decreed that no one, including the governor, was to obstruct the implementation of his despacho
and that he was to be notified immediately of its receipt, observance, and
faithful executionY
Without a legal charter and the proper royal authorization, the villa of
San Felipe el Real de Chihuahua struggled to govern itself and maintain its
stability during its early years. Given that Viceroy Balero had failed to define clear lines of authority, the villa's government remained structurally
unconventional. In the absence of a viable leader, San Felipe el Real's functionaries opted for a joint administration by two prominent vecinos, Gen.
Joseph de Orio y Zubiate and Col. Juan Felipe Orozco y Molina, until a
permanent corregidor took office.
Several cabildos in New Spain had experienced challenges from their
governors, who sought to seize or restrict the rights granted to them. Some
governors successfully suppressed cabildos altogether. 68 The Cabildo of San
Felipe el Real de Chihuahua vigilantly protected the rights, privileges, and
immunities that the viceroy bestowed upon the municipality. During 17181725, Cabildo members-the majority of whom were peninsulares-had
first-hand experience in the intricacies of Spanish municipal law. In particular, they had knowledge of the importance of the fueros (chartered rights
and privileges) that were granted to the municipality. They were undoubtedly familiar with the basic tenets of Spanish law and in particular, the
Recopilaci6n, which severely limited the power of governors, oidores
(Audiencia judges), and even viceroys to infringe on the internal affairs of
their local governments. Viceroy Casafuerte, for the most part, ruled in favor of the villa's capitulares, but he ruled against the critical decree that
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founded the villa. According to the capitulares, the intent ofViceroy Balero
was to remove San Felipe el Real and its residents from the direct control
and jurisdiction of the governor of Nueva Vizcaya and to subject them only
tQ viceregal rule. Viceroy Casafuerte opposed the capitulares' interpretation, basing his ruling on the real cedula of 1723, in which the king returned
the villa to the domain of the governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Although San
Felipe el Real was subordinated to the governor, the viceroy made very clear
that Governor Carvajal must respect the rights and privileges legally granted
to the villa and obey all the laws and mandates protecting it from illegal
intervention by his office.
Thegovernor's military intrusion proved to be the one major incident
that incensed the vecinos in the villa and forged the unity necessary to question Carvajal's actions and leadership. According to the Recopilaci6n, governors had no authority to intervene at will in the affairs of any cabildo,
much less to invade a legally constituted municipality. The governor had
obviously disregarded the royal laws written specifically to prevent the forceful
subjugation of a town's governing cabildo. The governor would have to contest jurisdictional disputes through the complex judicial system, whose procedures were prescribed by royal law. Carvajal's public contempt of royal
protocols resulted in the final despacho issued by Viceroy Casafuerte in

early 1725.
For the first six years of San Felipe el Real's existence as a villa, numerous
inconsistencies involving jurisdictional control and independence plagued
its Cabildo. Despite the municipality's villa status, successive governors of
Nueva Vizcaya believed that they had the right to rule San Felipe el Real,
given that it lay within their kingdom's boundaries. During six contentious
years, two viceroys, three governors, one delegado real, three corregidores,
and two apoderados generated a multitude of communiques and months of
litigation to resolve the issue of jurisdictional sovereignty and governance.
Ultimately and most importantly, Viceroy Casafuerte sought some measure
of judicial impartiality, handing down a decision that granted both the governor and the Cabildo some claim to victory. He restored San Felipe el Real
to the governor's administration, while unequivocally imposing serious consequences on the governor for the illegal invasion of and intervention in the
municipality, to which the Spanish crown had granted specific rights, privileges, and immunities. Thereafter, the governor exercised only nominal
authority over the villa of San Felipe el Real de Chihuahua.
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brought on, he declares, by the continual intervention of their governors, each of
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The Climax of Conflicts with Native
Americans in New Mexico
SPANISH AND MEXICAN ANTECEDENTS TO U.S. TREATI MAKING
DURING THE U.S.-MEXICO WAR,

1846-1848

Douglas W. Richmond

W

hat was the relationship of Spanish and Mexican Indian policy in
New Mexico to the agreements that the United States hammered
out with southwestern tribes during the U.S.-Mexico War ending in 1848?
Compared to Spanish and Mexican efforts throughout New Mexico, the
United States acted swiftly, negotiated treaties from a stronger position, and
immediately began to preserve order. The treaties that the United States
negotiated with Navajos and other tribes during its conflict with Mexico
determined the status of many of the region's indigenous peoples for the
next one hundred years.
Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. Indian policy in New Mexico evolved from
movements to conquer, colonize, or incorporate the region. All three nations wanted to exploit wealth, develop markets, protect settlers, and defeat
hostile international and Native rivals. However, crucial differences in policies, applications, and resources resulted in long Spanish hegemony, constant frustration for Mexico, and a comparatively swift victory by the United

Douglas W. Richmond is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Arlington. He presented an earlier version of this study at the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Historical Association in New Orleans on 28 March 1997. He appreciates the helpful comments provided by Benay Blend, Paul Charney, John V. Gilhooly, Linda Pelon, Michael M ..
Smith, and Joseph A. Stout Jr. Richard Francaviglia, Director of the Center for Greater Southwestern Studies and the History of Cartography at the University ofTexas at Arlington, provided
travel funds and research assistants to support the project.
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States. Spain initiated a comprehensive and long-term program to incorporate indigenous peoples into the broad pattern of Hispanic life, but Native
resentment against Spanish cruelties never dissipated and helped fuel resistance to total assimilation. During the massive struggles for Mexican independence in the 181OS, the Spanish colonial system, including its Indian
policies, collapsed under political chaos and from institutional neglect. After 1821 the new Mexican government simply lacked the resources to restore
the Spanish system. Moreover, Mexico could not organize military forces to
subdue indigenous raiding on its far northern frontier. Relentlessly marching westward across North America during the first half of the nineteenth
century, the United States ultimately brought greater economic, political,
military, and demographic resources to bear against Native Americans in
New Mexico and the Southwest.
The Spanish Empire in New Mexico

In 1598 don Juan de Onate initiated long-term Spanish contact with indigenous peoples in New Mexico. After traveling northward from Santa Barbara, Mexico, along the Rio Grande, Onate and Franciscan missionaries
established San Gabriel, a colony across the river from the present-day Tewa
village of San Juan. On 7 July 1598, the first recorded assembly of thirtyeight Pueblo leaders granted Onate and his followers permission to settle
New Mexico and swore allegiance to the king of Spain. However, many
Pueblo villages resisted the Spanish colonizers because of labor exploitation, physical punishment, and restrictions placed on their religious practices. As governor of the Kingdom of New Mexico, Onate dealt brutally
with all rebellious Native communities. In January 1599, after the Acomas
resisted a Spanish intrusion in their mesa-top pueblo, a force of Onate's
troops assaulted and leveled the village. The governor ordered the amputation of one foot on each surviving male over the age of twenty-five, and
twenty-five years of servitude in the Spanish colony.
Between 1607 and 1610, as Onate moved the provincial capital about
thirty miles south from San Juan to Santa Fe and awaited the arrival of his
successor, he embarked on a vigorous campaign to Christianize the Pueblos. Indeed, for the next seventy-five years, Franciscan missions anchored
Spanish New Mexico. In 1630 the director of the missionary program reported that sixty thousand Indians had been converted and that ninety chapels
had been built. I
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A triennial mission caravan, running between Nueva Vizcaya and Santa
Fe, brought fresh supplies and a few new settlers. Missionary workshops
taught the Pueblos weaving, leatherwork, blacksmithing, and a variety of
other tasks. The Franciscans became disturbed by the persistence of Native
spiritual ceremonies, which they considered idolatrous. The Franciscans
whipped indigenous religious leaders, imposed European concepts about
sexuality, and executed repeat offenders. 2 The Pueblos waited for the right
moment to oust the Spanish.
The time for rebellion came in the late 1670s. Under the leadership of
Pope, a Tewa medicine man from San Juan, various Pueblos coordinated
plans to initiate a broad revolt. Pueblo ceremonial associations and the secret nature of those meetings enabled Pope to map the revolt's strategy and
enlist the aid of most Pueblo villages. Pope's general instructions were simple:
kill all friars and colonists at a specified time. Originally set for 11 August
1680, Pope advanced the assault one day forward when Spanish agents captured one of his couriers. Pueblo fury drove all surviving northern settlers
into Santa Fe, which came under siege by Pueblos and their Apache allies.
Eleven days later, the beleaguered colonists departed for the south. Twentyone Franciscan missionaries and nearly four hundred Spanish soldiers and
settlers perished under Pueblo assault. But the Pueblo rebels did not attack
the retreating Spanish column, and in the absence of Spanish tyranny, unity
among the Pueblo villages broke down during the next twelve years. J In the
meantime, Spanish survivors and their Pueblo allies and servants established
communities in the El Paso del Norte area and awaited the response of the
Spanish crown to the Pueblo Revolt.
Don Diego de Vargas became governor of New Mexico in 1690. Two '
years later, launching from El Paso del Norte, he made a preliminary expedition into Pueblo zones to the north and obtained the formal submission
of twenty-three villages. Dissension among the Pueblos enabled the Spanish to recruit some Pueblos as allies, among them a substantial group of
Piros and Tewas who had followed the Spanish into exile in 1680. On 4
October 1693, Vargas left El Paso del Norte with eight hundred settlers and
soldiers. Despite promises to the contrary, he ordered the execution of seventy Pueblo leaders; he also turned over to the colonists a large number of
Pueblo families as slaves. 4
The Reconquest was a turning point in Spanish-Pueblo relations.

Dur~

ing his second term as governor (17°3-17°4), Vargas brought the Pueblos
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into a military partnership with the colonists against New Mexico's nomadic
tribes. Like Native allies of the Spanish elsewhere in New Spain, the Pueblos received food, weapons, and tools in return for their cooperation in wars
against the king's enemies. In addition, the Franciscans and civil authorities
modified their treatment of the Pueblos; coercive Spanish policies gave way
to more tolerance than Pueblos had experienced in the past. Vargas served
as godfather at baptisms ofthe sons and daughters of Pueblo leaders. Spanish authorities also took greater pains to protect indigenous legal rights.
The protector de indios (protector of the Indians), an individual appointed
to act on behalf of the Pueblos, gave them effective access to the Spanish
legal system. The Pueblos soon learned to operate Hispanic legal machinery, responding with vigor when their lands came under Spanish attack.
Thus, the communal outlook of Pueblo life persisted despite settler encroachments on Indian lands. 5
The Spanish slowly pacified much of New Mexico during the eighteenth
century. Christianizing sedentary tribes like the Pueblos remained a primary focus for colonization efforts there. Although the Spanish built twentyfive missions, approximately ten thousand Natives continued to live in their
thirty or so villages by the end of the eighteenth century. Spanish intermarriage with Native peoples, especially the Pueblos, increased the size of the
New Mexico settlement to eight thousand Spanish-Mexican colonists. Hardly
prosperous through much of the eighteenth century, New Mexico was at
least stable.
Although the Spanish had pacified the Pueblo region comprising central and western New Mexico, they encountered stiff resistance from other
tribes, specifically the nomads living on the colony's margins. The Navajos
had arrived in the Southwest shortly before the Spanish. Traditionally a
nomadic people, the Navajos modified many traditions after encountering
the Spanish and Pueblos. Becoming seminomads, the Navajos obtained
and raised Spanish horses, sheep, and cattle, and incorporated some Pueblo
ceremonies and myths into their own culture. To preserve peace, Spanish
law recognized Navajo land rights around Cebolleta Mountain, and the
Spanish made no serious efforts to subordinate the Navajos directly under
royal rule. Raiding, however, had been a mainstay of their warrior class; the
acquisition of the horse made the Navajos a military force to be reckoned
with. But the Navajos also faced attacks from nomadic neighbors. Living to
the east and south, their linguistic relatives, the Apaches, seized Navajo
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livestock. Under increasing pressure from Utes and Comanches to the north,
Navajo leaders journeyed to Santa Fe in 1706 to conclude peace with Spain.
In the early 17oos, the Apaches likewise came under attack from the
Comanches. 6
Spain's European rivals also created tensions by encouraging Native attacks against New Mexico. Lured by trading markets in the West and Southwest, the French entered the Missouri River area and moved onto the Great
Plains early in the eighteenth century. French traders introduced firearms
to various tribes, such as the Apaches, near New Mexico, upsetting the local
balance of power. At one point in the mid-eighteenth century, an alliance
between the Utes and Comanches seemed particularly threatening to New
Mexico, but they soon fought each other, with the Comanches triumphing.
Expanding their power on the central and southern plains, the Comanches
next scattered the normally pro-Spanish Jicarilla Apaches. Subsequent
Comanche pressure from the north forced the Faraon Apaches into eastern
New Mexico and the Lipan Apaches into southern New Mexic? and west
Texas. Comanche raiding, as well as trading, shrank Spain's northern frontier. However, the French defeat during the French and Indian War removed French interests from New Mexico's internal warfare in 1762.7
Domestic and imperial reforms finally provided peace treaties during
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Under King Carlos III (17591788), Spain undertook efforts to strengthen her military, expand economic
growth, and improve royal administration. Increased imperial competition
in North America forced Carlos III to strengthen New Mexico as a buffer
zone that could protect the valuable mines of northern Mexico. To tie the
Southwest together, Spain eventually created a comandancia general (commandant general), a new administrative unit covering California, Sonora,
New Mexico, Coahuila, and Texas in 1776. Madrid hoped to consolidate
the Rockies, Plains, and Pacific Northwest under its control. Meanwhile,
ongoing conflict with the Apaches led to a deportation program that considerably weakened the numerous tribes. Reinforcements of well-trained regular Spanish army troops, whose coordinated campaigns increased military
pressure, forced Apaches, Navajos, and Comanches to sue for peace in 1775
and 1786. In return for annual gifts, food rations, horses, and supplies, warriors promised to honor these long-sought peace treaties. During the late
178os, the Comanche, Ute, and Navajo nations also enlisted in Spanish
armies as auxiliaries against defiant Apaches. Implicit in these treaties were
Spanish assurances that the king would protect each tribe from the others,
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unless a nation broke the truce. No trade with foreigners would be allowed.
In 1786, the Mexican viceroy established a system of reservations called
establecimientos de paz (peace establishments), which later became the
model for u.s. reservations in the nineteenth century. Worried about external challenges, Spanish officials appreciated Comanche and Apache reports of the movements of U.S. traders and trappers on the Great Plains. 8
The peace establishments represented a conscious turn away from mission
programs to trade relationships as the fundamental Spanish mechanism for
managing Indians in far northern New Spain.
As Spanish power began to fade in the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, colonial authorities had to pay special attention to Navajo challenges. The Navajo strategy after 1800 was to conduct raids on Spanish settlements and then request peace shortly afterward. The Spanish responded by
counterattacking in great strength at Canyon de Chelly, a principal Navajo
sanctuary, resulting in the chieftains' request for peace. Signed on 12 May

1805 at Jemez Pueblo, the peace treaty featured a Navajo promise that the
nation would not claim.the.Cebolleta area, that it would return Spanish
children and other captives seized earlier, that it would make no treaties
with nations hostile to Spain, and that it would punish Navajo raiders. In
return the Navajos received the right to trade with the Spanish, and to plant
crops and graze herds on their lands. Despite some individual clashes, the
Navajos seemed to comply with treaty terms, even turning over criminals to
the governor. In response the Spanish offered land in the hope that agriculture would become a permanent feature of Navajo life.9
During the twilight of Spanish rule in New Mexi~o, Gov. Facundo
Melgares concluded the empire's last major treaty, this time with the Navajos. After learning from a Navajo collaborator named JoaquIn that a Navajo
faction planned to attack the Spanish settlements, a preemptive campaign
againstthe militants triumphed in February 1819. Melgares appointed JoaquIn
general of all Navajos with the understanding that they would now devote
themselves to subsistence farming. Both Navajo and Spanish criminals were
to be handed over to Santa Fe officials. With the struggles for independence in Mexico and South America reaching a climax, the treaty struck on
31 October 1819 emphasized the absolute necessity for peace on the part of
the Navajos. In exchange the Spanish promised outright ownership oflands
that Navajos had been harvesting earlier on an informal basis, a measure
consistent with Spanish policy. Furthermore, Spanish authorities prohibited the grazing of Spanish cattle near Navajo fields to prevent livestock
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damage to Navajo farms. To cement the peace, both parties agreed to exchange four young men as hostages each year. Their upkeep would be paid
for by Spanish officials. The Spanish offered gifts of money to friendly, cooperative Navajo leaders if they complied with the. treaty over the long term. 1O
New Mexico under the Mexican Republic

During Mexico's struggle for independence in the 181OS, a wave of republican fervor swept through New Mexico. As Spain fought against French invaders in Iberia as well as colonial rebels in northern Mexico, New Mexico
was cut off from government supplies and trade commodities traditionally
sent north from Chihuahua. In the meantime, Anglo traders from Missouri
began to trade with Indians on the northern fringe of New Mexico, in clear
violation of Spanish prohibitions. When Mexico won its independence in
1821, New Mexican authorities opened the province's borders to Anglo traders and merchants. Businessmen from Missouri instantly beat a path to New
Mexico, inaugurating the Santa Fe trade. Ox- and mule-drawn wagon trains-quickly carved out trade routes to Santa Fe and then to Chihuahua'. Those
who benefited most from the new econoinic activity were the merchants
and landowners of New Mexico.
One month after Emperor Agustin Iturbide assumed power in Mexico
City, Governor Melgares had to send out another expedition against the
Navajos. The 1819 treaty had been casual in terms of interpreting its provisions and making good on promises, but Melgares signed a new peace treaty
with the Navajos on 29 October 1822. The new accord featured a reciprocal
exchange of captives, freedom for the Navajos to trade and travel throughout New Mexico, and the appointment of a new general, provided that the
Navajos would accept Segundo as their national leader. However, Melgares
never exchanged the captives, probably because Jose Antonio Vizcarra succeeded him as governor before the year 1822 ended. Under Vizcarra, Mexican policy in New Mexico emphasized the conquest of indigenous nations.
Thus, Vizcarra sent the Navajos an ultimatum demanding the return of
enslaved captives, conversion to Catholicism, and resettlement in villages
around missionsY The new governor ignored the fact that previous Spanish
attempts to resettle the Navajos had failed. The new treaty foundered, and
both sides prepared for conflict.
Still, Governor Vizcarra was able to sign a more imaginative treaty shortly
afterward. The governor mobilized a substantial force of fifteen hundred
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troops to campaign throughout New Mexico, leading the Navajos to agree
to peace on 20 January 1824. The accord is notable for stipulations calling
for a reciprocal exchange of Navajo and Nuevomexicano captives. Another
clause promised the release of Navajo captives held in Mexico City. Article
6 required Navajo headmen to compel their people to give up stolen Mexican property. Article 7 went so far as to "ask for the aid of local authorities"
if Nuevomexicanos stole property from Navajos. The major problem was
that chronic labor shortages pressured Nuevomexicanos to capture and enslave Indians and to receive indigenous slaves - particularly children - from
Native trade partners in exchange for horses. Although Mexican law forbade slavery, local officials sanctioned it anyway. From the perspective of
some Native tribes, human captives were almost as valuable as horses as
compensation for individuals lost in warfare and as trade itemsY
The Mexican governor in New Mexico also concluded a treaty with the
Comanches in August 1826. Both sides agreed that the Pecos River would
be the limit of Comanche occupation and that the Comanches could not
pass over the right bank without informing Mexican officials. In return for
subsistence commerce, the Comanches promised not to disrupt the roads
between Santa Fe and Missouri and to aid trade caravans as much as possible. The governor promised to reestablish the Spanish practice of gift distribution in Santa Fe but never followed throughY Meanwhile, the Apaches
began to raid south into Sonora and Chihuahua.
Once Mexico began administrating New Mexico, the territory's relations
with the indigenous groups broke down. As financial and political turbulence weakened the young Mexican republic, many of the formidable Spanish institutions crumbled. The independence movement completely
disrupted the Spanish establecimientos de paz, and the Spanish and Mexican abandonment of the missions and presidios weakened frontier defenses
against Native assaults. Mexico still recognized land grants conceded to
Pueblos by the Spanish crown, but the new republic, as well as state governments, enacted legislation that weakened the legal protections of indigenous
land and water rights.
Another problem was the collapse of the old alliance between New
Mexico and the Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Jicarilla Apaches, a cooperative arrangement that Spanish administrators had cultivated carefully
during the late eighteenth century. Rations to pacify the Comanches and
Apaches dwindled. Violence among Apaches, Comanches, Navajos, and
New Mexicans increased during the 183os. New Mexico could field only
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nine hundred regulars and militia by the middle of the decade. In the Tucson area, Apaches began to gain the upper hand by the 1840s. Regular Mexican armies and informal armed groups invaded Navajo territory in search of
livestock and slaves. Impoverished members of the Navajo nation continued to rely on raiding to increase their wealth despite the attempts of their
elders to work out peaceful relations. Anxious Pueblos, often the victims of
Navajo expansion, allied themselves with any military force that would lash
out against Navajos.14
Restoring peace was a perplexing problem for Mexico. The pattern of
raiding, tranquility, and further conflict had characterized the northern frontier since the Spanish arrived in the late sixteenth century. War with Spain
and the Comanches pushed the Utes off the buffalo plains, forcing them to
plunder sedentary Spanish Mexicans in order to flesh out their economic
subsistence. Indians armed with rifles obtained from unscrupulous French,
Anglo, and even Mexican traders were difficult for New Mexicans to deal
with. The use of rifles in annual hunts led Plains Indians to overharvest
bison herds, on which their survival and independence depended. As a result, Navajos, Utes, and Apaches intensified their raiding. Disturbed by the
sale of intoxicating beverages to indigenous groups, the civil governor,
Donaciano Vigil, considered allowing local Nuevomexicanos to purchase
weapons from the North Americans to defend themselves. 15 Speaking out
against this policy, Padre Antonio Jose Martinez urged a humane approach
to New Mexico Indian policy. During the Mexican and early U.S. periods,
the outspoken pastor from Taos became a major figure in the territory's
-political affairs, consistently urging Native freedom, tolerance, and education. 16 His response to the unsettled state of tribal-Mexican relations was to
write an exposicion (interpretation) arguing for the human rights of indigenous peoples. Among other things, the padre's brilliant an~lysis of the situation stated:
Although the vast uncultivated fields of Mexico are deserted, they were
once occupied by these wild nations, and it was formerly observed that,
at a time anterior to the Mexican empire, they were inhabited by an
intelligent, numerous, and industrial people, the aborigines of our
republic. 17
Specifically, Padre Martinez proposed that all Indians be induced to live in
Mexican society, to cultivate lands as farmers and ranchers, to develop arts
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and industries, and to adhere to the rest of the republican institutions established by Mexico. More than anything else, the padre steadfastly believed
that education would assimilate and stimulate indigenous communities.
Printing the exposici6n on his own press, the padre distributed it to influentialleaders inside and outside New Mexico. A copy even went to Mexican
president Gen. Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna. 18
Mexico enjoyed peaceful relations more with the Pueblos than with any
other Natives in New Mexico. The Pueblos were an important group because they comprised nearly one-third of New Mexico's population, 43,433
souls by 1827. Particularly critical to Mexican control was the public display of at least a nominal Catholicism by large numbers of Pueblos. In
the Spanish tradition, Mexican authorities allowed the Pueblos to maintain their own religious customs as well as to enjoy a loose autonomy over
their villages. 19
On the other hand, the Navajos gradually gained the upper hand in their
frequent conflict with New Mexicans during the Mexican period. The pastoral and semisedentary Navajos raided northward into Ute country and
eastward into the upper and middle Rio Grande. Gov. Manuel Armijo (1827-

1829 and 1837-1844), a native Nuevomexicano, rejected Navajo overtures
until they signed a peace treaty in July 1839. Like the Spanish, Armijo appointed a single spokesman for the entire Navajo nation-a representative
who in turn would be under the authority of a Mexican prefect. The Mexicans, maintaining a hardnosed position, insisted that they be allowed to
keep their Navajo captives but that Mexican prisoners of the Navajos be
returned. Under Armijo's policy, Navajos who committed murder would
have to be surrendered to Mexican authorities. The Navajos objected to
that stipulation, fearing that those Navajos found guilty of murder would be
hanged by the Mexicans. If a Mexican sheepherder killed a Navajo, he
would pay an indemnity of thirty sheep to the victim's family and be punished according to Mexican law. The 1839 treaty also attempted to deal with
the vexing slavery issue by stating that Navajo families that escaped from
their masters would be free upon arrival in their homeland. 20 Since no exchange of hostages took place, peace was doomed by October 1839. The
Navajos resumed the fighting, demanding the return of slaves seized by
Mexican military expeditions.
Armijo finally decided that an offer of local autonomy, similar to that
enjoyed by Pueblos, would yield positive results, particularly when the Navajos learned that their autonomy had the sanction of the executive office in
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Santa Fe. The Mexicans also offered monetary. rewards, but the Navajos
spurned the enticement of "a small gratification" in return for the·Mexican
ratification of four chieftains elected by Navajo tribes. 21 Exercising the autonomy already in their hands, the Navajos would have nothing to do with
Mexicans passing judgment on their leaders.
By 1841 Mexican military commanders obtained agreements for open
trade between Navajo and Mexican communities, a policy that had been a
long-standing Navajo goal. The Navajos pledged themselves to establishing
a sedentary lifestyle, a desire of Padre MartInez. After both sides decided to
free captives and sign a series of treaties in 1841, the Mexicans hoped that
the turbulent New Mexican frontier had finally become stabilized. A mutual promise not to capture slaves seemed to offer the territory some hope.
Governor Armijo undoubtedly heaved a sigh of relief when he received an
optimistic report that, in return for permission to pasture their animals freely,
the Navajos were "dedicating themselves to planting on the banks of the
Puercos River, very close to the frontier."22 Violence and raiding returned,
however, when the Navajos released their captives and the Mexicans refused to reciprocate. 2l
Two years later, additional peace efforts met a similar fate. Jose Sarracino,
inspector of the New Mexico militia, reported to the new governor, Juan
Andres Archuleta, that several Navajo leaders wanted peace, despite the
robberies committed by younger, more aggressive Navajo warriors. To cultivate and maintain peace, Sarracino recommended giving cooperative Navajo chiefs the land that they had solicited during earlier negotiations. In
return, the Mexicans obtained a Navajo pledge of assistance on a projected
military campaign against Apaches and Utes to the north and east. Military
cooperation became imperative for Navajos as well as Mexicans because
Apaches and Utes were an ongoing threat to Sonora and Navajo country.24
The new peace treaty, ratified on 23 March 1844, also offered Navajos the
possibility of settling in and, opening trad~ with Mexican villages. The Nava;os agreed to reward those concessions by allowing their Mexican captives to return to Mexican-controlled areas. Mexican authorities still refused
to release Navajo prisoners, but a new provision gave Navajos the option to
pay a ransom for the liberation of Navajo slaves held by Mexicans. Although
Mexican authorities warned that further Navajo raiding would result in a
general war, Article 7 of the treaty addressed Mexican fears of its northern
neighbor: "When the enemies of the Mexican republic and those of the
Navajo tribe try to make war upon them, the contracting parties remain
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obligated to impede the aggression or to give prompt news in order to free
them from it."25 The provision essentially outlined a mutual defense pact
against the United States, an expansive country that threatened to inundate
all nations lying across its path.
Mexican hopes of an alliance with Native nations against U.S. expansion
and its ability to formulate relatively successful treaties soon crashed on familiar problems. On the eve of the U.S.-Mexico War, Native warriors again
would not honor the treaties and began to attack ranches, villages, and farms.
The Navajos became particularly active late in the spring of 1843, killing
settlers, carrying women and children into slavery, and stealing hundreds of
cattle and sheep. Likewise, the Utes began attacking settlements in New
Mexico. 26 Even under such dire conditions, Nuevomexicanos looked in vain
for military aid from the central government, which political factionalism
and turmoil crippled during the early 1840s.

The U.S. Hegemony
Uprooting Natives east of the Mississippi River and relocating them to the
West was U.S. Indian policy prior to the war with Mexico. Labeled the Great
American Desert in the early 1820S, those lands lying west of Arkansas, Missouri, and the Missouri River were designated the Permanent Indian Frontier by U.S. policymakers. Presidents from James Monroe to John Tyler
established this frontier in an attempt to encourage westward settlement
while confining indigenous tribes to less desirable areas and opening up
new lands for U.S. settlers.
The Permanent Indian Frontier, once thought to be the solution to the
indigenous dilemma, collapsed after the United States declared war on
Mexico in 1846. Under Polk's orders, the Army of the West, commanded by
Brig. Gen. Stephen W. Kearny, successfully conquered and occupied New
Mexico and California, and ambitious Anglo settlers followed in its wake
over the next decade. These new settlers damaged indigenous sanctuaries
in the Permanent Indian Frontier. 27 The U.S. government also chipped away
at the Native zone by laying claim to large tracts of land. It quickly became
apparent to Navajos and other southwestern tribes that the U.S. Army operated under two agendas: to defeat Mexico and claim Mexican or Indian
territory for the United States.
The results of White migration and decisions by U.S. officials to protect
their citizens from their indigenous neighbors motivated the Army of the
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West to negotiate peace treaties with the tribes. Although more successful
than similar attempts by Spain and Mexico, failure to enforce the terms of
the treaties produced hostilities that doomed the indigenous communities
to a lifestyle like the one they had lived before US. forces arrived. Washington, D.C., recognized these problems to a certain degree and compelled
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to respond.
Polk's election to the presidency as an advocate of national expansion in
1844 predetermined the outcome of Indian policy in the Southwest. Virtually everyone in Washington, D.C., understood Polk's well-advertised objectives for acquiring new territories beyond the Mississippi River. As he
settled the Oregon dispute with Britain during spring 1846, Polk turned his
attention toward obtaining Mexican California and New Mexico. Thus,
after the declaration of war on Mexico, Polk surprised nobody when he sent
the Army of the West under Kearny toward Santa Fe. By means of a confidential message from the War Department, Polk directed the Army of the
West to march along the Santa Fe Trail and occupy New Mexico. Upon
consolidating U.S. power there, Kearny was to lead a portion of his army
overland to claim California for the United States. Kearny's army of sixteen
hundred regulars and volunteers-the latter under the command of Col.
Alexander W. Doniphan -departed from Fort Leavenworth on the Missouri
River in June 1846 and began to move into New Mexico that August. z8 Kearny
marched ahead of Doniphan in order to secure Santa Fe. Merchant caravans bound for Santa Fe and Mexican towns and cities farther south followed obediently behind the US. column.
When Kearny arrived at Las Vegas, New Mexico, the first Mexican village on the Santa Fe Trail, he decided to declare the terms of US . occupation. After excitedly dismounting his horse and clambering onto the roof of
a prominent house, Kearny asserted his government's claim to New Mexico
and encouraged the residents of Las Vegas to swear an oath ofloyalty to the
United States. With the threat of armed force behind him, Kearny felt satisfied that the Nuevomexicanos would bow to his wishes. 29
But what about the Indians? Would they force Kearny to carry out a dangerous attack against them? To gauge the possibility of Native resistance,
Kearny also sent troops ahead of the main column to gather information.
They reported that "the Pueblos, Yutas and other Indian tribes, to the number of 5,000, had combined with the New Mexicans to oppose our march,
and that they would annoy our lines every day."30 Meanwhile, rumors from
all sides insisted that various Pueblo factions within New Mexico would
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join Mexican forces to expel the U.S. invaders. Such gossip proved to be
unfounded. On the other hand, Mexican authorities feared that U.S. military leaders would attempt to incite Indians against Mexico. At this stage,
however, the Pueblos, historically divided among themselves, were reluctant to engage in any hostilities, and their loyalty to Mexico was doubtful.
Instead, many Pueblos favored an accommodation with the Army of the
West. As U.S. troops approached Santa Fe in mid August, a Pueblo chief
informed Kearny that "Governor Armijo had visited Taos and persuaded
the Pueblos to join his army; but the wise men of the Pueblos ... told
Armijo that it was useless to fight the Americans."31 This discussion and
others like it throughout Pueblo country played a significant role in the
United States gaining control over New Mexico during the summer and
fall of 1846.
By the time Kearny reached the Mexican army's encampment, it had
fled. Meanwhile, U.S. merchants with business ties to Santa Fe, particularly George T. Howard and James W. Magoffin, had been collecting covert intelligence at the request of the U.S. government. As the Army of the
West entered New Mexico, the War Department ordered Magoffin and
Howard to persuade Governor Armijo not to fight the U.S. troops. With a
caravan of wagons carrying over a million dollars' worth of champagne,
claret, and other merchandise, Magoffin arrived in Santa Fe under a truce
flag and likely persuaded Armijo to withdraw and accept U.S. annexation.
The Mexican commander of Tucson withdrew his troops five months later
in December 1846.32 Indeed, the Army of the West entered Santa Fe without opposition on 18 August 1846. By then, Armijo had fled south to Chihuahua with his Mexican regulars.
These events help explain why Kearny and his forces marched unopposed into Santa Fe and enjoyed peace for the remainder of the year. After
his arrival, Kearny clarified the terms of U.S. occupation. Speaking to the
citizens on the Santa Fe plaza, Kearny emphasized that his army had come
as friends of the Nuevomexicanos, that New Mexico had become part of
the United States, that Nuevomexicanos were now U.S. citizens, and that
U.S. authorities and troops would observe the right of religious freedom in
New Mexico. Moreover, he promised that no theft or homicide would be
tolerated by the United States. When his address concluded, Kearny attended a Catholic mass and hosted a dance. Shortly afterward, Pueblo chiefs
arrived in Santa Fe to declare their allegiance to the United States. Four
days after his initial arrival, Kearny also warned that resistance to his author-
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ity would be "folly or madness."33 In late September, sensing that New Mexico
was relatively secure, Kearny began the long march westward with the battalion of First Dragoons. Colonel Doniphan remained behind with the
Missouri volunteers in Santa Fe and considered an attack on Chihuahua.
Clearly, many Nuevomexicanos supported U.S. annexation out of their
assumption that the U.S. army would control Native Americans in New
Mexico better than the Mexican government had. To the Mexican population as well as U.S. authorities, the Navajos emerged as the primary threat to
peace and stability. As several hundred settlers arrived in New Mexico from
other parts of the United States, the Navajos resumed their raids on New
Mexican settlements. The Navajos had no intention to wipe out Mexican
or Anglo settlers, because the settlements offered easy access to sheep and
cattle. 34 However, U.S. authorities believed that, to keep the Mexican American citizens compliant, the Navajos had to be pacified.
The migration of Whites into and across Indian homelands became the
foremost difficulty for the U.S. government in New Mexico. The problem
became more serious because there were already settlers living on and around
indigenous lands. As the Army of the West moved through Apache territory
toward California, settlers took possession of localities previously labeled as
"Indian land." This became the main factor that instigated various tribes to
raid settlements. 35 Navajo refusal to stop raiding, despite the presence of the
Missouri volunteers, inevitably forced Kearny to conclude that the Navajos
had become an impediment to the imposition of U.S. authority in New
Mexico. Since Kearny had pledged his protection to New Mexicans, he
had to act. 36
Kearny selected the unhappy Missouri volunteers to pacify the Navajos.
On 16 September, Kearny ordered Doniphan to organize a peace council
with the Navajos. Already discouraged from not having been paid,
Doniphan's soldiers became upset by this delay, which now diverted them
from their plan to attack Chihuahua. The Missouri volunteers were anxious to engage the Mexican garrison in Chihuahua, not the Navajos in western New Mexico. 37
Near Socorro, New Mexico, Kearny sent his order to Doniphan to march
against the Navajos. Specifically, Kearny instructed Doniphan to "send a
military expedition }nto the country of those [Navajo] Indians, to secure a
peace and better conduct from them in the future." Furthermore, Doniphan
was to obtain from the Navajos "all the prisoners, and all the property they
hold, which may have been stolen from the inhabitants of the territory of
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New Mexico, to be given up and he will require of them such security of
their future good conduct as he may think ample and sufficient."JS Therefore, Doniphan's expedition assumed the responsibility to protect U.S. citizensincluding Nuevomexicanos-and their interests from the real or perceived
threat of indigenous attack.
Peace negotiations from a position of strength became imperative to consolidate Kearny's victory. Mter ordering Doniphan's regiment into Navajo
territory, Kearny also encouraged New Mexicans, Anglo and Hispanic, to
wage war on the Navajos. His proclamation advised the settlers "to form war
parties, to march into the country of their enemies, the Navajos, to recover
their property, to make reprisals and obtain redress for the many insults
received from them."39 Thus, in this aggressive atmosphere, Doniphan's forces
sought to fashion a peace treaty with the Navajos.
The atrocities committed by the Missouri volunteers and accompanying
civilian militia against the Navajos are not precisely known. However, Charles
Bent, Kearny's appointed civil governor of New Mexico, registered his displeasure to Doniphan. Upon receiving numerous complaints of the "insubordinate and often oppressive and abusive conduct" of Doniphan's troops,
Bent ordered the colonel to "interpose your authority to compel the soldiers
to respect the rights of the inhabitants."40 The volunteers who served under
Doniphan wrote glowingly about his conduct, but Bent's letter indicates a
quite different reality.
With winter beginning in the mountains, Doniphan realized that his
campaign would have to be quick as well as decisive. His three companies
split up to scout for Navajos in the mountains and agreed to rendezvous at
Ojo del Oso near present-day Gallup. Dressed i~ little but summer clothing, Doniphan's troops suffered from cold, exposure, and typhoid fever.
Several men died during the operation. With the aid of Maj. William Gilpin,
Doniphan's forces made contact with Narbona, the leader of the Navajo
faction that had indicated a desire for peace. Other Navajos claimed that
they had signed preliminary understandings with Doniphan's subordinates.
The colonel urged them to come to Ojo del Oso as soon as possible. As the
volunteers made their way to the meeting place, they marched through
snow that was almost waist deep. Upon reaching Ojo d~l Oso, they were
relieved to find that the significant chiefs from each clan had arrived. Also
present were other subordinate Navajo leaders and warriors, a total of about
five hundred Indians. 41
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As Doniphan negotiated his treaty with the Navajos, he outlined the new
relationship between the United States and the indigenous peoples of New
Mexico. He offered little doubt as to what awaited those who would resist:
"We now have full possession of New Mexico ... when they [Navajos] now
stole property from the New Mexicans, they were stealing from us [U.S.
government]; and when they killed them [New Mexicans], they were killing our people ... this would not be suffered any longer; it would be greatly
to their advantage for Americans to settle in New Mexico."41 Sarcilla Largo
was one of the few Navajos to respond defiantly:
Americans! You have a strange cause for war against the Navajos.
We have waged war against the New Mexicans for several years....
We had just cause for all this. You have lately commenced a war
against the same people.... You have therefore conquered them, the
very thing we have been attempting to do for so many years. You now
turn upon us for attempting to do what you have done yourselves. 43
To some Navajos, whose people had waged war on first the Spanish and
then the Mexicans for well over a hundred years, Doniphan's demands
seemed ludicrous and outrageous.
The majority of the other Navajos present at Ojo del Oso, however, expressed a strong desire for peace. Doniphan reciprocated by inviting young
Navajos to learn a trade in the United States. Their intelligence, he explained, enabled them to learn civilized skills that would help develop the
Navajo people. Several Navajos offered to accompany Doniphan' back to
Missouri but reconsidered when they learned that Doniphan would soon
march his troops southward to attack Chihuahua. Once Sarcilla Largo concluded that the Navajos had no desire to fight the United States, the two
sides signed the following treaty:
Article 1. A firm and lasting peace and amity shall henceforth exist
between the American people and the Navajo tribe ofIndians.
Article 2. The people of New Mexico and the Pueblo tribe ofIndians
are included in the term "American people."
Article 3. A mutual trade, as between people of the same nation, shall
be carried on between these several parties; the Americans,Mexicans,
and Pueblos being free tovisit all portions of the Navajo country, and
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the Navajos all portions of the American country without molestation,
and full protection shall be mutually given.
Article 4- There shall be a mutual restoration of all prisoners, the
several parties being pledged to redeem by purchase such as may not
be exchanged each for each.
Article 5. All property taken by either party from the other, since the
18th of August last, shall be restored. 44
The treaty provisions indicate the durability ofIndian policy issues in the
Southwest. Over the course of nearly two and a half centuries, Spain, Mexico,
and the United States managed to work out trade understandings with Natives, but only Spanish and U.S. officials secured the return of prisoners
held by them. Unlike Mexico, Spain and the United States eventually
brought their military superiority to bear in winning somewhat durable treaty
understandings. Although contemporary scholars such as Hubert H. Bancroft
considered Doniphan's treaty, signed on 22 November 1846, a meaningless
gesture, it enabled the Army of the West to initiate U.S. control over New
Mexico. 45 The treaty did not, however, end Navajo resistance, which would
continue for another seventeen years.
As with virtually all other treaties between U.S. representatives and indigenous groups, Doniphan's treaty with the Navajos decidedly favored the
United States. The federal government in Washington, D.C., now claimed
New Mexico and its Navajo lands. The treaty also obligated the Navajos, by
threat of superior armed force, to a peace that many considered contradictory. It also represented the first U.S. treaty concluded with Indians inside
the old Mexican frontier. This crucial 'initial step helped lay the groundwork for future U.S. Indian policy in the American West after the U.S.Mexico War.
Other tribes in New Mexico also gave in to the United States. The Utes
had already agreed to peace terms with Doniphan on 15 October 1846. Mter
signing the treaty at Ojo del Oso, Doniphan and three Navajo chiefs completed a sixty-mile journey to meet with the Zunis, with whom the Navajos
were at war. Although the Zunis and Navajos bickered with one another,
Doniphan persuaded them to sign peace treaties at Zuni Pueblo on 26 November. Eventually, however, ongoing hostilities would move the military
governor of New Mexico to issue the Zunis fifty muskets with which to
defend themselves against the Navajos. Because the Hopis far to the west
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remained quiet, Doniphan considered them compliant enough not to bother
visiting. In general, the Pueblos remained largely unopposed to U.S. occupation. But the heads of New Mexican municipal governments began to try
asserting authority over Pueblo villages, while Mexican and U.S. claimants
questioned the right of Pueblo villages to the ownership of highly desirable
agricultural and grazing lands. Despite the proximity of U.S. authorities in
Santa Fe to Pueblos in the Rio Grande Valley and to the west, the United
States never signed a treaty with any Pueblo tribes. 46
Traditional animosities between Mexico and the Apaches minimized the
threat of prolonged warfare between Kearny and the Apaches. The Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora had been so plagued by Apache raids
that they began offering generous bounties on Apache scalps, which degenerated into a gruesome industry. Soon, not only Mexicans but also Anglo
Americans, runaway slaves, and other indigenous tribes took part in the scalp
trade sponsored in northern Mexico. Therefore, the Apaches could distinguish the Army of the West as potential allies when it approached the Apache
domain. Not surprisingly, Apache chief Mangas Coloradas contacted Kearny
to propose a treaty that would unite both their nations to battle the Mexi- .
cans. Kearny accepted gladly the Apache promise not to raid the Anglo
settlers, but the general declined the proposed joint campaign with the
Apaches because he had to campaign in California and likely distrusted the
ApachesY
Doniphan, however, retaliated when Apaches threatened the movements
of his Missouri volunteers. Fighting the Apaches cemented Doniphan's relations with some Mexican communities that had normally avoided all contact with Apaches. But when Nuevomexicano com~unities realized that
Doniphan's force could check Apache raiders, if not intimidate them, they
changed their minds. When Apaches stole mules and other stock, Mexican
communities participated with Doniphan's troops in counterattacks against
the Apaches. 48 However, the Missouri volunteers never engaged the Apaches
or the Navajos, despite Kearny's orders to subdue them.
Governor Bent, meanwhile, decided to relay information on the Native
populations to Sec. of State James P. Buchanan. Bent urged the government to take "immediate action" on what he considered eight "powerful
tribes" including Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and others. He argued, "Until
these Indians are effectually subdued, they will continue to blight the prosperity of that portion of this Territory which is exposed to their depredations." Treaty making was obviously of the highest necessity, but the U.S.
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government could "scarcely" count on the Indians enforcing "any peace
they may make until they have been made to feel the strength of our government."49 On 10 November 1846, Bent provided the U.S. commissioner
of Indian affairs with valuable demographic data showing that nearly forty
thousand indigenous peoples living in almost seven thousand lodges in the
New Mexico region now fell under U.S. supervision. He concluded, "It
becomes a subject of serious import how the numerous and savage tribes
are to be controlled and managed."50 Governor Bent's conclusions foretold
future military campaigns against southwestern Natives who failed to keep
the peace and to comply with U.S. Indian policy.
Doniphan's expedition, in conjunction with the Army of the West, is a
vivid illustration of how the U.S.-Mexico War affected Indian policy and
indigenous peoples. Whether Kearny or Doniphan realized the irrevocable
consequences of their policies and operations is unknown. Federal officials
directly associated with the formulation of Indian policy grasped the implications and drew up measures to deal with the acquisition of new territories
and the inhabitants residing within those areas. Thus, U.S. military protection of its citizens and economic interests initiated the changes that led to
the modification ofIndian policy drafted in Washington, D.C. The purpose
of treaty making, which followed the suppression of Indian threats, defined
relations between indigenous groups and the federal government. 51 The treaty
process, therefore, imposed obligations and limitations upon New Mexico
tribes at the convenience of the federal government. Doniphan's expedition
clearly illustrates the patterns of Indian-White relations that had been developing for over two hundred years.
Although the U.S. conquerors attempted to stop the outright enslavement of Native peoples throughout the Southwest, they responded to Natvies
by considering them childish and unworthy of equality or full civil rights.
U.S. authorities in California and New Mexico urged apprehensive Indian
leaders to trust their new government. But the treaties or agreements with
the indigenous populations did not prepare Kearny, Doniphan, or other U.S.
leaders for the impact that their new hegemony would have on the Native
populations in the Southwest. A simple desire for peace and their overly optimistic belief in future harmony would not be enough to preserve order. 52
Doniphan soon learned that his Navajo treaty was not having its desired
effect. Before he left New Mexico for Chihuahua, he received reports that
the Navajos had resumed raiding the settlements. In 1847 Indians killed an
estimated 47 Americans, destroyed 330 wagons, and butchered or dispersed
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about 6500 head of stock. Doniphan was either unaware of the history of
Navajo struggles against Mexico or simply ignored that historical legacy, for
he committed some of the same blunders that the Mexicans had. His insistence that the Navajos stop raiding seemed ridiculous to the Navajo leadership; Mexican and Ute forces never stopped attacking Navajo country in
search oflivestock and slaves. Subjected to such violence, the Navajos naturally struck back. For the next twenty years, Navajos endured a cycle of war·
and peace. After the US.-Mexico War, US. soldiers routinely entered the
Navajo homeland to wage war and enforce peace. The Navajos present at
the discussions with US. authorities would agree to peace terms, only to be
discredited by warriors who did not attend the talks. Hostilities eventually
resumed. 53
Despite the rapid conquest of Nuevomexicanos by the Army of the West
in August 1846, the occupation became a sanguinary affair within six months.
Dominated by agents of the American Party, the civil government formed
by Brigadier General Kearny included only two Hispanos, otherwise freezing out representatives of the leading New Mexican families. Although not
recognized by U.S. authorities, the Mexican legislature in New Mexico
continued to meet in defiance of the new US. order. Unruly U.S. troops,
the volunteers especially, abused and alienated New Mexican residents in
occupied towns and settlements. In December 1846, US. authorities unmasked a Nuevomexicano plot to smash the US. occupation government.
Consequently, political and social conditions in New Mexico were tense
and combustible when the new year opened.
The spark that touched off a Nuevomexicano revolt came when angry
Pueblos demanded the release of several jailed Taos residents in January
1847. Although treated fairly up to this point, the Pueblos would not accept
those arrests-arbitrary in their eyes-and rose up in rebellion to US. rule.
Rebels killed Governor Bent and six other individuals related to the American Party. Major battles between US. and insurgent forces at La Canada de
Santa Cruz and at Taos Pueblo attracted many Mexican participants. A fierce
US. assault eventually broke rebel resistance and killed dozens of fighters.
Formal executions of twenty-six Nuevomexicanos for taking up arms contrasted sharply with the justice generally delivered during the Spanish and
Mexican periods, when such executions were uncommon. Manuel Cortes,
a commissioned agent of the Mexican government, led in the Mora valley a
subsequent revolt that encouraged many villages in northern New Mexico
to rise up against the United States. Cortes's guerrillas attacked US. troops
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on remote roads and in grazing camps and stole horses, mules, and cattle
throughout 1847. Thus, in the end, the U.S. conquest of New Mexico did
not entail the peaceful assimilation of the Nuevomexicanos envisioned by
President Polk and other U.S. policymakers. 54
By March 1847, those swift reprisals generally restored order to New
Mexico. The prisoners taken during the revolt were turned over to civil
authorities for trial. Twenty-five were discharged, the grand jury finding insufficient evidence to indict them. However, the grand jury accumulated
evidence enough to bring indictments for treason against four others. The
U.S. territorial court in New Mexico tried and convicted one for treason
and others for murdering Bent. Meanwhile, the court suspended the case of
one prisoner convicted of treason until the governor received word from
Washington, D.C., about whether such a charge could be sustained against
any inhabitant of New Mexico whose U.S. citizenship derived from Kearny's
proclamation of annexation. Well aware that Nuevomexicanos were in fact
still citizens of Mexico until an international treaty severed that tie, President
Polk wisely remitted the sentence of Antonio Maria Trujillo for treason. 55
Mter the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildalgo ending their war, the U.S. government signed three additional
Navajo treaties from 1848 to 1851, but all failed. In May 1848, Col. Edward
W. B. Newby concluded a Navajo peace treaty that emphasized the return
of prisoners by both sides. A particularly sound provision mandated that
Nuevomexicanos stop raiding Navajo villages to take indigenous slaves and
retrieve stolen livestock. U.S. troops faced difficult conditions while attempting to enforce this treaty. One soldier complained of wolves howling around
his tent at night, martial law "severe to the extreme," and smallpox spreading throughout his camp "to a most alarming extent." He continued, "Many
men had died with it and a large number is [sic] now infected."56 His complaints presaged the trying mission of the U.S. Army to keep order in the Far
Southwest after the Mexican-American War.
An 1849 treaty by which the Navajos agreed to accept U.S. jurisdiction,
including trade and transport of goods, included pledges to stop their attacks on settlements and to surrender captives and stolen property. Although
the treaty did not deprive the Navajos of their authority to charge, try, and
punish tribal members of crimes, Navajo jurisdiction did not extend to
Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians of other tribes. Concluded by military governor Lt. Col. John M. Washington, this treaty mandated that the United
States designate Navajo territorial boundaries and apply policies that would
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enhance Navajo prosperity and happiness. To be precise, Navajo lands were
now annexed to New Mexico, with military posts soon to be established.
Although "donations, presents and implements" were promised them in
Article 10, the Navajos never complied with the stringent terms of the treaty
concluded with Lieutenant Colonel Washington. 57 In Washington, D.C.,
Congress refused to appropriate funds to fulfill the terms of the 1849 treaty.
U.S. Indian agents likewise negotiated a similar agreement with the Utes
that same year.
In October 1851, three years after the war with Mexico ended, Gov. James
S. Calhoun negotiated preliminary agreements with Zuni and Hopi leaders. Although the Navajos had rejected four peace proposals earlier that
spring, Calhoun surprised nearly everyone in the territory by meeting with
a Navajo council on Christmas Day 1851 at Jemez. Here, the Navajos actually turned over three hostages as the governor distributed about three thousand dollars' worth of gifts. Like the 1848 and 1849 treaties, this treaty
supposedly represented a "lasting peace" that never materialized. A year
later, a Gila Apache treaty contained pledges that the Indians would cease
raiding and taking captives in Mexico. At least three times, Indian agents in
New Mexico managed to return captives to Mexican custody.58
The cyclic pattern of war and peace and the continuous demands of
settlers for protection induced the U.S. Bureau ofIndian Affairs to devise a
new reservation system. William Medill, who had been appointed to the
position of commissioner of Indian affairs by Polk in 1845, found that his
office entailed more than the simple engagement of party politics. During
his first year, he was completely consumed with the dilemma over how to
manage the crises caused by the westward expansion. In his 1848 annual
report, one year after Doniphan departed New Mexico to conquer Chihuahua, Medill proposed a system that would pacify settlers as well as protect
indigenous tribes from "unsavory white influences." Medill's project would
have modified "Indian country to create two large reservations or colonies
in place of the old barrier line [Permanent Indian Frontier]. The colonies,
one in the north and one in the south, would open much of the western
border to white travel and settlement by relocating the tribes."59
Resembling the Spanish peace establishment, the U.S. reservation system became formal policy in the 1850S. In March 1850, Calhoun began to
urge federal officials to consider establishing a reservation system in the
Southwest. He thought that reservations of fifty square miles for the various
tribes would enable indigenous villages to feed themselves and abandon
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their habit of raiding. Certainly, the sentiment for fixed boundaries between
Native and Hispano/Anglo communities became widespread among New
Mexico's citizens and federal officials. In 1853 Gov. David Meriwether requested that the Indian commissioner allow him to offer treaties that would
terminate tribal title to land closest to White communities. At the same
time, the proposed treaties would remove the tribes as far away as possible
from Whites. In return for such one-sided treaties, Indians would be offered
annuities for the surrendered land. In April 1855, the U.S. Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars for Meriwether to negotiate with southwestern tribes treaties that included fixed boundaries and, for the first time,
that urged them to accept confinement to reservations. 60
On 18 July 1855, Meriwether persuaded Navajo leaders to accept removal
to a reservation of seven thousand square miles between the Rios Colorado,
Grande, and Zuni. By agreeing to accept payments of up to $102,000 by
1876, the Navajos gave up about two-thirds of their former country and could
neither plant nor graze east of the reservation boundary. Most of the reservation land was mountainous with only about one hundred square miles suitable for cultivating crops. Moreover, the Navajos objected to demands that
they surrender seven of their men accused of murder. 61
The reservation system rolled forward in the Southwest. In 1855 the Utes
agreed to a treaty in which they ceded all their land to the United States,
except for a reservation area that hugged the northern New Mexico boundary and in which they promised to remain for one year. Meriwether negotiated four additional treaties with other Utes and Apaches. By the outbreak
of the Civil War, the Navajos had resumed raiding and the U.S. Army had
launched a campaign to break their resistance and place them on a reservation. The defeat of the Confederate invasion from Texas in spring 1862 freed
New Mexico volunteers to prosecute wars against the Apaches and Navajos.
During the fall of 1862, in combination with California volunteers, New
Mexican federal forces defeated the Mescalero Apaches and forced them
onto the Bosque Redondo reservation. Repeatedly invading Navajo land
between 1863 and 1865, the New Mexican troops rounded up Navajos and
placed them at Bosque Redondo, which contained 8,354 Navajos by 1865.
However, this federal experiment in Native acculturation failed: the
Mescaleros fled back to their own territory in 1865, and hundreds of Navajos
died of starvation and disease.
The Treaty of 1868 between the U.S. government and the Navajos marked
the beginning of a new Navajo era because it set aside for their exclusive use
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a reservation of almost four million acres equally straddling northwestern
New Mexico and northeastern Arizona. Article 2 mandated that "other
friendly tribes or individual Indians" could live on the reservation but farming "shall cease to be held in common," while children would be compelled to accept mandatory education from resident instructors. As the
removal of the Navajos from the Bosque Redondo began, a temporary reservation was set up at Ojo Caliente in 1870 for the Apaches because it was a
fertile, well-watered region. As the reservations became institutionalized on
an official basis after the Civil War, they represented the end of indigenous
autonomy in the once Permanent Indian Frontier. 62

Conclusion
Certainly the U.S.-Mexico War resulted in important consequences for
American Indians in the Southwest. Among its most fundamental but often
overlooked results, the war destroyed the final legal barriers to permanent
tribal homelands and enabled the encroachment of Whites on indigenous
lands. Some Native American tribes, such as the Apaches, saw their traditional homelands split apart by the U.S.-Mexico treaty line articulated in
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, but they kept their people united
with frequent international border crossings. The U.S.-Mexican conflict
opened the land 'previously held by Spain and Mexico to U.S. possession
and development. Success in reaching quick accords with Navajos and other
indigenous peoples enabled the U.S. military units to focus on and crush
Mexican forces, culminating in a decisive victory at Embudo, which secured New Mexico on a permanent basis. The early experiences of the U.S.
treaties in New Mexico had greater ramifications for subsequent treaty making with indigenous peoples throughout the West for the next forty years.
Compared to the small militia utilized by Spain and Mexico, U.S. troops
and volunteers were well-equipped and adequately provisioned. In contrast
to the Spanish and Mexican policy of remaining neutral or actively encouraging fights between various tribes, the United States decided to station
sufficient troops to crush any alliance between Nuevomexicanos and
Comanches as well as any internal war between indigenous nations that
would disrupt New Mexico Territory. The civilian population eventually
was prohibited from taking reprisals against indigenous raiders, which they
often took during the Spanish and Mexican periods, for now the federal
government sought to supervise all military activity in the Southwest.
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Reservations illustrate the isolation and subjugation of Native Americans
in New Mexico. In other regions of the United States, the reservation policy
was motivated largely by efforts to free Native lands for White settlement, to
provide areas where indigenous peoples could better be programmed for
assimilation, and to protect them from White encroachment as well as new
vices. In New Mexico, reservation policy differed because the U.S.-Mexican
conflict necessitated neutralizing the possibility of any anticipated indigenous alliance with Mexico. After the war, U.S. policy concentrated on
minimizing intratribal unity. Partly for that reason, the Utes were removed
from New Mexico to their present reservation in Colorado. The weakening
of indigenous ties had economic ramifications as well. Trade between indigenous New Mexican tribes and Plains Indians made New Mexico an
outlet for goods and livestock stolen from the central and southern plains.
But this comanchero trade ended by the 1870s, when the U.S. Army succeeded in placing the Comanches and Apaches on reservations. By then,
the southern buffalo herd had been slaughtered, and the southern plains
tribes lost their primary means of economic autonomy.
Finally, U.S. officials had learned various lessons from Spain and Mexico.
The United States consolidated its victory in New Mexico by adopting missionary efforts, although on a much smaller scale than had the Spanish.
Waves of Protestant missionaries soon arrived and offered medical, educational, and religious benefits that eventually won over sizeable portions of
New Mexico's indigenous nations by the end of the nineteenth century.63
The Spanish establecimiento de paz became the prototype for subsequent
reservations throughout the western United States. With Mexico, Sec. of
State Anthony Butler negotiated an 1832 treaty requiring military escorts
between Missouri and Santa Fe. 64 From 1821 to 1846, the early years of the
Santa Fe trade, federal authorities in Washington, D.C., probably acquired
a basic understanding of how Spanish and early Mexican governments established treaties with Indians in New Mexico. Like Mexico, the United
States never committed enough military force in New Mexico to overwhelm
indigenous resistance in a few years. Fortunately for the new territorial officials during the U.S.-Mexico War, however, the Navajos and Apaches considered the North Americans more as potential allies against the Mexicans
and decided to negotiate with that objective in mind. Once the war with
Mexico ended, the determination to avoid further indigenous raids motivated Mexican leaders to insist that the United States accept responsibility
for halting hostile Indian attacks as part of Article 11 of the Treaty of
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Guadalupe Hidalgo. As a testimony to the durability of conflict between
Native Americans and their foes, the United States persuaded Mexico to
accept deletion of Article 11 upon ratification of the Gadsden Treaty.65 Unlike Mexico and Spain, the United States hesitated to assimilate its indigenous population, not bestowing citizenship until 1924Notes
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Book Reviews

A Woman's Place: Women Writing New Mexico. By Maureen Reed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005. xi + 355 pp. 30 halftones,
notes, bibliography, index. $21.95 paper, ISBN 0-8263-3346-x.)
Maureen Reed, assistant professor ofAmerican Studies at Minnesota State
University Moorhead, explores the themes of multiculturalism, tradition,
and feminism in twentieth-century New Mexico through the writings of
Mary Austin, Mabel Dodge Luhan, Cleofas Jaramillo, Fabiola Cabeza de
Baca, Kay Bennett, and Pablita Velarde. She argues that visitors to the "Land
of Enchantment" often experience what she terms "homesickness," an uncomfortable realization they share with some residents that the state's image as an exemplar of multicultural harmony obscures and distorts the reality
of poverty and ethnic and gender tensions that exist here. Reed demonstrates that the lives of the six women writers named above also reveal considerable dissonance between their expectations and goals and the forces
that shaped their lives and work as women in New Mexico.
Organizing five chapters around the concepts of home and homesickness, Reed begins her biographical studies with two women who ca.me to
New Mexico in the early twentieth century. Luhan and Austin sought personal refuge in the American Southwest, but like other Anglo Americans
they soon extolled Native and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic cultures as alternatives to the ruthless, competitive society of industrial America. Enthusiastic proponents of cultural relativism, they embraced and directed efforts to
mitigate the effects of modernization on Natives and Hispanos and to protect "traditional" cultures. But they maintained their sense of cultural superiority and some of their work retarded or prevented Native Americans and
Hispanos from moving toward economic prosperity.
Hispana and Native writers also saw their ways of life threatened by the
same forces that Luhan and Austin decried, and they too expressed concern
for their cultures and became involved in cultural preservation efforts. In
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recent years, numerous scholars have explored the memoirs that Cleofas
Jaramillo and Fabiola Cabeza de Baca wrote about growing up in wealthy
families in northern New Mexico. Reed's biographies also rely on additional
sources, including letters and interviews with family members, which provide new information about these authors. Reed is less hesitant than some
writers have been to explore the racism inherent in Jaramillo's work that
elevates her Spanish heritage but undervalues Native American contributions to New Mexican Hispanic society. Similarly, Reed's study of Cabeza
de Baca reveals some of the ambiguities of Cabeza de Baca's actions during
her long career as a home economist. Reed's convincing analysis probes the
contradictions of these two women who tried to preserve "traditional" culture even as they abandoned traditional expectations for women when they
sought education and public roles for themselves.
Reed's final two subjects also followed non-traditional paths in education, marriage, and careers. Bennett was the first Navajo woman to publish
her autobiography, and Velarde of Santa Clara Pueblo became an artist
working in paintings rather than in pottery or basketry. Reed's extensively
researched biographies reveal the personal struggles of these two women
whose works depict aspects of traditional Native cultures even as they challenged gender and racial stereotypes.
Reed believes a deeper understanding of the meaning of tradition and a
new concept of women's roles are required before New Mexico can move
beyond the superficial image of a multicultural state toward a true
multiculturalism, where economic disparity, racism, and sexism are eliminated. Students of modern New Mexico will find her book of interest.
Cheryl Foote
'IV! Community College

Moctezuma's Children: Aztec Royalty under Spanish Rule, 1520-1700. By
Donald E. Chipman. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005. xxiii + 200 pp.
Halftones, line drawings, maps, charts, glossary, notes, bibliography, index.
$45.00

cloth,

ISBN 0-292-70628-6.)

Donald Chipman's carefully researched study chronicles the heirs ofAztec
emperor Moctezuma II during the first two centuries of Spanish rule. He
places special emphasis on their efforts to secure entitlements presumably
owed to them as descendants of the "natural lords" of Mexico, the internecine
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struggles among different branches of the family, and the privations of those
who failed to win their cases. Accompanied by detailed genealogical charts,
the book is written in a style accessible to students and general readers. It
contains plenty of detail on the conquest and early history of New Spain to
acquaint these audiences with the context in which the family played out its
legal battles on both sides of the Atlantic.
Three of Moctezuma's children, Mariana, Isabel, and Pedro, survived
the conquest and left heirs. Mariana married a Spaniard and received an
encomienda, but her descendants surrendered it in return for a modest settlement with the crown. Isabel, usually seen as the emperor's principal heir,
was a child-bride three times before the conquest was complete (her last
two spouses were Cuitlahuac and Cuauhtemoc, the ill-fated successors to
Moctezuma). In the 1520S, she married three other Spaniards and had children by two of them. Her most famous descendant, however, was Leonor
Cortes Moctezuma, her illegitimate daughter by Fernando Cortes. Leonor
married Zacatecas mining magnate Juan de Tolosa; their daughter Isabel in
turn wed Juan de Onate, founder of Spanish New Mexico. Successive generations of Isabel's descendants lived in relative poverty as revenues from
encomiendas and other concessions dwindled.
Pedro Moctezuma's consorts were all indigenous women, but, ironically,
his branch of the family eventually found its fortune in Spain. Pedro's illegitimate son Diego Luis settled near Granada and married a granddaughter
of the Duke of Albuquerque. Their mestizo son Pedro Tesif6n married the
daughter of a marquis and later received his own title, Count ofMoctezuma,
that later passed to his granddaughter Ger6nima Marfa. When she wed Joseph Sarmiento de Valladares, a member of the Audiencia of Granada, her
husband became Count of Moctezuma and continued to use the title after
her death in 1692. Four years later Sarmiento became viceroy of New Spain,
and a Moctezuma once again ruled Mexico, but this time it was a Spaniard
with no genetic link to the Aztec emperors.
Hernan Cortes and his Spanish contemporaries wanted Moctezuma's
descendants to serve as worthy models of Hispanization, and Chipman's
evidence clearly shows that they succeeded all too well. Marriage into the
Spanish peerage and the attainment of other coveted Spanish honors (such
as memberships in the military order of Santiago) promised greater security
than perquisites based on kinship with the indigenous rulers of Mexico.
Chipman might have explored in more detail the implications of this insight for less privileged mestizos in New Spain, and he might have drawn
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some comparisons between Mexico's native aristocracy and of the Inca lineage in Peru, but his solid research will provide a useful platform for anyone
wishing to address these questions.
Cheryl E. Martin
University of Texas at El Paso

Uniting Mountain and Plain: Cities, Law, and Environmental Change along
the Front Range. By Kathleen A. Brosnan. (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2002. xii + 276 pp. Halftones, maps, notes, bibliography, index.
$29.95 cloth,

ISBN

0-8263-2352-9.)

Historians of western America have reinterpreted the region's economic
history around two developments: the influence of cities on western hinterlands and the gradual incorporation of those environments into national
and international markets. Kathleen A. Brosnan's careful and insightful study
of Colorado's Front Range-the heavily populated and developed area extending from Fort Collins on the north to Pueblo on the south-extends
this analysis in two ways. First, Brosnan demonstrates that although Denver's
"urban primogeniture" allowed it to dominate the Front Range and its resources, it was only the leading city in an urban system that also included
Colorado Springs, Pueblo, and other communities (p. 11). While Denver
led the development of mining and farming, Colorado Springs became the
leader in tourism, and Pueblo the foremost producer of steel. Second, the
Front Range did not instantly become an economic colony of outside capital, as western historians and westerners themselves often assume about such
places. Brosnan's study reveals considerable local and regional economic
vitality, as inhabitants of Denver, its sister cities, and their hinterlands exerted control over Front Range development into the 189os. Only gradually
did Front Range enterprises succumb to outside control and become enmeshed in a fully modern capitalist economy.
Drawing on meticulous research in manuscripts, government documents,
newspapers, and promotional literature, Brosnan leads the reader through
case studies of Denver, Colorado Springs, and Pueblo and their hinterland
relationships. Combining the techniques of urban, business, environmental, and legal history (Brosnan has credentials in law as well as history), the
author arrives at some fascinating insights. Urban historians, for example,
typically seek to identify the geographical advantages, often proximity to a
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water route or railroad lines that privileged a particular city and contributed
to its rise in power. Denver's peculiar advantage, Brosnan points out, lay in
the geographic intersection of mountain and plain: the city stood at the end
of a long, gentle, westward-trending rise in the high plains, but below the
rugged wall of the Rocky Mountains. This position made it a prime objective for shippers and an outstanding location for merchants, giving the city
an advantage over its rivals. In another surprising example, Brosnan devotes
an entire chapter to American Indians and Front Range cities in which she
draws a correlation between "urban expansion and Indian removal" (p. 40).
The elimination of Indian power on the Front Range followed from the
ambitions of the area's urban leaders to gain control of their hinterlands.
There are many more examples of such analysis, all of which make the
book worthwhile.
Uniting Mountain and Plain joins a growing list of outstanding books
that seek to reinterpret western urban and business history. More importantly, Brosnan has given the people of Colorado and the entire Rocky
Mountain Front an historical narrative that can help them make sense of a
crucially important but heretofore overlooked feature of their past.
Mark Fiege
Colorado State University, Fort Collins

Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest
Borderlands. By James F. Brooks. Omohundro Institute of Early American
History and Culture. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
419 pp. Halftones, maps, tables, appendixes, glossary, index. $55.00 cloth,
ISBN 0-8°78-274-2, $22.50 paper, ISBN 0-8078-5382-8.)
Captives and Cousins is a hallmark of Southwest and Borderlands history. It reworks familiar themes of violent encounters among different tribes
and communities of Native Americans, Hispanics and Mexicans, and Anglo
Americans in a chronological sweep that covers nearly two centuries, while
bringing to the story new empirical evidence and fresh interpretative perspectives. James F. Brooks's rendering of the multiple and uneven borderlands of northwestern New Spain (later divided into northwest Mexico and
the southwest United States) centers thematically on the taking of captives
among each of the major ethnic groups that peopled these extensive geographic spaces as well as within intertribal divisions and across regional
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boundaries. In numerous examples Brooks's coupling of slavery and kinship shows that each of the major players in the secular development of the
borderlands acted as both victim and aggressor, and that the trafficking of
human captives flowed in multiple directions: from as far south as Sonora
and Chihuahua to as far north and east as the Colorado basin and the Great
Plains, even reaching St. Louis, Missouri. His interpretive arguments attempt to synthesize opposing views of the captive trade and the narratives
that it generated ranging from violent seizure and harsh treatment to adoption into the host society. Brooks avoids coming down clearly on one side or
the other of these debates, which are both historical and contemporary. At
times he cloaks these dichotomies in powerful, evocative prose, but begs
the questions of involuntary kinship, coerced labor, and forced sexual relations that define his study.
This ambiguity extends to the several thematic motifs organizing the
complex material of the book's eight chapters. The opening chapter and the
final epilogue advance gender and cross-cultural notions of masculinity and
male honor as the defining framework for understanding trade networks
dealing in commodities, livestock, and human captives. Yet, the substantive
chapters of Brooks's study deal with the political economy and what we
might call the cultural economy of borderlands· slavery, ethnic mixtures,
ethnogenesis, and the inequalities of wealth and power that shaped each of
the social actors who playa major role in this story-Navajos, Comanches,
Utes, Pueblos, Hispanos, and Anglo Americans.
Brooks structures this study around the major spatial and ethnic components of the world he recreates for us, titling the first three chapters with
familiar descriptive terms used in the regional Spanish lexicon: los llaneros,

los pastores, and los montoneses. The next four chapters develop the narrative further into the nineteenth century, revisiting these spatial entities in
terms of "commerce, kinship, and coercion" with special emphasis placed
on the entwined Hispanic-Navajo relations among different bands and clans.
Throughout, Brooks addresses the internal divisions in each of these ethnic
"blocks," belying the assumed meaning of their labels. Thus, among the
Dine, female captives (binaalM) were increasingly consigned to subordinate slave status, and some Navajo bands traded captive brethren to
Comanches or to New Mexicans. Among both Indians and non-Indians,
livestock holdings established standards for wealth that cut ever deeper social divisions between "ricos" and rustic pastoralists - the latter exemplified
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by the comancheros and ciboleros, groups of Hispanic traders and bison hunters who migrated seasonally to the eastern plains.
One of Brooks's strongest recurring themes focuses on the ethnic mixtures that occurred, in large measure, because of the complex and far-flung
networks of captives exchanged and forced into migration. He persuasively
argues that the racial and cultural boundaries enshrined in some of the
classical historical and ethnographic literatures are temporal manifestations
of long-term processes of ethnic formation that were (and are) in continual
transition. Genizaros oflocal notoriety in New Mexico are one case in point.
While the name derives from the word janissary in the European and Mediterranean traditions of mercenaries and war captives among Christians and
Muslims, the term was applied in New Mexico to enslaved nomadic Indians who lost their specific tribal identities, were resettled in Spanish villages
or formed their own communities, and served as military auxiliaries. Census records and court cases cited in Brooks's study reveal that a number of
prominent Hispanic surnames in the region represented gen(zaro families,
which suggests a blending of ethnic distinctions over time. .
At a number of points in the book, Brooks calls these mixed pop~lations
"communities of interest," referring to the social, economic, and intimate
bonds that bound different racial groups together. The term is oddly and
anachronistically twenty-first century in tone, perhaps even sanitizing the
historical context of violence and communal rupture that marked the captive trade. Similarly, Brooks theorizes that captive women in Navajo society
could have been "social boundary markers" who served to "cement social
solidarity" -despite their status as slaves-an argument that remains rather
obscure and difficult to integrate with the broader narrative (pp. 246-7).
More convincingly, Brooks establishes that the nature of Borderlands slavery remained qualitatively distinct from the chattel slavery of the southern
United States because of the leveraging bonds ofkinship that made it possible for Borderlands captives to be adopted into their host societies and
become "free" adults. The ethnic labels ascribed to captives in various Hispanic and Native American communities signified not so much racial distinctions as recognized social statuses, which marked their alien origins as
well as their admittance to clans and extended families.
Captives and Cousins is based on a wide range of documents and transcribed oral testimonies, although it relies heavily on published texts
and secondary sources. Brooks's research is at its best when it offers an
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integrated cross-reading of archaeological, ethnographic, and historical studies, as exemplified in his discussion of probable historical relations among
the Athapaskans, Pueblos, and Spaniards. Some of his many anecdotes that
attempt to reconstruct the lives and destinies of captives, particularly for the
nineteenth century, artfully combine Mexican and Anglo documentary references. The book does not have a bibliography, however, carefully worded
and informative footnotes provide the reader clear paths to Brooks's sources.
This study centers historiographically in the conversations that have
shaped the fields of U.S. West and Southwest history. Brooks's vision turns
north and east more than it does south and intersects only tangentially with
Latin American theories and histories of multiethnic relations on the colonial borderlands of the Americas. Because of this orientation, Brooks overlooked opportunities to engage with well-developed Latin American
interpretations of race and ethnicity, including studies of northern New
Spain. Excellent scholarship produced in Mexico, Europe, and the United
States focusing on the northern Interior Provinces has discussed the themes
that define this study: coerced and captive labor through the encomienda
and labor drafts for the mines, miscegenation and the invention of new
identities, and the ideologies of honor and shame that served to naturalize
social distinctions of race and gender. Empirical studies of census data and
ecclesiastical registers have reconstructed patterns of adoption and reconstitution of households that crossed ethnic boundaries in ways that are mirrored in Brooks's study. The author turned to models of African slavery to
build a theoretical palette from which to paint his portrait of captivity and
kinship in northwestern Mexico and New Mexico, but ignored similar literature on the complex patterns of trade and warfare among nomadic peoples
in the Iberian borderlands of South America. Ethnohistorical research focused on the political and cultural formations of the equestrian nomads of
the pampas and southern Andean cordilleras offers compelling comparative themes with the Comanche riders of the northern plains and with the
web of relations negotiated and fought over time among Hispanic and Native American communities.

Captives and Cousins contributes important new perspectives to continuing debates, and opens new doors for comparisons and syntheses ofborderlands as contested spaces of power and merging identities.

Cynthia Radding
University of New Mexico
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Oratory in Native North America. By William M. Clements. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002. xvii + 186 pp. Appendix, notes, bibliography,
index. $4°.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8165-2182-4.)

During the eighteenth century, a Scottish physician and immigrant to
America, Cadwallader Colden, wrote a history of the Iroquois. In his work
History ofthe Five Indian Nations (1727), he included many illustrations of
Native oratory, in order that "the Genius of the Indians might appear better" (p. ,6). Had Colden been living in the Spanish Borderlands, he could
have captured equal "Genius" among ancestors of contemporary New
Mexico Indians. In North America, Indian oratory was ubiquitous. Recorded
by treaty negotiators, missionaries, explorers, and others, it evoked the admiration of almost all who succumbed to its power.
In Oratory in Native North America, William M. Clements, professor of
English and folklore at Arkansas State University, explores the "verbal art"
of Indian orators, whose speeches became an integral part of the "national
literature" of nineteenth-century America. Clements argues that oratory held
greater appeal for Euroamericans than Indian music (which was too unfamiliar) and Indian storytelling (especially origin stories), which seemed foreign to those acquainted with the Book of Genesis. Accounts of Native
speeches remained more accessible, since they appeared in newspapers,
commonly available from the eighteenth century forward.
As an assessment of its unique characteristics, Clements's monograph
offers a strong introduction to Native oratory. He explains the performance
of orators, stressing the multiple aspects of their delivery, including the significance of body language or the movements characteristic of various rituals, such as the integral role of the wampum belt in diplomatic negotiations
between eastern Indian nations or between these nations and Euroamerican
groups. He also emphasizes the orator's stature within eastern Indian nations. Orators received extensive training beginning in their youth, and they
were highly respected. Their skills enabled them to speak for the entire
community.
Clements's writing becomes most animated, however, when he refutes
the criticism commonly held by Euroamericans who accused the Indian
orator's use of "figurative language" as evidence of Native "poverty of
language" or inability to engage in abstract thought. As Clements notes,
when Indian orators relied extensively on metaphor, the use of irony, and
other linguistic tools to express their thoughts, they did so for very pragmatic
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reasons. Orators employed figurative language as "careful strategy," which
they used to gain rhetorical advantage, defuse potential confrontation, or
create "memorable impressions." They chose metaphors, such as the "covenant chain" used by the Iroquois, to clarify complex subjects that must be
revealed through images. Successful Indian orators employed all of these
techniques to achieve their goals.
Pleading for further anthologies of Indian oratory that contextualize specific speeches as illustrated above, Clements sets an example in his appendix, which includes selections of speeches recorded by Colden and others
who were struck by the powerful expression of these Native speakers. Oratory in Native North America argues persuasively for the significance of this
unique dimension of America's literary past.
Margaret Connell-Szasz
University of New Mexico

Jewish Pioneers of New Mexico. Compiled and edited by Tomas Jaehn, foreword by Thomas E. Chavez. (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 2003.
xi + 100 pp. 23 color plates, 127 halftones, maps, bibliography. $39.95 cloth,
ISBN 0-89°13-466-9.)
Jewish Life in the American West: Perspectives on Migration, Settlement, and
Community. Edited by Ava F. Kahn. (Seattle: University ofWashington Press
in association with the Autry Museum of Western Heritage, 2002. 144 pp. 10
color plates, 60 halftones, map, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $22.50
cloth, ISBN 0-295-98275-6.)
In recent years, Western Jewish history has become an integral part of
the analysis of the American Jewish experience, transcending its earlier status as an entertaining footnote to the story of the "real" American Jews of
the urban East. Based on this reality, publications on Western Jewish history
still tend to fall into two categories. One category contains works of largely
local interest, with colorful stories and illustrations. These works are like
family albums, whose attraction stems from the reader's personal connection to the places and personalities. The second-and growing-category is
synthetic works by historians whose goal is to situate the Western Jewish
experience (or, properly, experiences) into larger frameworks of American
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Jewish history and of Western history. Jewish Pioneers of New Mexico and
Jewish Life in the American West are, respectively, examples of each of these
categories. Both books originated in museum exhibitions and focus on the
formative period of Western Jewish life, from the mid-nineteenth century to
around 1920. Each has special strengths and makes a special contribution.
Jewish Pioneers of New Mexico is based on a recent exhibit at the Palace
of the Governors in Santa Fe. The editor's goal was to collect the scattered
material about early Jewish New Mexicans, "connect[ing] the many pieces
into a cohesive whole, while casting light on the immense contributions of
these pioneers to the state's cultural, civic, economic, and creative life" (p.
xi). This beautifully produced volume certainly succeeds in this goal. Portraits and biographies with generally useful captions compr!se the bulk of
the material. Four short essays written by historian Tomas Jaehn, on "Immigration," "Economic Activities and Politics," "Social and Family Life," and
"Jewish Faith on the New Mexico Frontier" complete the monograph. The
book functions also as a colorful exhibition catalog. The narrative is basic
and accessible for those with no background in regional and/or Jewish history. Historian Henry Tobias's short historiographical "Afterword" is a good
introduction to the issues for the nonhistorian.
This book will appeal to people who are familiar with New Mexico places
and names, but standing alone, Jewish Pioneers

of New

Mexico does not

really place its subjects in an expanded context. For example, the book discusses Jews' activity in civic affairs, without suggesting the ramifications of
this activity for Jews. Thus, it remains primarily a paean to Jewish citizenship in a developing country.

Jewish Life in the American West was published in conjunction with a
recent exhibition of the same title at the Museum of the American West
(formerly the Autry Museum of Western Heritage) in Los Angeles. However, it is less a catalog than an accompaniment to the exhibit. Edited by
Ava F. Kahn, the volume includes readable scholarly essays by Kahn, Hasia
Diner, William Toll, and Ellen Eisenberg, plus an afterword by Moses
Rischin, a pioneer of Western Jewish history. An identification of the contributors is, inexplicably, missing.
The book's goal, in Kahn's words, is to inspire "discussion of the major
regional themes in western Jewish life that carry the story beyond the community and local histories of the last few decades and open the way to a
more balanced picture of the West's diverse history" (p. 16). By focusing on
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specific important themes-women's experiences, commerce and urban
development, and communal organization and leadership-the writers also
place the western Jewish experience in the American historical context, in
the process revealing the exceptional ism of the Jewish experience in the
West arid its impact on Jewish acculturation.
Kahn's essay entitled "To Journey West: Jewish Women and Their Pioneer Stories" argues that the unique circumstances of the pioneer West
(particularly geographic mobility and scarcity of social resources) challenged
Jewish women to expand their activities in the public and secular realms,
transforming their self-definitions. In "The Jewish Merchant and Civic Order in the Urban West;' Toll discusses the processes by which immigrant
German Jewish men could quickly attain "not only economic security but
also political leadership and the moral stature of pioneers" in the fastdeveloping American West (p. 83). Eisenberg looks at Eastern European
Jewish immigrants who transitioned "From Cooperative Farming to Urban
Leadership." The experience of cooperative life in Jewish agricultural colonies in the West prepared these immigrants later to become driving forces
in the creation of strong Jewish communities in Western cities.
The most thought-provoking essay is Diner's "American West, New York
Jewish." She argues that mid-twentieth-century American Jews, who bought
into the myth of "The West" as quintessentially American, also developed
the paradigm in which New York City represented Jewishness and the West
represented Americanness. Jews in New York "could really be Jewish,"
whereas in the West "they became less Jewish as they transformed themselves into Americans" (p. 37-38). Thus, regionalism could express the Jewish need to assert both sameness and difference in America.
As regional Jewish studies mature, we are gaining a clearer picture of the
variety and the commonalities of the American Jewish experience. In 1880,
San Francisco was the second largest Jewish community in the United States,
after New York City. A century or so later, the second largest Jewish community is again in the West, in Los Angeles. Though stereotypes die hardand how otherwise, given all those Seinfeld reruns-the paradigm Diner
describes may begin to lose its salience.
Amy Hill Shevitz
California State University, Northridge
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Fred Harris: His Joumey from Liberalism to Populism. By Richard Lowitt.
(Lanham, Md.: Rownam & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. xv + 285 pp. Halftones, notes, index. $39.95 cloth, ISBN 0-7425-2161-1.)
Why should anyone care that Fred Harris moved from liberal to populist? As Richard Lowitt makes clear, Fred Harris is important because, despite his failure to persuade the American people to adopt his populist views,
the issues he raised remain pertinent thirty years later.
So who is Fred Harris? For eight years in the turbulent Johnson-Nixon
years, Fred Harris (1930- ) represented Oklahoma in the U.S. Senate. Although the major issues he focused on were the equitable distribution of
research and development funds, rural poverty, and the plight of American
Indians, he played a more significant role outside the Senate. He served on
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders known as the Kerner
Commission, which was established in the aftermath of the race riots of the
1960s. He ran aborted campaigns for the presidential nomination in 1972
and 1976. As chair of the Democratic National Committee, he oversaw the
expansion ofthe party structure to include women and minorities. The party
became more democratic and representative as the primary system replaced
back-room deals.
In the Senate, Harris initially focused on constituent service and party
regularity. Over time he moved away first from his constituents, then from
his party. Midway through his career, in 1968, he switched from support of
the war to opposition because he believed it was immoral. Shortly thereafter he began espousing New Populist ideals, which called for greater public
participation, less corporate influence, and less of the liberal top-down approach. Harris thought that the Democrats could recapture those people
alienated by liberalism by downplaying polarizing social issues and emphasizing economic reform, with government as the agent of equity rather than
of favoritism. After leaving the Senate, Harris became a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico.
Lowitt has been in the business a long time. His work consistently reflects thorough research, an eye for the telling anecdote, and graceful prose,
and this work is no exception. Lowitt interviewed associates of the senator,
but chose not to interview Harris. The one weakness of this book is that the
author offers no explanation for why Harris's views shifted in 1968 instead of
earlier or later. Had he interviewed Harris, Lowitt might have better explained why Harris changed his views. Overall, the book is highly readable
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and a good reminder that the United States was not always as conservative
as it appears to be now. Only thirty years ago liberal was a positive label, not
a slur. And, as Lowitt reminds us, not that long ago politicians believed in
the people, not spin.
John H. Barnhill
Yukon, Oklahoma

When We Were Young in the West: True Stories of Childhood. Edited by
Richard Melzer. (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Sunstone Press, 2003.345 pp. Halftones,
notes, bibliography, index. $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-86534-338-1.)
When We Were Young in the West is a compilation of childhood recollections of New Mexico in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many of
these reminiscences have been previously published and are, for the most
part, readily available in their original publications. Still, this collection of
excerpts from popular and well-known memoirs reminds readers that New
Mexico was not only inhabited by trappers, farmers, and ranchers, but by
their children as well. Marian Russell details the arduous trip across the
plains, Cleofas Jaramillo and Fabiola Cabeza de Baca advise about the importance of family structure and family life, and Agnes Morley Cleaveland
describes growing up with fear of violent attacks in a country unsettled by
European Americans.
Along with popular reminiscences of New Mexico history, Melzer includes recollections from lesser-known publications that may have been
overlooked as part of the story of New Mexico's children. Hispano poet
Jimmy Santiago Baca's "A Place to Stand" tells of life in a dysfunctional
family filled with alcoholism and prison experiences, and Sally Hyer's account vividly describes her experience as a Native American child in a hostile educational system, which disregarded her culture and heritage. One of
the more notable recollections is by the Kent children of Mrican American
descent, who experienced racial discrimination at the hands of Hispanic
and Anglo American families while growing up in Roswell.
Melzer separates these recollections into narrow- and at times overlappingcategories such as urban, rural, ranching, and farming, and selects a geopolitical and ethnographical cross-section of New Mexico's population. Youth
from Native American, Mrican American, Hispanic, and Anglo American
backgrounds who grew up in rural and urban areas, and were wealthy and
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poor, privileged and underprivileged, are represented in this anthology. The
author's subsequent conclusion reiterates the importance of children's views
in interpreting life in New Mexico, emphasizing the significance of families, traditions, environment, and education.
In the end, this medley of children's accounts does not bring much new
light to the study of children in the West. But, supported by a nice collage of
photographic images, it reminds us of the hardship these children endured,
how versatile and crucial they were to the economy and to the well-being of
their families, and how family and home impacted their upbringing. Most
importantly, this book is a welcome publication that places the experiences
of children from different cultural backgrounds side-by-side. Despite social
and economic hardships, and hints of racial and cultural discrimination,
the book paints a rather positive picture of childhood in New Mexico. Since
nearly all accounts were told from the vantage point of adulthood, historian
Marc Simmons's recent assessment that positive "events were so rare, [that]
they were cherished in memory" is likely correct and contributed to this
perhaps too positive picture of childhood in New Mexico.
Tomas Jaehn
Angelico Chavez History Library
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Salado Archaeology ofthe Upper Gila, New Mexico. By Stephen H. Lekson.
Anthropological Papers of the University ofArizona, no. 67. (Tucson: University ofArizona Press, 2002. viii + 103 pp. Color plate, halftones, maps, tables,
appendixes, bibliography, index. $16,95 paper, ISBN 0-8165-2222-7.)

In this slim but informative volume, Steve Lekson makes available excavation and artifact summaries of two late-period sites in the little known
Upper Gila area of the American Southwest. In the preface, Lekson emphasizes that data availability contributes to broad regional studies, even
though local control in collection may have been inadequate by today's
standards. His descriptions of the Dutch Ruin (excavated by avocational
archaeologists) and Villareal II (excavated by early cultural resources management efforts) add to the few available comparative datasets for this region in the post-Mimbres to Salado transition (ca. postA.D. u50 to 400-45°) ..
Beginning in chapter 1, with a discussion of the archaeological history
and geography of the Upper Gila, located in southwestern New Mexico,
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the author documents the Dutch Ruin and its remarkable whole-vessel collection; he carefully interprets these artifacts' contexts and associations. The
diversity of types in the collection (e.g. a color frontispiece depicting associated vessels of various types, a Ramos polychrome human effigy figure, and
numerous photos of the vessels in the collection) indicates the wide range
of social contacts the inhabitants enjoyed from trade connections to the
north, south, and west.
Chapter 3 documents the excavation of the Villareal II site with discussions of stratigraphy and architecture. The ceramic collection, analyzed by
Leckson and Timothy Klinger, is largely sherds, but yields important information for temporal placement as well as regional associations. Further data
is presented on nonceramic artifacts, faunal remains (by William Gillespie),
and plant remains. The dating of the site and neighboring components is
discussed in terms of comparable sites.
In chapter 4, Lekson discusses the chronology and duration of the sites
within the larger region. The author reevaluates settlement patterns and
competing hypotheses based on ceramic collections and diagnostic types.
Most notably, the role of Salado polychromes as diagnostic of the Salado
phenomenon that swept the Southwest is explored in association with Tucson, Maverick Mountain, and EI Paso polychromes, as well as Chupadero
black-on-white, Chihuahua polychromes and other more rare ceramic types.
In the concluding chapter, aptly titled "Salado with a Grain of Salt,"
Lekson explores cultural systematics and competing interpretations involving connections to Paquime, the Mogollon highlands, and local continuity
or discontinuity. The author argues that one interpretive size does not fit all
in the Mimbres study area, and that, indeed, the exploration of the postMimbres transition to Salado must be examined as a pan-southwestern phenomenon that transcends contemporary political boundaries and specific
archaeological study areas.
In this context, the author's descriptions and interpretations of two otherwise small and forgotten site excavations serve as a model for salvaging other
languishing excavation and collection efforts from past decades before all
information disappears. These small site descriptions, nonetheless, make
relatively large contributions to the rethinking of the Southwest.
Arleyn W. Simon
Arizona State University
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Translating Southwestern Landscapes: The Making of an Anglo Literary
Region. By Audrey Goodman. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002.
xxix + 224 pp. 26 halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $40.00 cloth, ISBN 08165-2187-5. )

Awarded the 2003 Western Literature Association's Thomas J. Lyon Award,
Audrey Goodman's book combines theories oftravel, ethnography, and translation with historical, literary, and photographic analysis to chart the formation of the Anglo American Southwest by artists such as Charles Lummis,
Zane Grey, Ansel Adams, Mary Austin, and Willa Cather. Despite their
homogeneity as middle-class, eastern or midwestern artists, these modern
regionalists generated hybrid art that enacted cultural translation, challenged
southwestern stock images, and envisioned an alternative to the uneven
economic development of the Southwest during the modernist period.
The first two chapters consider Lummis and Grey, two writers who popularized the Southwest through travel literature and romantic westerns. For
Goodman, however, Lummis's and Grey's cultural production is more complex and ambivalent. Lummis's ethnographic photography, for instance,
betrays signs of Native American resistance to romanticized tourist images,
and Grey's westerns imagine the unlikely alliance between an Anglo and
Native American who are both displaced by capitalist development and
political unrest along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The last three chapters examine the duplicity of southwestern, highbrow
modernist art. Photographs by Ben Wittick and Adam Clark Vroman disrupt romantic images of Native America, but such ruptures disappear in the.
high art of Paul Strand and Adams, whose photography captures a landscape void of Native Americans. Austin's ecological, ethnographic, and poetic translations, Goodman continues, appropriate Native American culture
to generate a sense of Anglo southwestern literary authenticity. Goodman
concludes that Cather's southwestern novels reveal the limitations of Anglo
regionalism, but also indicate the possibility of transcending the limitations
of space.
Despite the book's informed and admirable analysis, the erasure of Native Americans and Mexican Americans is central to the "translation'~ of
Goodman's thesis. According to Goodman, "Most writers and photographers
initially imagined the Southwest through rhetorical modes traditionally
engaged to impose colonial authority.... Yet through hybrid forms of transcription, imagined scenes of brotherhood and sisterhood between Anglos
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and Indians, images of vernacular landscapes, and moments of ecological
understanding, they translated their cross-cultural experiences into new
aesthetic forms and began to dream of transcending such colonial relations"
(p. xvii). Anglos are~'translating" a Southwest that exists only in their minds.
They are not translating Native American or Mexican American cultural
practices for Anglo America, rather they are imagining Natives or Mexican
Americans and then relaying that imaginative figuration to the mainstream.
This is no translation at all, but an act of transfiguration, wherein the Anglo
imaginary displaces Native Americans and Mexican Americans and replaces
them with Anglo fantasies of Native identity.
Goodman's discussion of "fantasies of collaborative and cross-cultural
communication" (p. xxiii) indicates how Anglos fancied themselves as the
Southwest's authentic Natives through complimentary acts of literary and
cultural dislocation that turned the region's Native Americans and Mexican
Americans into figments of the Anglo imagination. This may be Goodman's
point, but rather than "transcending" the region's "colonial relations" (p.
xvii), the translation that Goodman describes indicates an act of colonial
transubstantiation, as Anglos become southwestern natives by imagining
the region's racialized inhabitants out of existence.
Jesse Aleman
University of New Mexico

Immortal Summer: A Victorian Woman's Travels in the Southwest: The 1897
Letters and Photographs of Amelia Hollenback. Edited and annotated by

Mary J. Straw Cook. (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 2002. xi + 162
pp. 85 halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-89013-4°22, $24.95 paper, ISBN 0-89013-403-0.)

In this recent offering from the Museum of New Mexico Press, historian
Mary J. Straw Cook describes the 1897 trip of wealthy easterner Amelia
Hollenback and her sister Josephine Hollenback to the American Southwest. Told primarily through a series of letters from Amelia and Josephine
to relatives and friends back home in New York, the book traces the
Hollenback sisters' exciting visits to the Grand Canyon, the Verde Valley,
Laguna, Acoma, and Zuni Pueblos, and the Hopi Mesas. Cook notes that
the letters and photographs documenting their adventures in the summer
of 1897 reveal some of the earliest observations of the Southwest by women
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tourists and offer intriguing eastern perspectives of westerners and Pueblo
Indian culture.
Cook begins with a brief preface in which she relates her fascinating
uncovering of the previously unknown Hollenback family history. From
her 1972 encounter with the architect ofAmelia Hollenback's Santa Fe home
to her discovery a decade later of the vast Hollenback collection of letters,
diaries, and photographs, Cook's account provides a nice background for
readers interested in her research methods. Throughout the text, the author's
well-chosen and carefully arranged selection of letters portrays in vivid detail the beauty, wonder, and peculiarity of the American Southwest from
the perspective of the Hollenback sisters, who gained an appreciation for
western culture and an interest in archeological conservation during their
travels. Particularly effective is the section on the sisters' visit to the Grand
Canyon, where Amelia and Josephine, outfitted in restrictive corsets and
ankle-length skirts, rode mules to the bottom of the canyon and camped
beside the Colorado River. Full of good-natured self-derision and fascinating descriptions of the canyon, the letters in these chapters successfully convey the women's sense of adventure and wonderment encountering
unfamiliar landscapes and cultures.
Elsewhere in the book, Cook seems to assume that the Hollenback letters are self-explanatory, thereby leaving much of their interpretation to
implication. Longer annotations are needed in most sections to draw out
the meaning and historical importance of the letters. Moreover, without a
comprehensive introduction or conclusion placing the 1897 trip in historical context, the reader is left to question why the Hollenback story is significant. For example, Cook never addresses the extent to which Amelia
Hollenback's writings and photos of the Southwest differ from her male
contemporaries or from other women visitors to or inhabitants of the area.
Nor does Cook comment on where Amelia Hollenback's travels fit within
the larger context of women's experiences in the late nineteenth century.
Consequently, while the author pieces together a captivating tale of two
women's adventures in the American Southwest, she ultimately fails to demonstrate exactly how and in what ways the Hollenbacks' writings "make a
fascinating and valuable contribution to the history of early feminine tourism" (p. 146).
Tan Doolittle Wilson
Fort Hays State University
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Conexiones: Connections in Spanish Colonial Art. Edited by Carmella
Papilla with introductory essays by Stuart A. Ashman and Donna Pierce; narrative by Carmella Papilla and Donna Pierce. (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Museum
of Spanish Colonial Art, 2002. xvii + 176 pp. 218 color photographs, 17 halftones, map, selected bibliography. $5°.00 cloth, ISBN 0-9719103-0-8.)
Interweaving full-color images and short "narrative" pieces, this beautifully illustrated catalogue of the inaugural exhibition at the Museum of
Spanish Colonial Art in Santa Fe seeks to elucidate the cultural and material connections between colonial Spain and the New World.
In his introduction, "Of Culture and Community," former executive director Stuart Ashman briefly describes the genesis of the Spanish Colonial
Art Society, which was created in 1925 to assure the preservation of art objects produced in New Mexico and southern Colorado from the time of
Spanish colonization in the late sixteenth century until the present. Crediting the individuals and organizations whose financial, intellectual, and moral
support made the society's museum a reality, Ashman elaborates upon the
museum's vision and mission as he sees them today.
"Visions Realized" by Donna Pierce, curator for the Spanish Colonial
Art Society and chief curator of the museum, provides an overview of the
collection and the people responsible for acquiring, preserving, and documenting its multitude of objects. The essay recalls the efforts of E. Boyd
Hall and Alan Vedder (with whom Pierce was personally associated) to locate, collect, and restore objects in both the museum collection and in private and church collections in northern New Mexico. Pierce traces the
movement of these art objects from disparate collections at various historical organization facilities to a central collection exhibited in a full-fledged
museum.
"Un Mundo de Arte" (A World of Art), the first of Padilla and Pierce's
narrative pieces, briefly sets the historical, cultural, and political scene of
Mexico from the Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century to the
settlement and pacification of Mexico and northern new Spain - "new"
Mexico. Referring to collection objects from Spain, Mexico, Central and
South America, Europe, the Near East, and elsewhere in Asia, this monograph notes and compares stylistic influences from mudejar to neoclassicism in its attempt to define the aesthetic of what has been broadly called
"Spanish colonial art."
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"Grandes Obras" (Great Works) focuses on locally produced religious
statues and paintings, furniture, fabrics, jewelry, tools, and miscellaneous
decorative and utilitarian objects based on traditional Mexican and Spanish
design but made with local materials and reflecting regional characteristics.
The religious pieces in particular belie their miniature size and are, indeed,
"great works."
"Hecho con Fuego" (Made with Fire) features iron tools, military and
equestrian equipment, tinplate frames and lighting fixtures, and micaceous
pottery, while "Tesoros" (Treasures) displays small personal items such as
miniature reliquaries, jewelry, combs, tobacco flasks, and strike-a-lights that
pioneers often brought along when they immigrated.
Working from the last will and testament of Capt. Manuel Delgado of
Santa Fe (1739-1815), "La Casa Delgado" (The Delgado Home) re-creates a
"typical" Spanish colonial room full of utilitarian and decorative objects,
and other everyday mate!ial objects that might have been used during the
Spanish occupation of New Mexico. Looking at the museum collection's
historically equivalent items, one cannot help but be struck by the variety,
high quality, and wide-ranging sources of household items present in colonial New Mexico.
"Visiones" (Visions) explores the revival of New Mexican art and craft
traditions encouraged by early-twentieth-century preservationists - a movement that revitalized both modern and contemporary artistic traditions un-.
derlying local creation of religious images, furniture, and fabrics, while "El
Futuro" (The Future) highlights works by young Hispanic artists carrying
on these traditions with the encouragement and support of the Spanish
Colonial Arts Society.
"San Isidro Labrador: Santo de la Tierra" (Saint Isidore the Farmer: Saint
of the Land), examines several different images of this patron saint of farmers and helpmate to the early New Mexican colonists-from New Mexico
and Mexico, and from the nineteenth century through the present. The
closing narrative piece "Nuevas Obras" (New Works) showcases the museum's
most recent acquisitions-religious sculptures, furniture, metalwork, and
fabrics.
In engaging prose, Conexiones tells us everything we need to know about
the Spanish Colonial Arts Society, the individuals who helped shape it, and
its collection now housed in the Museum of Spanish Colonial Art.· The
catalogue's photography is superlative; its accompanying texts succinctly
identify the objects and define terms, style, and techniques. With masterful
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lighting and against a dramatically contrasting background, each object
becomes a jewel. Indeed, as in most catalogues, the illustrations show these
objects to far greater advantage than their actual museum settings. Complicating the task ofaccommodating a large and varied collection, the museum's
current edifice (a John Gaw Meem structure) was originally intended to be
a family residence.
Gloria Fraser Giffords
Tucson, Arizona

Bravo ofthe Brazos: John Lam ofFort Griffin, Texas. By Robert K. DeArment,
foreword by Charles M. Robinson III. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2002. xviii + 222 pp. 21 halftones, 2 maps, notes, bibliography, index.
$29.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3415-1.)

Last ofthe Old-Time Outlaws: The George Musgrave Story. By Karen Holliday
Tanner and John D. Tanner Jr. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2002. ix + 374 pp. 37 halftones, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth,
ISBN 0-8061-3424-0.)
These two works deal with notorious badmen in the American Southwest. Throughout Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, John Lam (or Laren)
and George Musgrave committed robberies and murders. With his dark
hair, mustache, and goatee, the stern looking Lam (c.1849-1878), as one
historian noted, "embodied the purest form of evil ... who left in his wake
shattered families and ruined lives" (pp. xi-xii). Lam's neighbors made sure
he died at a young age. On the other hand, the tall and good-looking
Musgrave (1877-1947) lived to be an old man while he "rustled, robbed,
and killed" (p. 259). Like other American outlaws in the Old West, Musgrave
lived out his last days in South America.
Robert K. DeArment, renowned outlaw-lawman researcher, has brought
together pieces of the historical record to cover events that occurred in Fort
Griffin and Shackelford County, Texas, particularly during the career of
John Lam. In doing so, the author illustrates in Bravo of the Brazos that
Lam was "avaricious and greedy, an unscrupulous thief and cold-blooded
murderer" (p. 5).
Lam had a Jekyll-and-Hyde personality. On the one hand, he became a
rancher, served as sheriff of Shackelford County, and had a devoted wife
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and family. On the other hand, from 1871 to 1878, Lam rustled cattle, rode
with raiders, and became a leader of the vigilante group "Tin Hat-Band
Brigade." Lam also mentored well-known desperado John Selman. One of
the more violent episodes involving Lam occurred in 1873, when he and his
companions shot and killed eight drovers in a dispute over the illegal branding of cattle. In time, even the stationing of Texas Rangers in the area did
not lessen the fears of local citizens. Then, in June 1878, an execution party
of vigilantes entered a jail and emptied their pistols into the body of Lam.
One historian characterized Lam's murder as a "sordid affair," which "should
have taken place long before it occurred" (p. 165).
In another well-researched work, Karen Holliday Tanner and John D.
Tanner Jr., two top-notch researchers, have put together the definitive biography of George West Musgrave. In Last of the Old-Time Outlaws, the authors describe Musgrave as, "handsome and rugged, charming yet obdurate,
affable but incorrigible," and conclude that he "came close to possessing
the almost impossible list of qualities that exemplify America's legend of the
western outlaw" (p. 259).
As a member of the High Five-Black Jack gang, Musgrave (who used
various aliases) took part in a number of robberies at the turn of the twentieth century. The gang raided Separ, New Mexico, seizing money and merchandise. When they robbed a bank in Nogales, Arizona, Musgrave was
wounded. The gang's most successful robbery occurred when it stopped an
eastbound Santa Fe Pacific train near the town of Grants, New Mexico.
Here they grabbed bags of gold coins and took a man's life, that of George
Parker, in cold blood. The malefactions of the latter caper turned Musgrave
into a fugitive:
In the early 19oos, Musgrave and his wife moved to Latin America. In
this environment he ran legitimate businesses, but continued his nefarious
ways. The seventy-year-old Musgrave died at home in Paraguay. Two people
attended his funeral, as rebels and government forces clashed. "Bullets were
whistling over the walls of the cemetery," one person wrote. "[George] would
have liked that send off" (p. 258).
Harold J. Weiss Jr.
Jamestown Community College, New York
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Bound for Santa Fe: The Road to New Mexico and the American Conquest,
1806-1848. By Stephen G. Hyslop. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2002. xiii + 514 pp. 38 halftones, map, notes, bibliography, index. $34.95
cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3389-9.)
The dominant theme of Stephen G. Hyslop's work is the "volatile blend
of accommodation and aggression" that characterized relationships among
Americans, Mexicans, and various Indian peoples along the Santa Fe Trail
(p. 103)' He effectively, if not dramatically, demonstrates this blend in his
study of the journey American merchants made to Santa Fe.
Bound for Santa Fe is divided into three parts. The first chronicles travel
on the Santa Fe Trail, beginning with the reconnaissance of Zebulon Pike,
who, Hyslop argues, not only explored the land itself but also the cultural
borderland between Mexico and the United States. Pike's tale~ of the high
price of imported goods in Mexico spurred American traders' desire to navigate this borderland. Mexico welcomed traders after it achieved independence from Spain in 1821. William Becknell, who reached Santa Fe in
November of that year, quickly established the route that would lead thousands of traders to the promised land of commerce. In particular, he inaugurated the Cimarron Route on the trail as a wagon-friendly alternative to
the rigorous Raton Pass. Hyslop notes that Becknell's example set the stage
for American success. "His accomplishment lay in establishing a viable routeand in making enough money in the process to encourage a larger party to
accompany him back to Santa Fe in 1822, this time with wagons" (p. 37).
Traveling in winter, Becknell did not experience the extreme thirst
(brought on by the heat) that devastated many later Cimarron travelers.
Neither did he encounter opposition from Comanche and Kiowa tribes,
who resented competing with Anglos for water and Anglo intrusion onto
their hunting grounds. As Hyslop clarifies, American and Mexican experiences with Indian peoples varied. Although trail traffic intruded on Indian
land and water supplies, Native peoples also benefited from trade with their
neighbors. Bound for Santa Fe primarily emphasizes Anglo-Hispanic relationships, but the author acknowledges the significant role played by the tribes
of the Plains and the Southwest on the culturally mixed Santa Fe Trail.
The first section of the monograph concludes with an awkwardly placed
chapter concerning authors on the trail. Hyslop examines individuals such
as trader/author Josiah Gregg, lawyer/adventurer Thomas Jefferson Farnham,
merchant wife/diarist Susan Magoffin, and many others whose experiences
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on the trail and in Mexico appear throughout the text. Intended to introduce the major "characters" to the reader, the information would have been
more effective if it was woven into the remaining chapters.
The recital of major players concludes, however, with a provocative discussion. What was the role of traders in a larger context? Were these traders
"advance agents ofAmerican expansion, infiltrating a foreign camp in peaceful guise, seducing Mexicans with alluring goods, and easing the way for
conquest" (p. 77)? Yes and no. Overall, Hyslop concludes, "The exchange
between the two sides was far too complex and ambiguous to be characterized simply as the exploitation of a weak partner by a stronger one" (p. 78).
Some Mexicans resisted American influence. Some American traders, like
Charles Bent, assisted in the conquest of New Mexico. In general, however, merchants .on both sides anxiously avoided conflict and advocated a
climate of "moderation and mediation" in which to conduct their business (p. 79)'
The strongest section of Hyslop's work is the second, which follows the
"Road to New Mexico" geographically from St. Louis to the Mexican market. Although travelers started gathering supplies in St. Louis, the real "jumping-off" points for serious trail travelers remained the "prairie ports" of
Franklin, Independence, and Westport in western Missouri. These inland
port cities flourished as traders stocked their wagons for the long journey.
Hyslop argues that, in a sense, preparing for a trip on the Santa Fe Trail was
like getting ready for a religious quest. The author writes, "Like the hope of
a cure that drew invalids westward, the dream of financial redemption on
the trail had spiritual overtones. Every journey was indeed an adventure....
a commercial outing that took on aspects of a pilgrimage, replete with trials
that tested a man body and soul and held out the promise, for those who
prevailed, of rewards that transcended financial calculation" (p. 95).
Travelers rarely began their adventure alone. In addition to their purpose
as a supply depot, prairie ports also served as a gathering place for caravans
of traders who would set out on their "pilgrimage" together. Like true ports,
prairie ports shared similar characteristics. All stood in close proximity to
the "ocean" (a sea of grass), all provided "opportunities for hell-raising:' and
all had a "diverse assemblage of races and languages" (p. u8). Out of this
varied group, travelers formed temporary travel partnerships. Formed not
for business purposes, but for defensive purposes, members of caravans espoused rules and requirements similar to those of a militia. Not everyone
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obeyed elected officers all the time, notes Hyslop, but the caravans nevertheless "had the effect of militarizing these otherwise commercial ventures
and contributing to that volatile blend of accommodation and aggression
that would long characterize exchanges on the Santa Fe Trail" (p. 103).
Traders traveled together for defense against the two major threats along
the trail: Indians and the environment. Native Americans had reason to
resent further White intrusion into their hunting grounds and increasing
competition for resources. However, as Hyslop maintains, traders who left
the prairie ports, and the last major tree-shaded rendezvous at Council Grove
(Kansas)

150

miles later, usually had much more to fear from the arid envi-

ronment than they did from Indian warriors. Indians rarely wanted to risk
their men or waste resources in attacking trading caravans. Ironically, the U.S.
government's minimal attempt to protect Santa Fe Trail travelers actually
heightened the threat of Indian attack. "The presence of troops on the trail,
meant to allay trouble," argues Hyslop, "could in fact incite opposition." There
were not enough troops to escort major expeditions all the way to Santa Fe
and if they "continued to escort traders only part of the way to their destination, they would simply be drawing attention to the caravan and exposing
traders to heightened risks once the soldiers turned back" (p. 174).
The hostile environment was a much greater threat to travelers, a force
"that could not be appeased or conquered but simply had to be endured"
(p. 187). Travelers who took the shorter Cimarron route (south of the Arkansas River) endured hardship toward the end of their long journey. As companies got closer to Mexican settlements, they frequently had to send
"runners" ahead to obtain food and water for lagging members of the company. Buffalo grass and shortgrass flourished in the High Plains environment, but humans and oxen did not fair as well. Weakened by hunger and
thirst, both two- and four-legged creatures often became dangerously disoriented in the desolate landscape.
Not every party using the Santa Fe Trail chose the risky Cimarron Route.
An alternative route that followed the Arkansas River until it turned southwest through the Raton Pass became especially attractive for smaller, lightly
armed groups who wanted to avoid the more dangerous Cimarron Route
and those travelers without big wagons who could successfully navigate the
Raton Pass. Bent's Fort, stationed along this route, provided extra incentive
for trader traffic to choose the longer route. Managed by William Bent, the
fort was a haven for both White and Indian traders. Bent established links to
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the Cheyennes through marriage, Hyslop notes, and the lines between Indian and White remained blurred at the fort. However, the possibility for
conflict was always in the air. "The fort embodied the dual nature of exchanges on the Santa Fe Trail, functioning both as a medium for peaceful
intercourse and as a bulwark against potential opposition" (p. 200). Accommodation and aggression were present everywhere on the Santa Fe Trail.
"For all the hardships they endured while crossing the plains, untutored
travelers found few obstacles on the journey more perplexing than the cultural divide between the Anglo and Hispanic worlds" (p. 229)' Traders soon
became acquainted with Mexican culture, however, and out of necessity
learned to flourish in New Mexico. Hyslop argues that the political and
economic isolation of the region helped the Americans with their task. Santa
Fe's distance from the "Mexican heartland created openings for Americans
that they would shrewdly exploit, first for private gain, and ultimately for the
enhancement and enlargemen~ of their native country" (p. 238). Traders
became the first Americans to "infiltrate" New Mexico. Rather.than through
violence, traders conquered through commercial exploits that "slowly loosened the attachment of New Mexicans to their native ways and wares and
left them increasingly susceptible to Americans and their goods" (p. 251).
This commercial conquest, Hyslop argues, became profoundly significant for the "American Conquest" of 1846-1848, the subject of the third
section of Bound for Santa Fe. The campaign that the soldier volunteers
recorded in their journals, Hyslop writes, was not "an impromptu invasion
but the culmination of the economic and cultural infiltration begun by the
pioneers of the Santa Fe trade a quarter century earlier" (p. 307)' Col. Stephen
Kearny and nearly seventeen hundred volunteer soldiers simply finished
what merchants had already started. Hyslop observes that Kearny's army
was rough and untrained, but their opponents were even less accomplished.
In this way, the conquest resembled the commercial invasion, in which
Americans rushed to get their goods to Mexico "in the hope of winning the
battle of appearances and precluding opposition" (p. 315).
Kearny accepted the surrender of Santa Fe in a "bloodless conquest."
Americans continued to exhibit a "willingness to engage the locals on their
own terms and deal with them firmly but fairly." This approach earned Americans a measure of success and acceptance in Santa Fe, Hyslop maintains. It
began with merchants, and when the army came and went, merchants remained to carve out what Hyslop called a "shared future" between the Anglo
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and Hispanic residents of Santa Fe. The war was only a "phantom, a fleeting
distortion of that compromising give-and-take between inextricable rivals
whose fortunes were forever entwined now in the Southwest" (p. 436).
Bound fOT Santa Fe is a solid introduction to the Santa Fe Trail. Hyslop
effectively uses writings of travelers to give readers an impression of life for
American men and women who journeyed to New Mexico in the midnineteenth century. For scholars who desire more than an introductory account, however, Hyslop's book may not satisfY. The author relies heavily on
extended quotations, using them in the place of detailed analysis. His interpretation is matter of fact and solid but ultimately leaves readers with a
modicum of knowledge about the trail and wanting more. However, what
Hyslop does he does well, and readers unfamiliar with the journey to Santa
Fe will find a wealth of knowledge in his work.
Julie Courtwright
University ofArkansas

Viola Martinez: California Paiute. By Diana Meyers Bahr (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003. ix + 202 pp. 3l halftones, map, notes, bibliography. $29.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3514-X.)
Indian policy at the end of the nineteenth century focused on assimilating Native Americans into White society; one of its main targets was children. Scholars often directly address the institutionalization of Native
children inside and outside boarding schools and examine the people who
carried out this policy. Recently, however, historians have shifted focus to
the children, their experiences, and the impact of these educational experiences. In Viola Martinez: California Paiute, Diana Meyers Bahr examines
the life of a woman who sought to hold onto her heritage, her language, and
her identity as a Paiute while living in a foreign setting.
Bahr begins her study with a general history of the Paiute from the perspective of Martinez's family. The first chapter focuses on the key concept of
the Paiutes' views of land and environment, and their use of space. This sets
up the rest of the story as the Paiutes began the struggle to maintain their
cultural identity in the face of U.S. assimilation policy. At a young age Martinez
fell victim to the boarding school system, which, in the early twentieth century, sought to eradicate Native heritage from children and immerse them in
White ways. Martinez's experience at the Sherman Institute became a defin-
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ing moment in her life because, as Bahr demonstrates, it isolated Martinez
from her family and people, while simultaneously giving her tools to bridge
cultures. She utilized these tools during her employment at Manzanar, a
Japanese-American internment camp, and in the urban setting of the Los
Angeles school system. Martinez's dedication to education is evident in her
quest to utilize her experiences outside her Paiute community, and in her
attempt to bring knowledge of mainstream America to her people.
This book is one of many stories about the boarding school experience of
Native children but it is particularly valuable for Bahr's portrayal of Martinez's
life beyond her school experiences. Martinez's life represents changes within
one Native American community and illustrates how one individual's initiative can enhance that community and bring understanding between cultures. "She recognized that she no longer quite fit in Owens Valley, nor did
she fit comfortably in Riverside. She was on the margin of each society,
partly in and partly out. During that long train ride she realized that she
needed to be in command of this marginality" (p. 67)' Martinez did indeed
take command of that marginality and became a bridge between cultures
and generations.
Another strength of this book lies in its portrayal of Martinez's life. Numerous photographs allow the reader to visualize Martinez, her family, and
the places important to her story, while the story line gives details of a Paiute
life. Although Bahr's conclusion summarizes Martinez's life experiences,
the inclusion of where Martinez fits into general patterns of Indian history
would have enabled the reader to place her in the broader histories of California, the American West, and Native America. This omission, however,
does not detract from the objective of the book, which will undoubtedly
appeal to a broad audience.
Rebecca Bales
Diablo Valley College

Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State
of Nature. Edited by Charles E. Kay and Randy T. Simmons. (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 2002. xix + 342 pp. Halftones, maps, charts, tables,
graphs, appendixes, notes, bibliography. $45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-87480-719-0.)
This intriguing collection of essays will surely inspire controversy while
providing a wealth of detailed analysis on the prehistoric North American
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environment. The editors, both political scientists, have assembled an impressive set of multidisciplinary works that draw on the recent research findings of sociologists, geographers, political scientists, archaeologists, and
anthropologists. This research attempt to shed new light on the old debate
over the "original state of nature" in pre-Columbian North America.
The editors and contributors do not shy away from their subject's controversial nature. In fact they embrace it immediately by arguing that their
perspectives may appear "politically incorrect" because they consider the
evolution of humans by natural selection a "given" and "view culture as
relatively insignificant compared to evolutionary forces" (p. xv). Historians
may find this strong assertion disturbing, especially the editors' and autho~s'
views on the importance of "optimal-foraging theory" as a historical determinant over the cultural values or beliefs of Native peoples. While these
views are sure to offend Native readers, the editors clearly and consistently
present their own perspective, and support their particular point of view
with thoroughly researched essays. Environmental historians in particular
will be interested in the data on aboriginal burning, hunting, the redistribution and extinction of native species, and Native land practices.
This dense collection features eight essays all focused on pre-Columbian
human impact on the North American environment including both the
land and species. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the authors' perspective, each essay provides a wealth of data for discussion on this important subject. Lecturers and students interested in the controversial
pre-Columbian period will find data to support various positions. Particularly interesting are the essays by Michael Alvard on evolutionary theory
and conservation, by Paul Marin on prehistoric extinctions, and a series of
essays detailing the human impact on the pre-Columbian California environment focusing on the movement and depletion of native species. Other
essays assess the role of prehistoric peoples in shaping ecosystems in the
eastern United States and the impact of aboriginal fire use on plant communities. All of these essays raise important questions about the "original"
state of the American environment, questions that still have direct bearing
on current land and animal management practices and beliefs.
The book is loaded with useful and well-designed graphs, charts, maps,
and tables offering probably more depth than most historians would need
or want on this subject for course adoption, but sure to be of interest to
graduate students and researchers. Although the conclusions ofthis volume
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are controversial, they are views worth considering by anyone interested in·
the history of the American environment.
Andrew Kirk
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Prostitution, Polygamy, and Power: Salt Lake City, 1847-1918. By Jeffrey
Nichols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002. ix + 247 pp. Halftones,
line drawings, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $34.95 cloth,
02768-x.)

ISBN

0-252-

This well-researched book examines "the highly charged arena of human sexuality" wrought by both prostitution and polygamy in Mormon Utah
(p. 2). It fits in with other recent western historical works that focus on the
economics of prostitution and the central role the demimonde played in
developing western communities. This work isan imaginative sociocultural·
portrait of prostitution symbiotically interwoven with the Mormon struggle
to defend polygamy in the late nineteenth century.
Jeffrey Nichols identifies a built-in tension and uneasiness within Mormon culture vis-a-vis prostitution. Mormons who criticized prostitution on
moral grounds appeared hypocritical for condoning polygamy, which nonMormons considered debasing to women and immoral (as well as illegal)
in its own right. Tension mounted as external attacks on polygamy increased
in the 1880s and 1890S. Mormons blamed non-Mormons for introducing
prostitution into what they perceived to be their virtually sin-free culture
and contributing to the moral declension of their religious utopia. Central
to these debates on polygamy and prostitution was power, particularly male
power over women. Nichols, a professor at Westminster College in Salt Lake
City, demonstrates that both Mormon and "gentiles" (non-Mormons) were
willing to pay for sex outside of marriage while hypocritically "demanding
chastity of other women in their lives," a point that may make this book
mildly controversial in Utah even today (p. 6). This is not the rock upon
which hagiography is sustained.
Nichols focuses on the first attempts of progressive reformers to regulate
and manage prostitution in the late nineteenth century. There was plenty
of money to be made in the business of prostitution, and Nichols details
the financial arrangements of the madams, bankers, and Salt Lake City
businessmen "who thus developed a direct interest in the success of their
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operations" (p. 59). By the early twentieth century, regulation gave way to
the increasing criminalization of "sporting girls" and, to a lesser extent, patrons, though the struggle over polygamy often deflected the full-scale assault that prostitution underwent. Because of the transience of the women
who sold sex in the West, Nichols feels that prostitutes in Salt Lake City
contributed to the region's "Americanization" and diversification.
By the 1920S reformers had succeeded in forcing prostitution further underground where it remains in modern-day Utah. As Nichols concludes, "The
slow pace of improvement in genuine economic opportunities for women ...
guaranteed that there would always be women desperate enough to sell sex,"
and "prostitutes will persevere" (pp. 216--17). Despite the difficulties they face
in maybe the most hostile environment in the West and the country, prostitutes continue to ply the world's oldest profession (pp. 216--17)'
Keith Edgerton
Montana State University, Billings

Gold Rush Capitalists: Greed and Growth in Sacramento. By Mark A. Eifler.
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002. 280 pp. 24 halftones,
notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8263-2821-0, $21.95 paper, ISBN
0-8263-2822-9. )
Riches for All: The California Gold Rush and the World. Edited by Kenneth
N. Owens. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. xii + 367 pp. Halftones, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $55.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8032-8617-1,
$27.95 paper,

ISBN

0-8032-3570-4.)

The development of New Western History, with its attentiveness to race,
class, gender, and environmental concerns, has caused many historians to
regard the well-studied events of the California gold rush from a fresh perspective. The new work generated by this shift in the field and also by the
recent celebration of the gold rush sesquicentennial has inspired the publication of numerous books. Among them are Gold Rush Capitalists by Mark
A. Eifler and Riches for All, a collection of essays edited by Kenneth N.
Owens. These books offer new and exciting perspectives as they reexamine
the familiar terrain of gold rush history.
Eifler examines the gold rush's impact on the development of Sacramento. The book historicizes the growth of Sacramento, a town whose his-
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tory, like that of the gold rush, has been susceptible to teleological narratives.
Eifler points out that Sacramento did not develop because of its natural advantages, but rather despite formidable problems; the city rose from the river's
floodplain through the actions ofleaders whose vision ofthe future was backed
by a good deal of power and luck. The story of Sacramento begins with John
Sutter, whom Eifler notes has incorrectly been credited with the birth of a
city that he actually lobbied against. The author argues that the course of
Sacramento history is closely intertwined with the struggle between miners
and local merchants over competing visions of the city's future, a fight that
would culminate in the Sacramento Squatters' Riot of 1850.
More than its

~xuberant

title suggests, Riches for All offers a nuanced

view of the gold rush and examines its impact on various groups of people
and its local and global legacies. This volume of essays edited by Kenneth
N. Owens brings together some of the best new scholarship from both veteran historians of the gold rush, and up-and-coming scholars in the field.
Absent here are stock narratives of the gold rush as a glorious, rough and
tumble event, stripped of any social and historical context or consequences.
The carefully researched essays build upon the insights of the New Western
History and shed new light on the gold rush as a "world event" (p. x).
Malcolm J. Rohrbough, Martin Ridge, Shirley Ann Wilson Moore, Susan
L. Johnson, Elizabeth Jameson, Albert L. Hurtado, and Michael J. Gonzalez
are among the dozen contributors to this volume. In an essay entitled "'We
Will Make Our Fortunes-No Doubt of It': The Worldwide Rush to California," Rohrbough describes how the news of California gold "spread outward in ever-widening concentric circles" across the globe, leaving in its
wake not only massive migrations to California, but also an increase in
commercial production as food and other goods were needed in the gold
country (p. 55). The essay also outlines the experiences of key groups of
immigrants to California including the French, Sonorans, Chileans, Chinese, and others.
Shirley Ann Wilson Moore's article, "'Do You Think I'll Lug Trunks?':
African Americans in Gold Rush California," illuminates the complex position of African Americans in a world where their social and legal status visa-vis the dominant White society was highly contested. Yet, as the author
points out, African Americans were often perceived by indigenous people
to be part of the oppressor group-and African Americans sometimes
acted the part, participating in bloody raids on Indian villages and in
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other atrocities. The article provides a good introduction to a range of issues
confronting gold rush-era African Americans - from the effect of gold fever
on communities to the influence of successful African American migrants
on struggles against slavery.
In "'My Brother's Keeper': Mexicans and the Hunt for Prosperity in California, 1848-2000," Michael 1. Gonzalez notes similarities in the rhetoric
employed by modern-day xenophobes and gold rush-era Anglos, who warned
of a Mexican reconquest of California. The article explores Mexican resistance and accommodation in Anglo-dominated, gold rush California, and
touches upon the ideological underpinnings of racist responses to Mexicans.
Owens's introduction, consisting of a detailed historiography of the gold
rush, may be of more interest to historians than undergraduate students, but
it still provides useful background on how historians have approached the
topic. Perhaps with the classroom in mind, Owens devotes the final section
of the introduction to a review of what he calls "California Gold Rush Fundamentals," presenting a basic narrative of the history. While the introductory chapter offers little synthesis on the gold rush, the essays in the collection
are so well chosen and nicely arranged that the book can stand on its own as
assigned course reading. The absence of a definitive statement on the "state
of gold rush history" seems appropriate here: Riches for All helps to unsettle
traditional narratives of the California gold rush, and it is fitting that the
book avoids enshrining a new master narrative of this key event in western
U.S. history.
Mary Coomes
California State University, Fresno

The Glory Days in Goldfield, Nevada. By Sally Zanjani. (Reno: University of
Nevada, 2002. xv + 141 pp. 183 halftones, map, bibliography, index. $31.95
cloth, ISBN 0-8784170-520-8.)
Goldfield, Nevada-magic words just after the turn of the centurylured thousands of fortune seekers into a god-forsaken desert environment.
Goldfield, and its contemporary, Tonopah, brought Nevada back into mining headlines and gave the state a reason for existence. They rejuvenated a
Nevada that had been suffering since the downfall of the Comstock silver
bonanza a generation before.
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Goldfield did not beckon long, but, like a roman candle on the Fourth of
July, its brilliance dazzled the multitudes. They came, worked, speculated,
schemed, played, and eventually left, but what a story between.
Well-known western and Nevada historian Sally Zanjani captures the
town and its era in words and photographs for her readers. She knows Goldfield as well as any person alive, a fact made abundantly clear in The Glory

Days in Goldfield, Nevada. The spirit, dash, heartache, and flavor of an age
long gone are recreated for readers. This book will serve as a wonderful
introduction into the excitement and times of the mining West for the general public. It should stir interest and encourage further reading adventures
backward through time.
For those who are interested in a more detailed account of Goldfield,
Zanjani has also written Goldfield: The Last Gold Rush on the Western Frontier (1992). This book is a nice complement to her recent monograph, The
Glory Days in Goldfield, Nevada.
The discovery of gold by Shoshone prospector Tom Fisherman around

19°0-19°1 dates the opening. It was not until 1903, however, that the site
created much interest. A tent camp emerged as prospectors scurried around
staking claims, most of which never paid a dime. The usual crowd followed,
including the omnipresent promoters who put Goldfield on the map. For
a while, Goldfield looked more promising than it actually was, until several rich mines developed, including the Mohawk and the Combination.
From that point on, the district beckoned everyone, and its heyday raced
into full swing.
The boom did not last, however. In 1907 a violent confrontation between
the miners' union and the owners marked the start of the decline. Wild
promotion, stock speculation, and declining ore values helped mar the
camp's and district's image, and soon Goldfield followed the path of its earlier contemporaries. By the late 1910S Goldfield became a shadow of its
former self.
A few people still live there, and occasionally another hopeful company
or individual explores the possibility of reopening the old mines. Nevertheless, to recapture the glory days, look to Zanjani's books.
Duane A. Smith

Fort Lewis College
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Moving from the Margins: A Chicana Voice on Public Policy. By Adela de la
Torre. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002. xi + 141 pp. Table, notes,
bibliography, index. $16,95 paper,

ISBN

0-8165-1991-9.)

This short collection of Los Angeles Times editorials by Adela de la Torre
promotes a more sustained dialogue aimed at bringing Latinos from the
political and economic margins to the mainstream of society. Written in the
mid-1990s from a consciously integrationist, middle-class perspective, the editorials focus on how public policy issues have impacted Latinos in California.
The anthology is organized topically into chapters dealing with immigration; bilingual and K-12 education; higher education; affirmative action;
health care; welfare reform and the underclass; and Latino participation in
Los Angeles electoral politics. Each chapter follows a similar format in which
Times reader commentaries precede editorials, concluding with a summary
written in 2001. In a final section, de la Torre summarizes and reflects on the
larger conversation occurring between readers and the editorial columns.
Her goal is to engage in dialogue with the general public, particularly
the majority White population, rather than Chicana and Chicano scholars.
The editorials address local Los Angeles and California politics including:
Propositions 187,2°9, and 227, and Latino-White relations, particularly Latino
movement from the margins into the mainstream. A characteristic policy
position supporting a legal guest-worker program for immigrants suggests
that employers and employees should negotiate wages and working conditions, while government agencies should mediate disputes and monitor unfair
labor practices. While overcoming the resistance of Latino advocates fearful of a replay of previous guest-worker programs, such programs are problematic for employers who prefer immigrant labor because of the lack of
legal protection that immigrants receive. Apart from this specific case, de la
Torre's concerns are more oriented toward the growth and integration of the
Latino economic and political middle class than the more profound challenge of empowering the poor and the underclass.
As de la Torre notes, constructing a dialogue between Whites and Latinos
became much more difficult in the early 1990S as dominant societal perceptions of Latinos took a turn for the worse, largely driven by the escalation in
Mexican immigration. Policies supported by both major parties increasingly
emphasized individual efforts as the key to success rather than structural
and societal policies aimed at integrating Latinos as a group. Group-oriented
policy initiatives, meanwhile, became increasingly racially oriented and
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exclusive and denied a relevant role in both major parties to Latinos, who
were increasingly willing to cross over into policy discussions. It reflected a
growing racial divide in the state in which policies were characterized more
by emotional furor than reasoned discussion.
As the reader reflects on the sharp shift in dominant racial perceptions
and policy concerns in the early twenty-first century, the discussions of the
mid-1990S appear distant and the focus on California increasingly provincial. Nevertheless the issues remain poorly unresolved and the need for
dialogue continues.
Dionicio Valdes
Michigan State University

Mexican-Origin People in the United States: A Topical History. By Oscar 1Martfnez. The Modern American West. (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press, 2001. xxvii + 244 pp. Maps, charts, tables, bibliography, index. $45.00
cloth, ISBN 0-8165-1179-9, $17.95 paper, 0-8165-2089-5.)
Mexicans are simultaneously the oldest settlers in the United States and
the nation's largest and most recent immigrant arrivals. Mexican men and
women shaped the regional landscape of the Southwest, were in turn shaped
by it, and in the process helped to define American perceptions of the region. Persons of Mexican descent are diverse and complex, and have a high
degree of racial, religious, and linguistic visibility. Mexicans continue to
fashion much of the social, cultural, political, and economic reality of the
Southwest and the West.
The field of Mexican American history emerged from the political and
social activism of the 1960s and has changed dramatically since the publication of Rudolfo Acuna's Occupied America (1972). The growth of academic
and popular interests in the field has produced a boom of scholarship on
the subject of Mexican American history in the past thirty years. MexicanOrigin People in the United States, one of the more recent additions to this
historical scholarship, is the work of Oscar 1- Martfnez, Regents Professor of
History at the University of Arizona, whose books have helped define the
field of Mexican American history.
Mexican-Origin People in the United States is a clearly written and wellaccomplished re-creation of Mexican American history. Martinez divides
his book into four parts, each consisting of two chapters for a total of eight
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finely crafted chapters. The book is organized chronologically and thematically as the author covers major topics in Mexican American history. Spanning both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the monograph
successfully contributes to a deeper understanding of the Mexican population of the United States through Martinez's careful topical presentations.
A vast literature now exists that explores the history of the Mexican American experience. Many of Martinez's insights are relevant to the key ideas
and questions that have characterized recent debate among historians in
this field. The author has achieved his goal of writing a history of the Mexican American people that is balanced, accurate, comprehensive, and readable. It is highly recommended and useful reading for professors and students.
The author's systematic analysis and clear style of writing have set the framework for future academic work.
Zaragosa Vargas
University of California, Santa Barbara

Incident at San Augustine Springs: A Hearing for Major Isaac Lynde. By Richard Wadsworth. Frontier Forts and People Series, no. 3 (Las Cruces, N.Mex.:
Yucca Tree Press, 2002. viii + 375 pp. Halftones, notes, bibliography, index.
$25.00 cloth,

ISBN

1-881325-56-3.)

Forgotten Fortress: Fort Millard Fillmore and Antebellum New Mexico, 18511862. By Richard Wadsworth. Frontier Forts and People Series, no. 4. (Las
Cruces, N.Mex.: Yucca Tree Press, 2002, vi + 410 pp. Halftones, appendixes,
notes, bibliography, index. $25.00 cloth,

ISBN

1-881325-57-1.)

With the possible exception of Robert Scott's Glory, Glory Glorieta: The
Gettysburg of the West, Richard Wadsworth's Incident at San Augustine
Springs has to be the worst book ever written on the Civil War in New
Mexico Territory. From the very beginning, the book suffers from a number
of glaring and fundamental flaws. First and foremost is Wadsworth's unfamiliarity with or unwillingness to utilize any of the recent scholarship on
the subject. Conspicuously missing is any mention or use of the superb
work of the late Martin H. Hall, detailing the fight between Maj. Isaac Lynde
and Col. John Robert Baylor at Mesilla prior to Lynde's surrender, or John
Wilson's superb work on the drunken Federal retreat from Fort Fillmore
and the surrender of the bulk of the 7th Infantry at St. Augustine Springs.
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Noticeably absent is any reference to George Wythe Baylor's short but accurate biography of his older brother, along with a number of other primary
sources.
Unfortunately, the book is flawed by other obtrusive problems. Foremost
is the annoying repetition of the fact that Lynde was never given a hearing
and was considered a traitor in the North. There are also a host of outlandish assertions that are not supported by the historical record. For example,
Wadsworth goes as far as to accuse Gen. Winfield Scott of treason by shifting Fort Bliss from the Department of New Mexico to the Department of
Texas. First of ali, there were few officers in the Federal Army, as the first
year of the Civil War would prove, as loyal as "Old Fuss and Feathers."
Moreover, such a move had long been contemplated and came years before the sectional crisis dragged the country into the bloody cauldron of
war. Outside Maj. Henry Hopkins Sibley contemplating marching his small
command from Fort Union south into Texas and his urging Col. William
Wing Loring to store war materials and supplies at Fort Bliss where they
could be seized by the Confederates, there is no evidence that large numbers of southern-born officers in the antebellum army in New Mexico plotted treason, as Wadsworth believes. In fact, many southern officers were
Unionist. There is also the assertion that Col. Edwin Vose Sumner established Fort Fillmore forty miles north of El Paso so the post would fall under
his New Mexico command. The post was established by Sumner to protect
the citizens of the Mesilla Valley from raiding Apaches, and it would have
been illogical to establish it elsewhere.
There are other conclusions that are certain to raise eyebrows. Although
the Bascom Affair was certainly a watershed in the history of Apache wars in
the Southwest, the incident did not adversely influence "all Indians west
of the Mississippi River." Nor did it begin "the period in American history
called the Indian wars" (pp. 90-91). It is doubtful the Lakota Sioux ever
heard of Lt. George Nicholas Bascom. To say that on Lynde's "shoulders
alone may have rested the death of hund~eds of thousands of young men
afterwards" demonstrates a lack of overall understanding of the war (p. 229).
C~nsidering the tumultuous events in the East at the time, the "incident"
did not grab headlines in either Richmond or Washington. There is also no
evidence that Lynde in his flight from Fort Fillmore was in the process of
using Baylor Canyon in crossing the Organ Mountains. Baylor Canyon was
steep, rough, and could not be traversed with wagons. Although Wadsworth
speculates that the name of the canyon may have originated when Baylor
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University completed research there (p. 258), it was, in fact, named shortly
after the war for Colonel Baylor who used it to position his small army in
front of Lynde's fleeing Federals.
There are also uncounted minor errors. Albert "Sydney" Johnston was
not killed at Shiloh in 1861; Albert Sidney Johnston died at Shiloh on 6
April 1862. Fort Buchanan and Fort Breckenridge were not located near the
New Mexico-Arizona border; they were much farther to the west.
In researching the history of Fort Fillmore, Wadsworth does utilize a
number of reliable primary and secondary sources. Forgotten Fortress, however, suffers from many of the same problems as Incident at San Augustine
Springs. It is poorly written, highly repetitious, and frequently digresses into
a series of mini-biographies of the officers who were stationed at the post.
Many of the lengthy quotes in the book, although interesting, are not really
relevant. Moreover, there are a number of glaring errors, many of which a
good copy editor could have corrected. One example is "Bascom" somehow evolving into "Bascomb" (pp. 92-94).
It is obvious that Wadsworth, a mathematician, physicist, and retired army
computer programmer, has produced two lengthy volumes that are a labor
of love. The first volume even contains a tear-out ballot with which readers
can judge Lynde's actions at St. Augustine Springs. Unfortunately, anyone
interested in the early months of the Civil War in New Mexico and the
history of Fort Fillmore will want to seek out more reliable sources.
Jerry Thompson
Texas A6M International University

Book Notes

Navaho Expedition: Journal of a Military Reconnaissance from Santa Fe,
New Mexico, to the Navaho Country, Made in 1849 by Lieutenant James H.
Simpson. Edited and annotated by Frank McNitt, foreword by Durwood
Ball. The American Exploration and Travel Series. (1964; reprint, Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2003. Ixxxviii + 296 pp. Halftones, appendixes, index. $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-8061-357°-0.)
Everyday America: Cultural Landscape Studies after J. B. Jackson. Edited by
Chris Wilson and Paul Groth. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
x + 385 pp. Halftones, line drawings, notes, index. $49.95 cloth, ISBN 0-52022961-4, $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-520-22960-6.)
Art and the Crisis of Marriage: Edward Hopper and Georgia O'Keeffe. By
Vivian Green Fryd. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. xvi + 278
pp. 14 color plates, 127 halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $4°.00 cloth,
ISBN 0-226-26654-0.)
The American Indian Mind in a Linear World: American Indian Studies and
Traditional Knowledge. By Donald L. Fixico. A Taylor and Francis Group
Imprint. (New York: Routledge, 2003. xvi + 207 pp. Halftones, notes, bibliography, index. $22.95 cloth, ISBN 0-415-94457-0.)
Indigenizing the Academy: Transforming Scholarship and Empowering Communities. Edited by Devon Abbott Mihesuah and Angela Cavender Wilson.
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003. xi + 245 pp. Appendix, index.
$5°.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8°32-3229-2, $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-8°32-8292-3.)
Captain John H. Rogers, Texas Ranger. By Paul N. Spellman. (Denton:
University of North Texas Press, 2003. xvii + 270 pp. 18 halftones, notes,
bibliography, index. $29.95 cloth, ISBN 1-57441-159-1.)
Bibliophiling Tejano Scholarship: Secondary Sources on Hispanic Texans.
Center for Big Bend Studies Occasional Papers, no. 8. (Alpine, Tex.: SuI
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Ross State University, Center for Big Bend Studies, 2003. xiv + 471 pp. Halftones, bibliography, index. $25.00 paper, ISBN 0-9707709-l-X.)

Creative Collectives: Chicana Painters Working in Community. By Marfa
Ochoa, foreword by Amalia Mesa-Bains. (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2003. xvii + 139 pp. 24 color plates, bibliography, index. $45.00
cloth, ISBN 0-8263-2110-0.)

Dining at the Lineman's Shack. By John Weston. (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 2003. 210 pp. $36.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8165-2282-0, $17.95 paper,
ISBN 0-8165-2283-9.)
The Underground Heart: A Return to a Hidden Landscape. By Ray Gonzalez.
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002. x + 186 pp. $35.00 cloth, ISBN 08165-2°32-1, $17.95 paper, ISBN 0-8165-2°34-8.)
Wild Bill Hickok Gunfighter: An Account of Hickok's Gunfights. By Joseph
G. Rosa. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. 216 pp. Halftones,
line drawings, maps, bibliography, index. $17.95 paper, ISBN 0-8061-3535-2.)
Deadly Dozen: Twelve Forgotten Gunfighters of the Old West. By Robert K.
Arment. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003. 266 pp. Halftones,
notes, bibliography, index. $29.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3559-x.)

Why the West Was Wild: A Contemporary Look at the Antics of Some Highly
Publicized Kansas Cowtown Personalities. By Nyle H. Miller and Joseph W.
Snell, foreword by Joseph G. Rosa. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2003. xvi + 685 pp. 59 halftones, 4 line drawings, appendix, index. $125.00
cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3526-3, $19.95 paper, ISBN 0-8061-3530-1.)

The Guaymas Chronicles: La Mandadera. By David E. Stuart. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003. xiii + 394 pp. Halftones, maps.
$24.95 cloth, ISBN 0-8263-3188-2.)
Scenes of Visionary Enchantment: Reflections on Lewis and Clark. By Dayton Duncan. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. x + 198 pp. $22.94
cloth, ISBN 0-8°32-1724-2.)
Native American Flags. By Donald T. Healy and Peter J. Orenski, foreword
by Carl Waldman. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003. xxii + 325
pp. 192 color plates, 175 halftones, 175 maps, index. $29.95 paper, ISBN 0-

8061-355 6-5.)
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Icons ofLoss and Grace: Moments from the Natural World. By Susan Hanson,
illustrations by Melanie Fain. (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004.
xvii + 201 pp. Line drawings. $24-95 cloth, ISBN 0-89672-522-7.)
The Ornamental Hermit: People and Places of the New West. By Robert
Murray David. (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004. x + 197 pp.
$24.95 cloth, ISBN 0-89672-523-5.)
Blood ofthe Prophets: Brigham Young and the Massacre at Mountain Meadows. By Will Bagley. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002. xxiv +
493 pp. 36 halftones, maps, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. $26,95
cloth, ISBN 0-8061-3426-7, $24.95 paper, ISBN 0-8061-3639-1.)

News Notes

Archives, Exhibits, and Historic (Web) Sites

The Albuquerque Museum announces "Prelude to Spanish Modernism:
Fortuny to Picasso." The exhibit features Spanish paintings on the international art scene between 1860 and 1910, and runs through 27 November
2006. The museum is located at 2000 Mountain Road Northwest, Albuquerque. For more information, visit the museum website: www.cabq.gov/
museum/.
The Palace of the Governors, Museum of New Mexico, announces "Lasting Impressions." The exhibit features literary art from the arrival of the
state's first printing press in 1834 to the present. The exhibit opens 18 February 2005 and runs through 4 February 2007. The Palace of the Governors is
located at 105 West Palace Av~nue, Santa Fe. For more information, call
(505) 476-5100, or visit the museum website: www.museumofnewmexico.org.
Calendar of Events
10

October 2005: The Museum of New_Mexico hosts "Surviving Columbus

Day-Chautauqua Program." The program includes speakers who will address issues relating to Native sovereignty, self-determination, and cultural
survival. The event will be held from 2:00-+00 p.m. at the Fort Sumner
State Monument. For more information, call (505) 355-2573, or visit the
website: www.museumofnewmexico.org.

13-16 October 2005: The Western History Association announces its fortyfifth annual conference, "Western Traditions and Transitions: Cultural Diversity and Demographic Change." The conference will be held at the
Marriott Camelback Inn in Scottsdale, Arizona. For more information, visit
the website: www.unm.edu/~wha.
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15 October 2005: Deadline for submissions to the Southwestern Social Science Association. The annual conference will be held 12-15 April 2006 in
San Antonio, Texas, at the Sheraton Gunter and St. Anthony's Hotel. Panel
proposals or single papers in all fields are welcome. For submission information, contact Nupur Chaudhuri, Department of History, Geography and
Economics, Texas Southern University, 3100 Cleburne Road, Houston, TX
77004, (713) 313-7814 phone, email: nupurc@earthlink.net.

November 2005: Deadline for submissions to the Historical Society of New
Mexico 2006 Conference, 20-22 April 2006, held at the Albuquerque Old
Town Sheraton Hotel. For submission information, see the advertisement
in this journal or visit the website: www.hsnm.org.
1

November

Deadline for submissions to the Western Association of
Women Historians Annual Conference. Proposals for panels or single papers on any historical subject, time period, or region are welcome. Papers
do not necessarily have to focus on women or gender history, although those
issues are of special interest to our membership. Panels, workshops, or
roundtables on major concerns of women in the historical profession are
also encouraged. For submission information, contact the program chair,
Regina Lark, University of California Los Angeles, Center for the Study of
Women, 288 Kinsey Hall, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 900951504, (310) 206-5898 phone, email: rlark@women.ucla.edu.
1

2005:

15 November 2005: Deadline for submissions to the Southwestffexas Popular Culture Association and American Culture Association Conference,
"Atomic Culture in the Nuclear Age." The conference will be held at the
Hyatt Regency in Albuquerque, 8-11 February 2006. For submission information, visit the website: www.h-net.org/~swpca/.

30 November-4 December

The American Anthropological Association announces its 104th annual meeting, "Bringing the Past into the Present:
A Forum on the Ancient One and the Future of Anthropology." The meeting will be held at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C.
For more information, visit the website: www.aaanet.org/mtgs/mtgs.htm.
2005:

